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\ 



THE 



RUSSIANS 



AT THE 



GATES OF HERAT. 



By CHARLES MARVIN. 



if^ 



WITB MAPS AND POBTBAIXS. 



t MAY 13i88.< 



NEW YORK: 

GEORGE MUKRO, PUBLISHER, 

17 TO 27 Vandewater Street. 



y 



.^ 



LIST OF MAPS AND PORTRAITS. 



MAP OF THE RUSSO-AFGHAN REGION . . IVontispiece. 

PAGE. 

GENERAL KOUROPATKIN . . . . . .11 

LIEUTENANT ALIKHANOFF . .... 27 

GENERAL ALEXANDER KOMAROFF / . . . 37 

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR PETER STARK LUMSDEN, K.C.B., C.S.L. 43 
MAP SHOWING THE DISPUTED TERRITORIES . , .53 

GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, V.C., K.C.B. ... 83 

LORD DUFFERIN 103 



PREFACE. 



In vaj " Russian Advance Towards India," published in 1882, I 
made these remarks: " In my writings on Russia 1 try to be impar- 
tial. 1 know 1 have a greater love for Russia, the country of my 
youth, and a better appreciation of the Russian people, than the so- 
called Rus«>ophile ' traders in politics, who lauded her indiscrimi- 
nately in 1877, froai motives of self or party interest, and abandoned 
her afterward to false attacks: and the public know, from my writ-, 
ings, that 1 am a vigilant and anxious observer of the Russian ad- 
vance toward India. I am thus, 1 suppose, both a Russophile and 
a Russopliobe. As for my local opinions, my youth was passed in 
a country which has no political parties corresponding with our 
Liberal and Conservative tactions, and does not want them; while 
my studies have led me to survey politics from the standpoirt of 
one who considers himself more in the light oi a citizen of the 
English Empire — of that great empire that embraces the five em- 
pires of England, of Canada, of Australia, of South Africa, and of 
India — than merely a Liberal or Conservative Englishman of Lesser 
England only. Being, in this sense, an Imperialist, and a non-party 
writer,, i claim immunity from any charge of unduly favoring Lib- 
eral or Conservative policy in my remarks on the Central Asian 
Question. At the same time, I would have it with equal clearness 
understood, that the opinions expressed are not merely the heedless 
and ephemeral views of an irresponsible writer, but the deep con- 
viction of one who is conscious that they may some day be called 
■up against him, in other spheres than that of journalism and Litera- 
ture. " 

These remarks cover all that 1 need say by way of a preface to 
the present volume, except that the entire work having been writ- 
ten and got out in eight days, 1 may ask indulgence for any errors 
that maj have escaped my eye in the volume. 

CHARLES MARVIN. 

Grosvenor House, 

Plumstead Common, Kent, 
March 23d, 1885. 



THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 



mi AFTER 1. 

HOW ALIKHANOFF FIRST WENT TO MEE.V. 

The landing of the Russians at Krasnovodsk— Early Turcoman campaigns— 
Alikhanoff joins Lomakin's army as a private soldier — Acts as special cor- 
respondent of the Moscow (Sazetfe— Skobeleffs siege of Geok Tepe— Russia 
determines to secure a military survey of Merv — Alikhanoff proceeds to 
the oasis disguised as a trader— 'How he obtained plans of the fortress— Per- 
suades Makdum KuU, the principal Merv warrior, to attend the Czar's coro- 
nation at Moscow. 

There are two Russian movements in the direction of India. 
One originated at Orenburg, and had for its objective Cabul. 
Commencing belore the Uiimeau war it rapidly developed itself 
afterward, and ingulfed in succession the Kirghez tribes and the 
iihanates of Khokand, Bokhara, and Khiva. Practically speaking, 
this movement ceased shortly before the last Turkish war, and has 
not been continued since. The interest m Turkestan for the mo- 
ment, therefore, being purel.y historical, we may exclude tn account 
of the advance in the direction of Cabul from this volume. 

The second movement was from the Caspian, and had tor its ob- 
jective Herat. A deal of confusion and bad statesmanship has arisen 
from confounding this advance with that made from Oienburg and 
Tashkent. The troops, have been always different, the officials 
different, and conditions regulating the advance different. We have 
only to specify one popular error to show how essential it is that 
the public should clearly realize the difference between the two 
movements. For instance, it is often said that colossal mountain 
ranges bar the Russian advance to the Indian frontier. This is 
quite true as regards troops marchins: from Tashkent and Samar- 
cara upon Cabul and Peshawur, The lofty Hindoo Koosh, that, 
must be traversed to reach the Ameer's capital, ranges in heiaht 
from 15,000 to 20,000 feet. But there is nothing of the kind betweeri 
the Caspian and Herat, nor yet agtiin between Herat and the ludo- 
Afghan frontier. Setting out from Krasnovodsk, a Russian could 
drive a four-in-hand all the way to the Indian frontier near Quetta. 

If this fact be clearly borne in mind, the reader will readily 
understand how rapid the Russian ad"^ance has been since Sliobe- 
leff broke down the Turcoman barrier, and how essential it is that 
the disadvantage of there being no physical obstacle to a powerful 
military movement from the Caspian should not be enhanced by 
allowing Russia to secure the great midway camping ground of 
Herat. 

In the time of Peter the Great, and again in the reign of Il^licho- 



8 THE EUSSIAIs^S AT THE GATES OF HEKAT. 

las, Russia seized points on the East iCaspian Coast, but tlie so- 
called Caspian advance toward India did not definitely commence 
until a descent was made upon Krasnovodsk in 3869. Intheau- 
tunm of that year a flotilla left the Caucasus port of Petrovsk, and 
landed on the opposite side of the Caspian a few Cossacks and in- 
fantrymen, 'and half a dozen guns. Attached to this expedition 
were three men who subsequently figured prominently in Central 
Asian history. One was Stolietotf, the envoy Russia sent to Cabul 
in 1878; the second GrodekoS, who made a famous ride to Herut in 
(he same year, and the third Captain Skobelefi, then a harum-scarum 
subaltern. 

" We made a great mistake when we. landed at Krasnovodsk," 
said the latter to me, shortly before his death. " Insteaa of going 
ahead we dawdled about, reconnoitering the country. A strong for- 
ward movement was not approved of by the Government. The re- 
sult was, we gradually taught the Turcomans how to fight, and at 
last they fought so well that it needed a series of great campaigns 
to crush them." 

Our space is too limited to describe in detail those reconnoiterings 
and skirmishes which, during the period from 1869 to 1878, con- 
verted the I'ekke Turcoman from an undisciplined horseman into a 
skillful builder of big redoubts. No headway whatever was made 
after Skobeleft left in 1873 to join the expedition to Khiva, and a 
long series ot reverses culminated in a crushing defeat and rout of 
the Russians at Geok Tepe in the autumn of 1879. 

This was the campaign in which two notable, personages partici- 
pated — Mr. Edmund O'Donovan, and Private Alikhanoff. The 
former was attached to General Lazareff's force, and spent the 
whole of the summer in the Caspian. Unluckily he fell ill when the 
advance took place, and was thus debarred from seeing anything of 
the fighting. What we know of the campaign is mainly derived 
from the letters of a few Russians attached to the force. The 
best appeared in the columns of the Moscmo Gazette, and were 
signed " Arsky." The writer was Alikhanoff, the present Governor 
ot Merv.* 

This AlikhanoEE is a very remarkable man. He was born at Bal?;u, 
and by birth is a Daghestani. Russia's Asiatic subjects have a 
happy way of identifying themselves with their masters, which our 
language renders impossible in the case of India — they turn their 
names into Russian ones, by placing an " o3 " (son) at the end of 
them', Alikhanoff is simply Ali Khan, with an " oft " added to it. 
When Sir Peter Lumsden proceeded to the xlfghan frontier, he took 
wi^h him from London a very accomplished Indian oflBcial as inter- 
preter, also, curiously enough, one "Ali Khan." But England 
had failed to effect such a transformation in her Ali Khan as Russia 
has with hers. J saw him depart from Charing Cross. He was 
highly educated and thorouy,'hly devoted to England; but he had 
never thought of identifying himself with us by changing his name 
from Ali Ehan into Mr.' Alikhanson, or, better still, Mr. A^lison. 

The case is totally different in Russians Asiatic provinces. The peo- 

* See " Ttie Disastrous Russian Campaign against the Turcomans." London: 
W. H. AUen&Co.,1880. 



THE KUSSIA^i^rS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 9 

pie not only identify themselves with tine Russians, bui the Russians 
identify themselves witn the people Englishmen would never think 
of, placino^ their home army under a' Sikh or a Mahralta, or per- 
mitting a Bengali to become a Cabinet Minister. An Indian lias 
practically no career in England. On the other hand, every avenue 
in Russia is open to tlie Caucasian. The Armenian, Louis Melikoff, 
rises there to a position next to that of the Czar. Generals Ter- 
goukasoff and LazarefC, two other Asiatics, commanded Russian 
troops in the Turliish war of 1877-78, and when AlikhanofT accom- 
mished his famous raid upon Meiv, the exploit is extolled aa a 
Russian exploit, and not as the achievement of a mere native. 

Alikhanofi received a good education, and developed a remarka- 
ble talent for drawing. Skilltul with pen and pencil, had he lived 
in England he would have doubtless become one of the foiemost 
correspondents of the day. At an early age he entered the army, 
and atter serving in the Khivan expedition as a captain of the cav- 
alry under Skobeieff, received the appointment of aide-de-camp to 
the Grand Duke Michael, Viceroy of the Caucasus. At the close of 
the Turkish war he suddenly fell into disgrace. A quarrel occurred 
between him and a superior officer, and he challenged him to tight a 
duel. The true particulars of this affair have never publicly trans- 
pired. Some say Alikhanoff was a boisterous officer, given to in- 
sulting people when in his cups, others that his superior officer was 
a scamp, hated by everybody in the regiment. Whichever story 
was current, Alikhanoff was tried by court-martial, deprived of all 
his appointments. and decorations, and reduced to the condition of a 
common soldier. 

" You need to measure soldiers by a different standard from that 
which you apply to civilians," said bkobeleft to the writer in 1882. 
" 1 have had much experience in warfare, and have found that the 
men who fight best are pi^ecisely those who are apt to be trouble- 
some in time of peace. A government should be always very indul- 
gent to its troops in time of peace. Those who are most difficult to 
deal with in time of peace often prove to be the best fighters in time 
of war." 

Skobeleff's remarks referred to General Valentine Baker, whom 
he characterized as our " one good general." We were discussing 
the different modes of treating officers in disgrace adopted by Eng- 
land and Russia. In England we dismiss an officer who has made 
a false step from the arruy, and, however good a man he may be 
professionally, he is practically lost to the country. In Russia, on 
the other hand, he is simply reduced to the ranks, stripped of his 
titles, and sent to some fr6ntiei district in Asia to serve as a private 
soldier. Such a man naturally becomes a desperado, and forms cap- 
ital material for leaders of the stamp of Alikhanoff. In many cases 
they retrieve their reputation, and it is the custom, if they display 
extraordinary courage, or render any particular service, to restore 
them at a stroke to their former posi-tion. This was done in the casti 
of Alikhanoff, when he successfully accomplished his swoop upon 
Merv. It is obvious that the presence of such inflammable materi 
als on the Russian frontier is even far more dangerous to peace than, 
the predatory characteristics of the Afghan tribes Russian diplomats 
make so much fuss about. 



10 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

Alikiianoff fell into disgrace about the time General Lomakin re- 
turneil to the Caspian from an unsuccessful attack upon the Tekke 
strongholds in Akhal. He at once elected to. be sent to Tchikishlar 
to join the expedition General Lnzarefil was prepuring to lead against 
the tribesmen. There he met O'Donovan, and one ot the last letters 
that lamented correspondent wrote to me before proceeding to the 
Soudan contained a request that 1 should give his hearty wishes to 
Alikhanoff it I met him during my journey in the Caspian. Re 
saiQ Aiikhanofl was a " capital fellow, a brave and capable soldier, 
and much liked in the camp." 

During this campaign Alikhanoff attained the highest rank as a 
non-commissioned officer. When Skobeleft arrived the following 
year to retrieve the broken fortunes of the Lazarelf-Lomakin ex- 
pedition, he was accorded every opportunity of distinguishing him- 
self. However, attached to the force were so many heroes, as dash- 
ing as himself, that his exploits were lost amoEg the crowd of great 
achievements. 

The history of Skobelefl's siege of Geok Tepe yet remains to be 
written. O'Donovan saw nothing of it, except the final rout, 
through a telescope from a hill on the Perso- Turcoman frontier. 
Hence he left it undescribed in his book on JVIerv. None the less, it 
was a campaign full of exciting incident, and a clear account of it 
would be very popular in this country. 

Retreating from their line of settlements, stretching alone: the 
Akhal frontier, from Kizil Arvat to Geok Tepe, the Tekkeg collect- 
ed to the number of 40,000 families at the latter plate, and forming 
a camp, with tents pitched closely one against the other, built round 
it a huge clay wall, reminding the Russians of an immense railway 
embankment. The defense was mainly controlled by two chiefs, 
Mahdum Kuli Khan and Tekme Sardar. The latter had submitted 
to Russia the year before, but being badly treated by Lomakin, had 
lied the camp and joined his countrymen afresh. There he in- 
structed in the art of building rapidly large earthworks, after the 
manner he had observed practiced by the Russians during their ad- 
vance. 

The expedition the previous 3'ear had been dispatched up the 
Atrek River, from its mouth at Tchikishlar. Skobeleft changed 
the base to Krasnovodsk, or more properly to Port-Mechaelovsk, a 
small harbor on the south-east side of Krasnovodsk, and considera- 
bly nearer Akhal. It is from this point that the railway now runs 
in the direction of India. 

At that time the Turcoman barrier was considered so difficult to 
break down that Russia was readj'" to resort to extraordinary ellorts 
to hasten the submission of the tribes. During the debates on Can- 
dahar, Lord Salisbury said that he had always believed that the 
Turcoman barrier would last his life-lime. Even in Russia, so severe 
was the resistance apprehended, that General Tergoukasoff, Skobe- 
leff's predecessor, did not think that the barrier could be broken 
with less than three years' hard fighting. To quicken matters, Rus- 
sia therefore selected Skobelell for the task, and very wisely gave 
him carte hlandw as to the resources he was to employ to accom- 
plish it. 

Stowed away in the magazines at Bender, on the south-west fron- 



THE KUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 



11 



.tier, were one hundred miles ot railway, which Russia had pur- 
chased to use iu the Balkan campaign, in the event of a failure of 
the Berlin Conjq:ress. At Skobeleft's request, the material was 
shifted to the Caspian, and laid down in the direction of Geok 
Tepe. In this casual manner originated the Russian railway to In- 
dia, which has eftected so many changes in Central Asia, and prom- 




GENERAL KOUROPATKIN". 



ises to completely revolutionize the relations of England and Russia 
with the region. 

The railway, however, proved of very little service in the actual 
campaign, and we must, therefore,- reserve an account of it for a 
future chapter. While it was being built Skobeleff pushed on a 
force to Bami, the first stronghold of any size in the Akhal oasis, 
and there gradually accumulated the munitions of war and food sup- 
plies esseatial for the siege. When everything was ready he ad- 



12 THE RUSSIA XS AT THE GATES OE HERAT. 

viinced to Geok Tepe, and, seizing a foitified point close to the walls, 
commenced attack upon -the fortress. 

The Tekke stronghold was fully as diflicult to take as the Rus- 
sians had expected. Their artillery made no impression with the 
huge clay rampart; they had to resort to every form of siege opera- 
tions to reduce the fortress The conflict lasted nearly a month, 
during which the Russians suffered heavy losses, and experienced 
severe privations. Step by step, liowever, SkobelefE pushed his way 
until he got close enough to sink a mine, which was Cfirried to the 
foot of the rampart. At the same time, his 69 guns fired daily from 
100 to 500 shots into the place, and tne expenditure of ammunition 
by the infantry ranged from 10,000 to 70,000 rounds a day. 

The brunt of the attack fell upon General Kouropalkin, com- 
manding the Turkestan Contingent. AS this officer is spoken of 
as likely to command the Russian arms, in the event of a conflict at 
the gates of Herat, it may be well to take advantage of the oppor- 
tunity to say a few words about him. 

Among rising Russian generals, there is probably no one more ad- 
mired by the army than Kouropatkin, He was SKobelefli's right- 
hand man in most of his campaigns. He served with him in the 
Khivan expedition, and in the Khokandese campaign. Be acted as 
chief of his staff at Plevna, and during the march upon Constanti- 
nople, and he exercised immediate control, under Skobeleft, of the 
forces before Geok Tepe. 

■ When Skobeleff was appointed to the charge of the army against 
the Turcomans, one of his first acts was to telegraph to Kouropat- 
kin, then in the Kuldja frontier, to join him with a coDtingent of 
Turkestan troops. His march across Central Asia excited univer 
sal admiration at the time. After being weeks on the road, proceed- 
ing from Tashkent to Khiva, Kouropatkin had to accomplish a diffi- 
cult march across the deset't, by a route almost unknown, to the 
concentrating point of Bami. General Annenkofi was at Bami at 
the lime and went out to meet him. " Kouropatkin," he said to 
me. in dilating enthusiastically un this achievement — " Kouropatkin 
had been twenty-six days marching over a sandy and waterless des- 
ert: yet his force marched in clean and trim, and as fresh as a daisy. " 

When, at the invitation of Skobeleff's friends, I accompanied the 
funeral party, conveying the body of that great hero from Moscow 
to its last resting-place at Spasskoe Selo, in South Russia, in 1882, 1 
was thrown for several days among Skobelefit's favorite officers; and 
more than once 1 heard a controversy among them as to whether 
Kouropatkin was not almost as good a leader as their lost general, 
" Kouropatkin," said a Turkestan officer to me during one of these 
discussions, "possesses ail the characteristics of Skobeleft, cast in a 
cooler mold. They worked admirably together, Kouropatkin im- 
parting coolness and calculation to Skobeleff, and Skobeleff fire and 
enthusiasm to Kouropatkin. 1 am quite desolate now that Skobe- 
leff is gone " — here his eyes filled tvith tears—" but it is a consola- 
tion to all of us that we have still got Kouropatkin. He is now the 
Rkobelefi: of Russia." 

During the first few days succeeding Skobeleff's death a strong 
and angry feeling prevailed in Russia against the. Government. It 
was felt that the deceased hero's merits had never been properly ap- 



THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 13 

pieciated by the State, and 1 encountered various officers a1 Moscow 
who were persuaded he had been poisoned. To appease the army 
the Emperor felt he could not do belter thari summon Kouropatkin 
from Central Asia and give him a high appointment at home. Since 
then he has been treaied as a favorite at Court, and if he has secured 
no notoriety abroad, it is simply because he has always devoted him-' 
self to his profession and left politics alone. Skobeleff had in him 
all the elements of a great statesman as well as of a great general. 
His political influence was becoming positively embarrassing to the 
Czar's ministers when be died. Kouropatkin has never sought to 
form a party in Russia— he is quite content to be a great general, 
and nothing more. 

During the siege ot Geok Tepehe had charge of the advanced po- 
sitions iiud displayed extraordinary coolness and courage. Unobliu- 
sive almost to a fault, he carefully supervised the mechanical parts 
of the siege operations, while Skobelefl" applied himself to keeping 
th troops in that rollicking, reckless mood he considered so valuable 
in the presence of the enemy. Seated at the mouth of the mine, 
Skobeleff used to time the progress of the sappers underground tun- 
neling in the direction of the fortress. It the officer in charge ac- 
complished the specified portion in less than the time fixed, he was 
kissed and caressed, and perhaps treated to champagne or vodky; if 
the reverse was the case, he was roundly abused before all the sol- 
diers. 

Throughout the greater part of the siege Alikhanoii, who was 
now a cornet of the Pereslaff Dragoons, was employed in foraging 
operations, or reconnoitering that portion ot the fortress facing the 
desert, which was uninvested by the Russians. 

At length the day of the assault arrived. More than a ton of gun- 
powder was laid at the head of the mine, immediately under the 
rampart, and, on being fired,, laid bare a broad entrance into the 
enemy's defenses. Through this, and another breach made by tbe 
artillery, the Russians rushed into the pUce, and perpetrated all the 
horrors usual when orders are given to infuriated and semi-barba- 
rous troops to give no quarter to either sex. 

Even when the Turcomans, no longer offering resistance, streamed 
out in a disorderly mob across the desert in the direction of Merv, 
men, women, and children mingled together, no mercy was shown 
to them. Artillery followed- in their rear, and mowed them down, 
until darkness put an end to the pursuit. During that short few 
hours' chase the 1,000 pursuing Russians slaughtered 8,000 of the 
fugitiv^es. Hundreds of women were saved: 6,500 bodies were also 
afterward found under the fortress. At Kertch the year before last 
1 met an Armenian Jew, Samuel uourovitch, who had accom- 
panied as interpreter a secret Russian mission to Cabul in 1882, and 
was present at the sacK of Geok Tepe. He told me that the carnage 
was fearful. 

" One thousand Russians cut down 8,000 Turcomans in a few 
hours. The whole country was covered with corpses. The morn- 
ing after the battle they lay in rows, like freshly mown hay, as they 
had been swept down by the mitrailleurs and artillery. I myself 
saw babies bayoneted or slashed to pieces. Many women were rav- 
ished before being killed." 



14 THE RUSSIAN'S AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

" But Skobelefi: told me that not a woman had been dishonored.'* 

"" Lots were," he replied, energetically. " They were ravished by 
the soldiers before my eyes. SkobelefE may not have known it. I 
could tell you many horrible things that took place; but " (lappioghis 
lips significantly) " it is better to be silent in this world. The plunder 
at Geok Tepe was immense. The troops were allowed to get drunk, 
plunder, and kill for three days after the assault." 

During the assault, and in the subsequent pursuit, the infantry 
engaged fired 373,804 rounds, the cavalry 12,510, and the artillery 
5,864 rounds; 224 military rockets were also expended. The total 
loss of the Turcomans during the siesre was estimated by Skobeleff 
at 20,000. In other words half the defenders perished. 

The two leaders, Tekme Sardar and Makdum Kuli, escaped, and 
fled to Merv. Pusuing on their rear, Skobeleff occupied Askabad, 
Ihe capital of the Akhal TeKkes, twenty-seven miles east of Geok 
Tepe, and dispatched Kouropatkia thence almost half way to the 
Merv oasis. It was these reconnoiterings of Kouropatkin that occa- 
sioned so much e:scitement at the lime. The belief was general that 
Skobeleff would occupy Merv. 

It is almost unnecessary to state that he did not; but it is well to 
disperse any doubts that may exist as to the reason he did not push 
OQ any further. It is generally supposed that a disinclination to 
displease England, and a desire to keep his promises, caused the 
Emperor to restrain the ardor of Skobeleff. Tliis is a !nistake. By 
the terrific blow he struck the Akhal Tekkes at Geok Tepe, Skobe- 
leff shattered to pieces the Turcoman barrier Lord Salisbury had 
fondly believed would last his life-time; but he was too mauled to 
reap the full advantage of it for the moment. He only had a strik- 
ing force of 2,000 men after he occupied Askabad, and having used 
up nearly all his ammunition during the siege, he was not in a con- 
dition to push on to an unknown oasis, and expose himself to a rep- 
etition of the hard knocks he had received at Geok Tepe. 

So he returned home; but before he left Akhal an incident oc- 
curred which shows what a deep personal interest he took in the 
Central Asian Question. In spite of Russia's avowed intention of 
keeping the country she had won, and notwithstanding that the 
Turcoman barrier had been shattered, the English Government de- 
cided to evacuate Afghanistan. The ablest English writers on the 
Russo-Indian Question were averse to surrendering Candahar, but 
the Government persisted in its policy* and it received the warmest 
concurrence of the Marquis of Ripon. 

Speaking at Leeds, on January 28, 1885, the ex-Viceroy said; 
" We withdrew at a time which suited our purpose, and which we 
believed to be to the advantage of the Afghan people; and as our 
troops marched away with steady steps from Candahar, no voice 
was lifted against us, and no dog barked at our heels." 

Yet, as a matter of fact, a voice was lifted against us, and poi- 
soned the motives of our departure. That voice was Skobeleff's. 
In an official account of Skobeleff's campaign, General Grodekoff, 
the chief of his staff at Geok Tepe, has just published, the follow- 
ing passage occurs: " To raise RxissW s presiige in Central Asia and 
to depress that of England, General Skobeleff sent native agents into 
the bazaars of Central Asia to spread throughout the region the re- 



THE RUSSIAiTS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 15 

port that it was the White Czar who had compelled England to 
evacuate Afghanistan." 

Such a revelation can not be very pleasing to those who held at 
the time that we were conciliating Russia by evacuating Candahar. 
As a matter ot fact, our retirement encouraged the Russians to ad- 
vance. They tnought we had had enough of Afghanistan and 
would never enter the country any more. In an official Russian 
account of the war which I have in my possession, and which is to 
be found in every military library in Russia, the writer, General 
Skobeleft, asserts that we retired because we were so repeatedly de- 
feated by the Afghans that the people of India were excited to a 
mutinous condition by our disasters. If our army had not fallen 
back in time the whole of India would have risen against us! 

It is the publication of such works as Skobeleff's " Anglo- Aighau 
Conflict " and Skobeleft's plans for invading India that has stimu- 
lated so strongly the desire of Russian military men to upset our 
Eastern India. 

Just before the evacuation of Candahar took place, a clever cari- 
cature was published in Russia entitled " England and Russia in 
Central Asia." This represented two feet: one, English shod, step- 
ping off a piece of ground marked *' Afghanistan," and another, 
incased in a big Russian boot, advancing closely upon it, with the 
evident intention of administering a kick to the retiring party. I 
had several thousand copies of this caricature struck off, and dis- 
tributed them to Parliament and Press during the Candahar debate; 
but I did not imagine at the time — nor yet, 1 suppose, did anybody 
—that tne Russian artist had so correctly represented in a skeich 
meant to be humorous what Skobeleff had actually done. 

The brilliant and dashing general having administered a parting 
kick at us, returned home, and Russia proceeded to organize her 
new possession, in the meanwhile O'Donovan made his famous 
dash to Merv, and during his five months' stay jv^rote those won- 
derful letters which will never perish so long as any record exists 
of British travel. 

But Mr. O'Donovan did more than simply pen letters to the 
"Daily News." He endeavored to persuade the Turcomans to 
cease their attacks upon the Russians and avoid giving them any 
offense. These efforts were to a large extent successful, and from 
the time he left the oasis until the Russians occupied it the only 
outrage the Merv Tekkes perpetrated was the attack on the Par- 
fenoff surveying party in 1882. This outrage, however, was due 
to some bad characters, and was so quickly and promptly dis- 
avowed by the tribe that the Russians expressed themselves per- 
fectly satisfied with the reparation made by the Mervis. 

After O'Donovan had left the oasis, the Russian authorities de- 
cided they would thoroughly establish their influence there. Tekme 
Sardar, one of the two Tekke chiesfs defending Geok Tepe, had 
already surrendered to them, and had been sent to St. Petersburg 
to be tamed by a sight of Russia. The second, Makdum Kuli, 
O'Donovan's friend, they tried to win over through their secret 
agents, but failed. 

One of these secret agents was Fazil Beg, a Russianized Khivan. 
He used to go backward and forward between Merv and Askabad 



16 THE RUSSIAJSrS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

and encouraged all the Tekkes he could to visit the latter place to 
traffic at the bazaar the Russians had erected. 

The Russians are well aware of the value of a bazaar as a means 
ot exercising influence in the East. Directly they finished their 
lort at Askabad, they erected a bazaar there, and encouraged 
Armenians from Baku and Tiflis to establish shops in it. Before 
long tne Tekkes ot Merv, atti acted by the high prices the Russians 
gave for their supplies, began to appear at Askabad, first, singly, 
and somewhat shy, afterward in bands, when they found they were 
well treated. 

In course of time the richer and more influential of the Mervis fol- 
lowed suit. As all arrivals at ihe bazaar were notified to the Rus- 
sian authorities at once, they extended a warm hand to every Tekke 
who possessed any influence whatever at home, and in this manner 
created a pro-Russian party at Merv. 

Herat is about as close to Merv as Merv is to Askabad. It is 
well to bear in mind that the moment the Russians occupied Merv 
they established a bazaar there with Armenian traders from Baku, 
and commenced applying to the tribesmen of the Murghab those 
tactics so successful at the capital of the Akhal Tekkes. But for 
the opportune arrival of Sir PelerLumsden last autumn there might 
have already been a pro-Russian party at Herat. 

As soon as events had sufficiently matured, the authorities at 
Askabad decided to send an officer to Merv to obtain secretly a 
military survey of the oasis. Alikhauoff was the person chosen. 
To facilitate his operations a caravan was fitted out, commanded by 
an Armenian trader named Kosikh, representing in Central Asia 
the Moscow firm of Konshin and Co. Kosiiih was already known 
at Merv to many Tekkes who had transacted business with him in 
the Askabad bazaar. 

Alikhanoff played the part of clerk to Kosikh the trader, and 
also acted as interpreter. It was a ^reat advantage to him in his 
expedition that he spoke the language of the Turcomans quite flu- 
ently. To assist him in his survey a cornet of the Cossacks, S(»ko- 
loff, was appointed, and was also disguised as a caravan clerk. 

To prevent any possibility ot a failure of the enterprise, the Rus- 
sians decided that they would not ask the permission of the Merv 
Tekkes to visit them, but would pounce upon them unawares. 
Alikhanofl:, England knows to her cost, is an expert in efi'ectins: sur- 
prises, and his audacity was never better displayed than in his cara- 
van journe}' to Merv. 

Quitting Askabad early in February, 1888, the caravan, consist- 
ing of a few camels escorted by half a dozen well-armed Turcoman 
horsemen, set out for Merv ?j24 Kahka and the Tejend oasis. The 
distance by this route is about 230 miles, and is divided into six 
marches. The distance from Merv to Herat is 240 miles. 

Fazil Beg, the spy, went on to Merv beforehand to secure some 
guides for the expeditiou., and arrange with the pro-Russian party 
for tne protection ot the traders as far as he could. During the 
journey Alikhanofl: made a thorough survey of the countiy, explor- 
ing parts unvisited by Mr. O 'Donovan, and, entering Merv at night, 
encamped in the midst of the Tekkes, without anyb^bdy being aware 
of it except the chiefs in Russian pay. 



THE EUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 17 

The next morning, ot course, there was a great hubbub at Merv. 
The people were not quite so stao;gered as when Mr. O 'Donovan 
put in his sudden appearance among them, tor many had become 
acquainted with the Russians in the interval; but they were more 
angry, and had not Alikhanoil possessed influential supporters 
among the chiefs, things would have fared badly with the caravan. 
At the least, they would have been expelled at once from the oasis. 

As usual, a meeting of the khans and elders was convened the 
moment the presence of the Russians became known, and the latter 
•were summoned to appear before it. The meeting took place in a 
large Icelrtka or tent, to reach which the Russians had to pass 
through an "immense" crowd of sightseers. "Entering the 
kelrtka," says Alikhanoft, " Kosikh, extending to every one his 
hands, which were shaken verj'' unwillingly, sat down, as befits a 
lich Russian merchant, side by side with Mahdum Kuli, 1, as'inter- 
preter, sat on a felt at the entrance. The silence continued. Wait- 
ing some time for some one to speak, 1 decided to break it myself, 
1 therefore commenced with something like the following ha- 
rangue: 

" * From the letters you have received, you doubtless know the 
aim of our journey, M)^ master, Severin Beg, is a rich Russian 
meichant. He enjoys the greatest respect of our authorities, and 
hence they instructed him to give their salaam to the people of 
Merv. Deciding to establish commercial intercourse with you, 
Severin Beg has come here to find out, on the spot, whether he can 
buy and sell in your markets. The Russian Government fully sym- 
pathizes with this action, since it anticipates from it mutualad- 
vantages^ so desirable for the friendly and peaceful relations of 
neighbors. Thus, tlie sole object of our journey here is trade, anct 
we should like to know what your views are upon the point, and 
how you mean to regard it." 

Another prolonged silence, broken at last by an old man, who 
said: 

" ' Commerce is a good thing, but we fear to draw upon us the 
responsibility which will arise if any attack is made upon you by 
those bad men who exist among us, as everywhere. Go back to 
Askabad to negotiate with our delegates." Fix our relations, and 
when both people are united, trade as much as you like,' etc., of ati 
equally evasive character. 

" ' 1 tell you we are traders,' I rejoined; ' it is not our affair to 
join or disunite peoples. For that, apply to the Russian Govern- 
ment, send it your envoys if you like. As regards us, there is noth- 
ing undetermined in our relations. The Russians are at peace with 
you. The Askabad bazaar is tilled with traders from Merv. We 
did not see, therefore, any reason why we should not come here, 
and hence resolved to come. Give us a decided answer. Will you 
let us unpack and commence trade, or do you demand our return? 
But mind, 1 warn you beforehand that your action will be viewed 
in its proper light by General Rohrberg, if you close to Russians 
alone that route which is freely made use of by the rest of our neigh- 
bors, Bokharans, Khivans, Persians, and Afghans. Just think 
what your relations will be with a powerful neighbor if the authori- 



18 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

ties at Askabad reply to your conduct by refusing lo allow a single 
JSlervi to pul his toot on Russian soil? Wliowiirbe the loser then?' 

Again a profound silence, broken at last by a discussion of the 
chiefs as to whether delegates should be sent to Askabad or not. 

" ' We don't value the trade ot Merv so much as all that,' 1 said 
at last, ' we are not disposed to waste our time running backward 
and forward. It we go back this time without selling our goods, 
you won't see our faces any more. 1 should like to ask you to tell 
me whether you assemble and debate every time a caravan airives, 
or only do tliis to the Russians?' 

" ' No, we would not assemble thus,' replied an elder. ' If any- 
body were to fall upon the caravan of any other country, if they 
were to rob it before my eyes, 1 could not even wink my eyes. We 
are not afraid of them; but we don't v^ant anything to happen to 
you, the merchants of the great Padishah." ~ 

" ' The Deople are ready to obey us,' added Kara Kuli Khan; ' we 
have no doubts on that score. But there are not a few kaltamans in 
tne oasis — robbers from whom We ourselves are not safe. They 
might fall on your packs and on you yourselves.' 

" ' If we do not oieet with any hostility on ihs part of the people,' 
I replied, ' we will answer for the rest. Our arms and our escort 
v;ill keep the robbers in order.' 

" Again a profound silence. Makdum Kuli exchanged significant 
glances with his neighbors. 

" * 1 have said all 1 have to say,' I continued ; ' we will now await 
your answer. If it be the same as before, we shall prepare for the 
journey back to Askabad. ' 

" I felt sure that the previous answer would not be repeated. 

" After another discussion Makdum Kuli said: ' Tell the trader, 
that we are only, influenced by fears for his safety, otherwise, we 
^ave nothing against him, and he may stop here forever if he likes.' 

" ' God forbid!' 1 replied. ' It will be quite enough to stop here 
two or three market days to see what your trade is.' 

" * In that case, here is our answer,' said Makdum Kuli. ' Let 
him remain here two or three market days, and afterward return to 
Askabad with the delegates.' " 

This was agreed upon, .and the assembly broke up. AlikhanoH's 
account of the discussion throws a broad light upon his adroitness 
in managing Asiatics. He thoroughly unde'rstands their w^ays. 

The Russians stayed a fcrtniglit at Merv, during which Ali- 
khanofl: made as many friends as he could, and intrigued against 
those who were disposed to mterferewiJi the accomplishment of his 
great aim. Disguised afresh as a Tekke, he availea himself of 
every opportunity to explore the oasis, and by stealing out at early 
dawn secured unobserved a survey of the fortress of Merv. 

He himself was quite at home among the Tekkes, but Kosikh 
grew nervous after hearing that some of the people had been plot- 
ting against his life, and hastened the departure of the caravan. 
Alikhanoff took advantage of the return journey to survey another 
route between Askabad and Merv. 

Shortly afterward, another Russian ofiicer, a Mussulman, named 
Naserbegofi:, w^ho had accompanied Stolietoft to Cabul as topogra- 
pher, was sent to Merv in disguise, and pushed on thence to the 



THE EUSSIAITS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 19 

Oxus. By this time the Tekkes had lost so much of their hostility 
to the Russians, that it was felt that an agent might be sent there 
openly. Lessar was selected for this mission, and passed through 
Merv to Khiva without exciting any animosity. In this manner 
Russia secured within a twelvemonth a survey of all the roads con- 
verging from the Turkestan and Transcaspian oasis upon Merv, and 
dispelled the disinclination of the people to receive Russian visitors. 

Another success followed upon this. AlikhanofC, who had main- 
tained close relations with Makdum Kuli, persuaded that chief to 
tlirow in his lot with Russia, and proceed to Moscow to witness the 
Czar's coronation. His submission was considered a great gain for 
Russia. He had been the soul Of the defense of Geok Tepe, and 
the authorities at Askabad had always feared that he might repeat 
that terrible resistance at Merv. His departure from the oasis left 
the people without a leader, and henceforward the Russians felt that 
they could afford to play a bolder game. 

1 saw Makdum Kuli several times at the Czar's coronation. He 
lodged with other Asiatics at a hotel opposite the rooms assigned to 
me by the Russian Government. The splendor of the Kremlin 
festivities thoroughly tamed him, and when he returned with the 
rest of the Turcomans to Askabad lie was as little disposed to fight 
Russia any more as Cetewayo after his trip to Loudon. 

Knowing how great his personal influence at Merv had been, 
Alikhanofl: induced him to pay a visit there on his return, to describe 
to his tellow-countrymen what the glories of Russia were like. His 
descriptions of the sight he had seen at Moscow exercised a most de- 
pressing eftect upon the anti-Russian party, while at the same time 
the handsome Russian uniform he wore, and the account he gave ot 
the favors conferred upon him by the Emperor, provoked a aesire 
among other chiefs to make the acquaintance of such generous 
masters. 



CHAPTER n. 

THE SWOOP UPON MERY. 

Russia, aagry at our continued occupation of Egyyt, resolves to seize the gates 
of Herat^ — Secret concentration of troops at points commanding Merv — 
Colonel MuratofE goes to the Tejend oasis "to retru-n," but rerhains— Sud- 
den appearance of Lieutenant Alikhanoff at Merv — The intrigues resulting 
in the acceptance of the Suzerainty of Russia — Russia promises to place 
only one officer in the oasis — Sudden advance of the Tejend force behind 
the Askabad deputation of chiefs — The Merv Tekkes hurriedly resist, but 
are defeated, and the Russians enter the fortress — Alikhanoff made gov- 
ernor of Merv. 

Just then the Egyptian question was exciting a good deal of at- 
tention. Our active interference in Soudan affairs had not yet be- 
gun, and during the lull preceding it a general European discussion 
was prevailing as to whether England should or should not evacuate 
Egypt. Russia had never concealed her opposition to our being 
tiiere at all, and she therefore threw herself vigorously into the con- 
troversy. 

To understand her teelings properly we must endeavor to exam- 
ine things a little- from her stand-point. Russia makes no secret that 
she is determined some day to have Constantinople. Her longing 



20 THE KUSSIAl^S AT THE GATES OF HEEAT. 

for the Bosphorus is as great now as it ever was in her career. The 
most resolute opponent to her arms is England. Austria and Ger- 
many she believes may be "squared;" but up to now it his been 
impossible to buy off England. Still Russia has always nourished 
a hope that when matters reached a decisive stage, our acquiescence 
might be purchased by allowing or assisting us to annex Egj^pt. 
Carlo was the price to be paid for Constantinople. 

1 have no space to go fully into the details ot this policy; but 1 
have said enough to indicate that Russian statesmen could not be 
pleased at our occupying Egypt and offering them no compensation. 
We appropriated the power of Egypt; vse assumed control of the 
Suez Canal; and still we as fiercely as ever refused to allow Russia 
to advance upon Constantinople. 

I shall be told that Russia had no right to be angry at our occu- 
pation of Egypt, since we had no intention nt annexing the coun- 
try. ]n reply, 1 must ask that matters be again looked at from the 
Russian stand-point. Russian policy is dictated by the impressions 
and the feelings of Russian statesmen, not by the impressions of 
Englishmen. The general impression in Russia at the time was that 
England had virtually annexed Egypt, and that the fluctuations and 
contortions of Mr. Gladstone's policy masked a cut and dried plan 
for permanently retaining the country. 

Anybody who has lived in the military states ot Europe can easily 
understand how such an impression should have arisen. The states- 
men ot Russia, Germany, Austria and Fiance usually formuh.te a 
policy long in advance of current events, and resolutely apply them- 
selves to deliberately working it out. English statesmen, on the 
other hand, mostly live trom hand to mouth. The occupation of 
Egypt was the result ot no deep "design," using the term in the 
continental sense. England floundered into the Egyptian embroglio, 
and yet the errors of her statesmen did more to root her influence 
and authority in the country than the cleverest scheming could have 
done. Now, men who make events are apt to think that others make 
them also. Russia, at first disposed to treat Mr. Gladstone's disin- 
terested policy as generously as that statesman's Liberal supporters, 
observed after a while that England benefit ed so largely by his 
blunders that she began to ascribe them to a deep and clever plan. 

When England first sent troops to Egypt there were three great 
obstacles to a prolonged or permanent occupation of the country. 
In the first place, the English public generally were averse to it; in 
the second, the Egyptian people, it was thought, would never toler- 
ate a foreign ruler; in the third, most politicians held that all trie 
Great Powers would oppose it. 

The first two obstacles had practically disappeared bj'' the autumn 
ot 1888. After the collapse of Arabi Pacha's army the whole of 
Egypt proper submitted without a struggle to English authority. 
Excluding the Soudan, the country proved amazingly easy to rule. 
The people, in short, appeared to be so utterly unable to do without 
their new masters that Euirland began to look upon herself as marked 
out by Providence to control Ifie country. 

Of course she only meant to control it for a time, but to Russia, 
who had opposed any occupation at all, it was as obnoxious that she 
should remain in Egypt three, five, or fifteen years, as forever. What 



THE KUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HEEAT. 21 

England considered a troublesome burden, Russia reo^arded as a 
splendid acquisition— a grand dependency possessing all the elements 
ot a second India. Our continued occupation, therefore, displeased 
her. Finding we were indisposed to evacuate the country at once, 
she decided she would establish a counterpoise in the East. She re- 
solved to reopen the Central Asia Question. 

The Emperor was pertectly aware that Merv was no counterbal- 
ance to Cairo, or Sarakh? to Alexandria; but what he bad in view 
was the creation of a new base that would enable him to reopen in 
. turn the Eastern Question on advantageous terms. Merv, if a 
" mere collection of mud huts," as the Duke of Argyll expressed 
it, was the stepping-sione to Herat, and at Herat he would be able to 
put the screw on England if her policy in Egypt continued to dis- 
please him. 

1 have been at pains to describe the influence the Egyptian Ques- 
tion had on the occupation of Merv, because, if it be clearly appre- 
ciated, the subsequent movement to the gates of Herat will be found 
to contain a larger amount of menace tlian is commonly imagined. 
The swoop upon Merv was no hap-hazard event. IMo local reason 
whatever provoked it. Russia was not forced to occupy Merv by 
any circumstance on the spot compelling her, against her wish, to 
violate her numerous assurances to this country. 1 believe that 1 am 
acquainted with everything that has been published in Russia— 
ofiQcial or non-official— bearing upon the occupation of Merv. This 
published literature does not contain a single charge against the peo> 
pie of Merv, in excuse for the annexation. 

Therefore, all that has been written in England by writers ignorant 
of the course of events in Russia, extenuating the annexation on the 
grounds of the difficulty ot keeping the Merv Tekkes in order except 
by annexation, is theoretical nonsense. The Merv Tekkes were in 
excellent order at the time, so far as Russia was concerned. They 
bad committed no outrages on Russia, and were committing none. 
It was as safe for Russian caravans to journey from Askabad to 
Khiva, across a desert which, anterior to the previous campaign, 
had been a prey to disorder, as to journey from Tashkent to Sam- 
arcand, or Tiflis to Baku. The Merv Tekkes scrupulously avoided 
attacking Russian subjects, and it was a matter of common notoriety 
that these man-stealers of the Asiatic steppes, finding their occupa- 
tion as such gone, were becoming quiet, hard-working, industrious 
peasants. 

It is true that there were small forays now and again against the 
Persians of the Atak oasis, a district stretching from the Russian 
frontier to Saiakhs; but they were a mere bagatelle compared with 
the great plundering expeditions the Tekkes twenty years previous 
had led in different directions, and Russia herseK was indirectly re- 
sponsible for them. 

The Atak oasis was an integral part ot Persia. The Shah's right 
to it was never questioned until Russia occupied Askabad. The 
Alieli and other Turcomans paid tribute regularly to the Shah's 
representatives, and appealed to them for help when they quarreled 
with the Tekkes ot Merv. If that help was not always forthcoming, 
it did not demonstrate that the Atak was not part of Persia, for the 



22 THE RUSSIAN^S AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

people of the oasis were as much given to forays as the Tekkes, 
and, as often as not, we're themselves the offenders. 

To put an end to this condition of things, Persia prepared, after 
the occupation of Askabad, to exercise more stringent authority 
over the people of Atak. The Shah felt that, if he only kept them 
in order, and prevented them perpetrating small raids upon Merv, 
the people of Merv in turn, hpving no provocation for their forays, 
would suspend their outrages. The Persian authorities admitted 
that their Atak suhjecls provoked the raids, and one has only to 
refer to O'Donovan's book to see how exasperating they could be 
toward their Merv neighbois across the desert. 

But 1 wish it to be clearly understood that, after all, these raids 
were very rare subsequent to the occupation of Askabad— say half 
. a dozen limes in the course of a season", and that only a few indi- 
viduals paiticipated in them. The Persian border from Askabad to 
Sarakhs was incomparably quieter than it had been in O'Donovan's 
time, and had the iShah's troops occupied two or three pbints in ihe 
"oasis, the last vestiges of border turbulence would have disappeared. 
Russia allowed the troops to almost reach the district, and then de- 
livered a sort of ultimatum for bidding them to enter it. 

The English Government protested strongly against this. It dem- 
onstrated clearly enough the Shah's claim to the territory. It 
showed how great would be the benefit to the people of Atak and 
Merv if the frontier were properly administered. Russia refused to 
listen to any arguments. She would not ocupy the district herself, 
and she would nut allow Persia to do it. She kept open this tiny 
sore on the Persian frontier in order that if ever she wanted a pre- 
text for occupying Merv one would be immediately forthcoming,* 

Of course this was not the sole reason ; there was another and 
greater one. The easy road from Askabad to Herat, via Old Sarakhs, 
runs through this Atak oasis. Had Russia let Persia assume definite 
control over it. the advance upon India would have been blocked. 
Russia could have only advanced with the permission of the Sbah, or 
by violating his territor3\ This circumstance gave an importance 
to the Atak oasis out of all proportion to its intrinsic worth. It 
was, from the Russian stand-point, absolutely essential to Russia. 

From what I have said, which, in common with the greater part 
of this book, is basea on Russian information, it will be seen that 
there was ro tribal turbulence on the Russian- frontier at the time 
the swoop was made upon Merv; and that, as regards the Persian 
border, the old raids had dwindled down to petty pilferings, which 
could have been suppressed at any moment if the Emperor had bil- 
lowed the Shah to keep his subjects under better control. 

So insignificant were these pilferings, that Russia has never 
attempted to cite them as an excuse for the occupation of Merv, It 
is only a few English writers who have put forward the plea, and 
they have done so because they were ignorant of the true state of 
affairs on the Russo-Turcoman frontier in the autumn of 1883. 

To me it has always appeared ridiculous, as well as unpatriotic, 
for Englishmen to invent pleas for Russia's aggressiveness based on 

* The negotiations on the question of the Atak oasis will be foimd in Blue 
Book, Central Asia, No. 1, 1884. 



THE KUSSIAls^S AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 23 

mere theory, which Russia herself does not take the trouble, or is 
unable to put forward, in extenuation ot liei advances toward India. 
Tribal turbulence provol^^ed tlie conquest of GeolcTepe, and Russia's 
contention on this score 1 have always defended. But tribal turbu- 
lence did not provoke the occupation of Merv, and those who fancy 
it did should just femember thai Russia herself has never sought 
justification on these grounds. 

Nor is the plea that Alikhanofl and Koraarofl: acted on their own 
responsibility any sounder. Russia herself has never advanced this 
excuse. It is only English writers who have done so, and done so 
without the slightest basis for their erionous assertion. 1 can prove 
this at a stroke.' 

In the spring of 1883 the garrison of Khiva, located at Port Petro- 
Alexandrovsk, consisted of the 4th Regiment of Orenburg Cossacks, 
the 5th and 13th Turkestan line battalions, and the 6th battery of 
artillery. This was the strength of the garrison, according to the 
oflQcial report published in Russia early in tbe yesa-, and it tallied, 1 
have good grounds for believing, with the list in the possession of 
the military authorities at Simla, derived from non-Russian sources. 
In the autumn of 1883 the garrison was increased by the arrival of 
the 17th Turkestan line battalion from Samarcand. 

1 only knew of this last year, after the occupation of Merv was 
an accomplished fact. Every day 1 received from Russia the prin- 
cipal newspapers, including those of the Caucasus and Turkestan; 
and one morning, glancing through the Moscow Gazette, 1 saw 
that among the sufferers from a tiood at Fort Petro-AIexandrovsk 
were the men of the 17th line battalion, Now this battalion be- 
longed to the garrison of Sumarcand, distant at least a month from 
Khiva, by the quickest possible means of conveyance— how, there- 
fore, had it come to be shifted to the latter place, and for what rea- 
son? 

This was explained in an equally casual manner a short time 
afterward. Writing from Fort Petro-Alexandrovsk to the same 
paper, a correspondent, signing himself Gospodin Tchursin, men- 
tioned, among other things, the suicide of Lieutenant Bodisco, of 
this same 17th battalion, " who had been in a state of deep melan- 
choly from the time, six months previous, when the battalion had 
been sent from Samarcand to Khiva, to be dispatched lo Mery, and 
■who had preferred blowing out his brains to accompauying it any 
further. ' ' 

This 17th battalion, therefore, was sent to Khiva from Samarcand, 
in the autumn of 1883, to take part in the occupation of Merv. As 
soon as Alikhanofi induced the Merv Tekkes to submit, it marched 
from Khiva to Merv, via Tchardjui, on the Oxus, aad now forms 
part of the regular garrison of the place. ' Bodisco. who was home- 
sick, refused to accompany it any further, and committed suicide. 
The demonstration is clear, consequently, that Alikhauoff's swoop 
upon Merv was not a filibustering exploit, carried out by him and 
other frontier officials on their own personal responsibility. 
Alikhanoff and KomarofE were under the control of the Governor- 
General of the Caucasus, Prince Doi dukoff-Korsakofi. The 17th 
line battalion, on the ocher hand, was under the control of General 
Tchernayefi, the Governor- General of Turkestan. The two ad- 



24 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HEEAT. 

ministrations are as widely distinct as the governmenlsof India and 
Canada. To secure the simultaneous action ot the two adm]nistration& 
in support of one another, the impulse must proceed Irom St. Peters- 
burg. As a matter ot fact, the 17th battalion was marched to Khiva 
by tiie order ot the Minister of War, and, to cut unnecessary argu- 
ment short, the whole of the operations culminating in the occupa- 
tion of Merv were directed by the authorities at the Russian capital. 

It is well to bear in mind that although this stealthy movement of 
troops in Turkestan was not known to the public of this country^ 
the military authorities in India were cognizant of it. Through the 
Hindoo traders arriving from Turkestan and other sources the In- 
telligence Branch was placed in possession of information, difficult 
to disbelieve, that the Russians were moving totvard the Afghan 
and Turcoman territories. The military authorities appealed to the 
Marquis of Ripon to take timel}'' precautions against this move, but 
their warnings weie pooh-poohed and their counsels disregarded. 

While the Turkestan authoiities were concentrating troops to take 
part in the occupation of Merv, the officials of the Caucasus were 
not idle. 

In October our Minister telegraphed from Teheran that the 
Governor of Askabad, General Komiiroff, had sent a force to the 
Tejend, and established a fort there. The Tejend may be roughly 
described as the midway oasis between Askabad and Merv. It is 
there that the Hari Rud or Tejend, the river watering Herat and 
Sarakhs, buries itself in the Turcoman sands. Although larger than 
the Merv oasis, it was practically unoccupied until after the fall of 
Geok Tepe. The Persians would not let the Mervis settle there, and 
the Mervis would not let the Persians, After Skobelefl: took Geok 
Tepe, General Kouropatkin pushed on to the place, and found there 
several thousand fugitives. Tnese submitted, and either returned 
home or settled down along the Tejend River, Russia promising to 
protect them from the Persians. As the Tejend oasis was a no 
man's land before then, their submission conferred upon Russia, in 
her opinion, a sort of right to the country. 

From Askabad to the Tejend oasis is about 120 or 130 miles, the 
road running along the Russian oasis of Akhal and Persian oasis of 
Atak to Kahka. a large Atak settlement 80 miles from Askabad, and 
then turning oft at right angles across tire plain to the Tejend, 50 
miles to the north. Readers of O 'Donovan's book will remember 
that the dashing Irishman made a halt on the banks of the Tejend, 
He quitted the Persian frontier at Mehne, 53 miles to the east of 
Kahka. and traversed the 50 miles to the Tejend in a night. From 
the Tejend to Merv the 80 or 90 miles' distance is usually done by 
the Turcomans in a day or a day and a half. 

After things had settled down in Central Asia, subsequent to the 
English evacuation of Afghanistan, and the Russian annexation of 
Askabad, a small Cossack force was periodically sent to the Tejend. 
The excuse for this movement was that the new settlers there were 
Russian subjects, and that Russia required a proper topographical 
knowledge of the oasis. 

At first the Merv Tekkes were extremely alarmed at the approach, 
of the Cossacks so close to their country, and assembled in thou- 
sands to bar the way across the plain to the Merv oasis. But when^ 



THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 25 

time after time, the Cossacks returned without advancing beyond 
the Tejend, they grew less suspicious. They were gradually lulled 
into a false security. In this manner when, at length, the Russians 
sent a larger torce than usual to the Tejend in the autumn of 1883, 
the Merv Tekkes went about their ordinary occupations, and made 
no preparations for defense. They had at Merv a fortress far largef 
and stronger than the one at GeokTepe Skobeleff had nearly broken 
his army to pieces in battling his way into, and, what was more, 
they had cannon; but, not imagining that the Russians had any im- 
mediate designs on their oasis, they undertook no measures of de- 
fense. 

It is well to bear these facts in mind, because Russia is endeavor- 
ing to secure the Jiadgheis district of Afghanistan a pouncing posi- 
tion similar to the one on the Tejend. Ak Robat is even closer i6 
Herat than Kari Bent, on the Tejend, is to Merv. Russia, in 1888, 
lulled the Mervis until she had got them completely off their guard, 
and then she pounced upon their stronghold, regardless of all her 
assurances to England. In the same manner, if we let her retain 
the gates of Herat, she will wait until a favorable moment occurs, 
and then the key of India will be carried by a sudden coiq^ de main. 

The military movement in the direction of the Tejend did not 
escape notice in England. A discussion arose as to whether the ex- 
pedition to the Tejend did not constitute a violation of Russia'^ 
assurance not to advance beyond the limits of the last annexation. 
Thereupon the Journal de St. Petersbourg which must surely 
have told more fibs in its time than any existing newspaper, pub- 
lished an indignant denial of the reports in circulation. The move- 
ment of troops to tlie Tejend was not an "expedition;" it was 
simply a reconnaissance. It then drew a fine distinction between 
the two expressions. An " expedition," said the organ of the Rus- 
sian Foreign Office, " always goes and stops, but a reconnaissance 
always returns!" 

Considering that Russia had already mapped every inch of the 
Tejend region, and knew through the explorations of Alikhanoff, 
Lessar, Nasirbegoff , and others, ihe whole of the surrounding coun- 
try, the necessity for even a "reconnaissance" was not very ap- 
parent; above all, a reconnaissance by a force, which, according to 
our Minister at Teheran, comprised 1,000 infantry, 500 cavalry, anl 
10 guns. 

Our embassador at St. Petersburg, Sir Edward Thornton, was 
thereupon instructed to make inquiries at the Russian Foreign 
Ofilce. In reply he wrote: " His Excellency, M. Vlangaly, said 
that he was no' aware of any force having been sent in that direc- 
tion,^ but he was not surprised at learning it. He said that on the 
<iccasion of the raid which had been made about two rnonths ago 
iinto Persian territory by Turcoman raiders, when they carried off a 
number ot cattle, etc., and, as he believed, some men, the Persian 

*The conversation took place Jan. 2, 1884. Yet the organ of the Foreign 
Office had said, Nov. 10, 1883: " II y eu en effet une reconnaissance faite sur le 
Tejend (there has been, in fact, a reconnaissance made on the Tejend)," so that 
he could not have been totally unaware of it. However, his memory brightened 
up when Sir Edward gave htm to understand that we knew what was going on, 
although he refused to impart any information, or admit more than was 
.squeezed out of him by our embassador. 



26 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

Government bad appealed to the Inaperial Government to use their 
influence for the recovery of their cattle, etc., which had been 
taken. Instructions had consequently been sent to the coaimander 
of the forces ai Askabad to do his best to meet the vi ishes of the 
Persian Government. M. Vlan^aly supposed that it had been im- 
possible to do so without the use of force, and that a small detach- 
ment bad consequently been dispatched for that purpose; but his 
Excellency doubted whether it could be nearly so large as 1 had 
mentionea, or could he answer my inquiry as to the particular 
direction which the force in question would take." 

It must not be supposed that this raid was a very large one. simply 
"because the Shah had appealed to Russia for redress, or that the 
Shah could not have himself secured reparation if he had applied 
direct to the Merv Tekkes. The simple fact is, that Kussia had not 
only prevented the Shah from administering the Atak frontier, but. 
had also severed the close relations previously existing between 
Merv and Teheran. 

As is well known to readers of Oriental history, Merv tvas once a 
dependency of Persia. After the Russian movement toward India 
commenced from the Caspian, British diplomscy for years did its 
utmost to get the Sbah to establish a Persian protectorate over Merv, 
and the Merv Tekkes, to acknowledge it. It was a very foolish 
policy, because, to put the matter briefly and forcibly, English 
statesmen tried to place the desert lion under the control of the 
Persian jackass. A far more sensible plan was that suggested by 
Colonel Valentine Bakei when he visited the Perso-Turcoman 
frontier in 1873. This was, to place the Mervis under the Afghans. 

Readers of Yambery's delightful " Travels is Central Asia " can 
not have forgotten the amazing instances he gives of Persian cow- 
ardice. A dozen or more Persians, attacked by two or three Tur- 
comans would not only throw down their arms and beg for mercy, 
but also ask for the cords and bind each other prisoners, without 
making the slightest attempt at resistance. The Afghans, on the 
contrary, were quite a difierent people to deal with. The Merv 
Tekkes always admitted that they were braver men than them- 
selves. 

The notion of passing under the rule of the Ameer was therefore 
not distasteful to them. After Valentine Baker's return the Gov- 
ernment sent on a special mission to the Perso-Turcoman frontier 
Major Napier, son of Lord Napier of Magdaia. This was what he 
reported home: 

" The occupation of Merv by an aggressive power will open the 
way to further extensions of influence on what has always been the 
weak: side of Afghanistan, the side of Herat. As to the reasons 
underlying the evident desire of the Tekkes for an Afghan alliance, 
there is a very general impression abroad that an alliance with 
Afghanistan— the Afghans are their co-religionists — means an alli- 
ance with England, 1 received " (from the various Tekke chiefs 
he saw) " abundant proof of their desire tor a direct connection 
with us, and 1 believe that they might be turned into a peaceful, 
honest, and prosperous community, and would prove a real strength 
to the border and to the empire." 



THE EUSSIAKS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 



27 



Not long afterward General Sir Charles MacGregor paid a visit 
to Sarakhs and Herat, and also advocated the inclosure of Meiv 
within the political limits of Afghanistan, but his words fell flat 
on the ears of the authorities. England persisted in weaving her 
ropes of sand for binding Merv to Persia, and only left oft when 
Russia sharply declared after the annexation of Askabad that she 
would not tolerate any more eftorts on the part of the Shah to es- 
tablish his influence there. 




LIEUTENANT ALIKHANOFF. 



An intimation, in effect, was conveyed to Persia that if she wished 
to carry on diplomatic intercourse with Merv it must be done 
through the medium of. the Askabad authorities. Previously the 
Shah and the Mervis had settled their quarrels themselves, by the 
short and summary process of letaliation one against the other, 
varied by occasional truces, during which they exchanged prisoners 
and hostages. The Shah had now to appeal to Komarofl:. In this 
manner Russia secured for herself a pretext for meddling with the 



28 THE RUSSlAlSrS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

afiairs of Merv. If the Mervis failed to raid against Russia the 
latter could always harass Ibem by brinsing Ihem to book for their 
raids on Persia— raids, be it remembered, largely occasioned be- 
cause Russia would not allow the Shah to put his frontier districts 
in order, and keep his own subjects from raiding against Merv, 

Now this particular raid mentioned by Vlangaly having occurred, 
and Persia having appealed to Komarofl for redress, all that ihe 
latter needed to do was to send a message to Merv, when reparation, 
would have been at once forthcoming. The attack the previous 
year on the Parfenoff surveying party was a far grosser outrage, 
yet the tribe disavowed it at once, on receipt of Russia's demand 
lor the offenders. In the interval Russia's influence had become 
immensely more powerful at Merv. This is avowed by Lessar and 
others. But Russia needed a prete7s:t, and this not to justify herself 
in the eyes of the Tekkes, but to blind JKngland as to her intentions 
on the Tejend. She did not wish her projected coup de main to be 
frustrated by the action of England. 

On the spot Russia did not trouble herself about the pretext at all. 
"When the force proceeded to the Tejend no ultimatum was sent to 
Merv, nor was any attempt made to settle the matter promptly. As 
a matter of fact, the sufferers had already done that themselves. 
They had seized some camels belonging to the Mervis. and squared 
their own loss by inflicting another on their neiglibors. 

Undeterred by England, therefore, Russia was able to consolidate 
her position on the Tejend, and await events. By the end of the 
year everything was ready for the swoop. All that was now needed 
was some complication that would divert England's gaze, and 
minimize the force of her indignation on finding the annexation of 
Merv an accomplished fact. 

The occasion pfas found early in 1884. The long pent storm ia 
the boudan had burst, and the Government were serioHsly embar- 
rassed. Baker Pasha had just gone to tlie East Soudan to relieve 
Sinkat, and General Gordon was on the point of starting for Khar- 
toum. The belief was general that our troubles were only just 
commencing in the Soudan, and in no country was this impression 
stronger than in Russia. 

Events, consequently, were ripe for the swoop. The decisive 
moment, for which the Russian Government had deliberately pre- 
pared by assembling forces on the Turkestan: and Transcaspian 
sides of Merv, had at length arrived. The signal was given for de- 
livering the blow. 

Acting on the orders transmitted to him by General Komaroff, 
Alikhanoff started off for Merv, accompanied by a few horsemen and 
the hero of Geok Teppe, Makdum Kuli Khan. Arrived there he 
put up for the night at the tent of Yousouf Khan, one of the four 
chiefs of Merv, and brother to Makdum Kuli. Yousouf, like many 
of the leading men, had already been bought over 1o Russia. 

The next morning a public meetiuo; was convened, and Alikhanoff 
read out to the people Komaroti's ultimatum. Immediate submis- 
sion was demanded, and, to enforce his tlireats, Alikhanoff pointed to 
the Tejend and announced the force established there to be simply 
the vanguard of a greater army then advancing toward the oasis. 
That the submission was not a purely voluntary one is proved by 



THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HER^T. 29 

the following passage occurring in the Russian Graphic {Vse- 
mirnaya lllustratsia), from the pen ot Gospodin Krijauovsky, a 
Russian officer ot Askabad, who seal that paper a sketch showing 
the submission ot the Merv chiefs in General Komaroff's drawing- 
room. He says: " General Komarofi:, wishing to take advantage 
oi the impression which had been produced on the Tekkes by the 
dispatch of a detachment of our troops to theTejend, ordered Lieu- 
tenant Alikhanoff and Major Makdum Ruli Khan to proceed to 
Merv, and invite the Mervis to beg for mercy and become Russian 
subjects," The 8mt, which is edited by the brother ot Koma- 
roff, supports this by its disclosure of the threats which Alikhanoff 
used with reference to the Tejend column being the vanguard of an 
advancing army. 

Having already created a strong pro-Russian party b}'- his in- 
trigues, Alilihanoff experienced very little difficulty in persuading 
the people to accept the suzerainty of Russia. His arguments were 
no doubt strongly backed by the renegade, Makdum Kuli, who was 
probably compelled to dilate on the glories ot Moscow, where, 
among other things, he had wilnessed, within a few paces of Lord 
Wolseley, the feeding of half a million people and the review of 
100,000 troops. 

According to reports prevalent in Russia, Alikhanoff secured ac- 
quiescence all the more readily by wrapping up his terms in tissue 
paper. He repudiated any intention of occupjnng the country witk 
a large garrison. All that Russia would do if tliey submitted 
would be to send a governor with two or three assistants, and 
things would go ou the same as before. 

England was treated in a similar fashion. When M. de Giers 
officially informed our embassador of the submission of Merv, Feb. 
15, he intimated that, in accepting it, the Emperor would simply 
send "an officer" to administer the government ot that region. 
He added that " this officer would perhaps be accompanied by aa 
escort ot Turcomans!" 

The solitary Russian officer pi oved to be as expansive as the fa- 
mous four and a half battalions sent to Khiva a decade earlier. " To 
give an idea of the Khivan Expedition," said Count Schouvaloft to 
Earl Granville, January 8th, 1873, '* it was sufficient to say that 
it would consist of four and a half battalions." In reality Russia 
sent to Khiva 53 companies of infantry, 25 sotnyas ot Cossacks, 54 
guns, 6 mortars, 2 mitrailleuses, 5 rocket divisions, and 19,200 
camels, with a complement of about 14 000 men. 

At the bidding of Alikhanoft, the principal chiefs and elders 
signed a parchment deed he had Ijrought witli him, and selected a 
deputation to proceed I o Askabad. On the way the party was jomed 
by Colonel Muratoff. the commander of the Tejend force, and arrived 
at Askabad on the 6th of February, t\vo days after the annihilation 
of Baker Pasha's army at Tokar. The next morning, at 11 o'clock, 
the four chiefs and twentj^-tour notables took the oath of allegiance 
to the White Tsar in General Komaroff's drawing-room. 

When the ceremony was over, Komaroff made a short speech to 
them, in which he declared that now they had made their submis- 
sion to Russia, they would find the White Tsar a valiant protector 
of their interests. "To prove this to you," he said, "1 tele- 



30 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

graphed tbis morning to Teheran, demanding that the Persians 
should give up to you the hundred camels they took the other day, 
and 1 have just received a message from the Shah acceding to my 
request."* 

Not a word was said about the cattle taken from the Persians, 
which had served Russia as a diplomatic pretext for assembling 
MuratoS's force on the Tejend. That was conveniently consigned 
to oblivion. 

Russia, in a word, having made use of a Persian grievance to steal 
the independence ot Merv, rounded on the Shah the moment the 
theft Nvas accomplished, and treated him in turn as a delinquent. 
One can easily understand the Mervis exclaiming, " How great a 
ruler is this Russian general! He has- only got to send a message to 
the Shah, and the-fiovereign of Persia submits at once to iiis dic- 
tation!" 

, Several days were spent in feasting, and then came the denouement. 
General Komaroff decided to proceed to Merv, and this was made 
the pretext for dispatching more troops— as a guard of honor! — to 
the Tejend. Arrived there, the whole available force was set in 
motion behind the returning deputation, and Fort Kari Bent being 
only three marches from Merv, the Russian army was already close 
to the oasis before its approach was known. 

The elders were the first to arrive. They confirmed the reports 
that the Russian army was advancing, and asked the people to take 
out water to the troops. A tumult arose. A strong party, headed 
by Kajjar Khan, protested against the invasion, and threatened to 
kill anybody ivho obeyed the elders' request. They then applied 
themselves to the discussion of the best means of repelling the Rus- 
sian advance. 

The Merv oasis is not very large, and it is surrounded on all sides 
by barren plain or desert. Retreat from it was practically impossi- 
ble. The Russians controlled three sides, and the Sari ks— bitter 
enemies of the Tekkes— the fourth. To defend themselves against 
an invader the Tekkes had built an immense clay-ramparted in- 
closure, capable ot accommodating the entire population with their 
herds and cattle. But there was no time to assemble the people 
inside it before the Russians arrived. The Mervis felt that tliey had 
no course open to them but to surrender. 

The reports current in Russia that Alikhanoff tricked the people 
into submission by promising that no garrison should be installed, 
are sirouofly supported by this tumult. It the army had been ex- 
T>ected, the so-called " anti-Russian party" would have organized 
resistance and made a stand somewhere. As it was, nothing what- 
ever was done, and when the intelligence arrived that the Russians 
were already close at hand, the only thing the Mervis could do was 
to go out on horseback, and fire a tew ineffectual shots into the 
column by way of a protest. 

While the excitement was still prevailing, Alikahnoff entered the 
oasis with a sotnya of Cossaclis and endeavored to allay it. The 
attitude of the people, however, was so defiant that lie thought it 
prudent to take the advice of, liis Merv friends and fall back upon 

* &iyanovsky''s narrative. 



THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 31 

the Kussian army, then camping for the night tvrelve miles distant 
from Merv.'^ 

After dark Kajjar Khan, with several thousand horsemen, made 
an onslaught on the Russian camp, but was repelled with heavy- 
loss. The next morning (March 16) the Russians marched early 
and occupied the fortress without serious resistance. Lessar says 
that altogether there were three fights or " skirmishes." The Rus- 
sian loss, he adds, was " one man." Kajjar Khan fled to Afghanis- 
tan. 

The fortress was far too large to afford security to the Russian 
force. General Komaroff, therefore, impressed several thousand 
Mervis at once, and compelled them to build, under the supervision 
of his olficers, a regular fort on the European principle. The com- 
pletion of this sealed the fate of Merv. 

In reward for his successful swoop Alikhanoff received the rank ot 
major, and all his decorations; he was also made Governor of Merv. 
Makdum Kuli was rewarded by being appointed head of the Tejend 
oasis. Koraaroff received the Order of the White Eagle, his district 
was raised to the rank of a province equal to that of Turkestan, and 
he himself was made governor-general. 

To further add to his importance, he was assigned permission to 
carry on diplomatic intercourse direct with the neighboring states 
of Persia and Afghanistan. In other words, if he wished to in- 
trigue with the Ameer without resorting to the instrumentality of 
the Foreign OflQce at St. Petersburg, he was at liberty to do so. 
Lessar was appointed his diplomatic agent for this purpose. 

The news of the occupation of Merv excited a storm of indigna- 
tion ia England. At first, the artful manner in which the Russian 
Government represented the annexation as a " voluntary submis- 
sion " provoked a few excuses. It was said that as the people of 
Merv themselves had asked to become Russian subjects the Em- 
peror was, to a certain extent, justified in relieving himself of the 
burden of his assurances to England. " After all," it was a happy 
ending lo the Turcoman question, and Russia, having got Merv and. 
rounded off her frontier, would trouble us no more. 

Before a week was over, however, Komaroff 's brother had let the 
cat out of the bag. The editor of the Svei, himself a military 
officer, was so proud of the cleverness displayed by his brother in 
accomplishing the swoop, that he published an account of the 
operations on the Tejend, and the audicious threats of Alikhanoff 
that had brought about the submission of Merv. 

Prom this account sprung the impression that Alikhanoff and 
Koraaroff had acted as filibusters, and forcea the hands of tneir 
Government, but the facts 1 have given demonstrate this impression 
to be totally wrong* It is an impression which has never prevailed 
one moment in Rusisia. There is nothing in the Smt narrative 
to justify its existence, and the account Ihave given of the concen- 
tration of troops in Khiva disposes of the notion completely. 

To be short and plain, Alikhanoff and Komaroff simply acted ac- 
cording to the instructions telegraphed to them to Askabad, and no 

* Some of these particulars are taken from the narrative of a Turcoman eye- 
witness, published in an Indian paper. They curiously taUy with Russian re- 
ports. 



S"^ THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

more anticipated the desires, or forced the hand ot their Govern- 
ment, than Lora Wolselej did when he invaded E.nypL and con- 
quered Arab! Pasha. If Alikhanofl's diplomacy at Merv was shady, 
it was not a whit darker in hue than the diplomacy CKercised by the 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburg, 

The annexation ot Merv was deliberately planned by the Russian 
Government, and carried out in strict accordance with its orders. 
The coup de main was totally unprovoked by the Teklies; it was 
done in violation "ot a whole series of solemn assurances to Eng- 
land and the blow was struck in a treacherous and cowardly manner, 
dishonorable to a nation that had produced such a hard-hitting, 
fair-tighting hero as Skobeleft. 

When Russia annexed Askabad, 1 defended her action against 
the whole English Press. When the excitment took place over the 
Atrek boundary convention with Persia in 1882, 1 issued a map to 
Parliament and the Press, based on the new treaty with the Shah, 
showing that Russia had done no evil. In my various writings on 
Central Asia 1 have always justified her policy when I thought it 
fair, and have never hesitated to condemn the policy of England 
when 1 considered it stupid or selfish. 

1 can fairly claim, therefore, thai when 1 denounced the annexation 
ot Merv, on the news becoming known in this country last year, 1 
did so without any avoM ed animus as a Russophobe. 1 felt that the 
Emperor had broken his solemn promises, and the promises of Alex- 
ander 11., without the slightest measure ot justification. Nothing 
has been published in Russia since to shake this conviction, while 
the facts that have come to light have only strengthened what 1 be- 
lieve to be a fair and impartial view of the transaction. 

There had been two widely distinct and clearly opposed views of 
the Russian advance, among members of the House ot Commons, 
up to the time of the annexation of Merv. The debate that-took 
place when the news became known, was the first that found the 
two sides united as to the necessity tor disregarding farther assur- 
ances, and opposing a firm and unsevered front to Russian aggression. 

According to the Newcastle Daily Chronicle, this unanimity 
was, to acertain extent, due to a pamphlet 1 circulated in the House 
among all the members just before the debate began, giving an ac- 
count of Merv and the results which I believed would inevitably 
spring from the annexation. In that pamphlet, which served as a 
handbook to the debate, I drew particular attention to the open char- 
acter of the country lying between Merv and Herat, and 1 printed in 
large type this warning:* 

" That the annexation of Merv, being inevitably attended with 
the incorporation of the Sarik Turcomans, will extend Russian rule 
up the Murghab to Penjdeh, at the toot of the Paropamisus, to 
within 140 miles of the Key of India. England, at the same time, 
being still posted at Quetta, 514 miles from Herat."* 

* Five htmdred copies of the pamphlet, " The Russian Annexation of Merv," 
with three maps, and a frontispiece illustrative of Merv, were struck off in 
twenty-foiv hours. There being no time to post them, they were distributed in 
the members'' lobby. " Soon after the House assembled, half the persons in the 
lobby might have been seen with the orange pamphlet in their hands. As the 
House filled, a demand arose for copies among the minor menabers who had 



THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HEEAT. 33 

How I came to predict so correclly the second Russian advance, 
from Merv to tlie gates o± Eerat, can be best described in another 
chapter. 

CHAPTER 111 

THE ADVANCE TO THE GATES OF HEKAT 

Senerai PeiTusevitcli''s secret survey of Afghanistan in 1878— His suggestion 
that Eussia, after occupying Merv, should insert a wedge between Herat 
and Meshed — Concentration of troops at Merv — General KomarofC seizes 
Old Sarakhs — AlikhanofE's intrigues with the Sarik Turcomans — His attempt 
on Penjdeh — Lurnsden finds the Russians advancing up the Hari Rud, and 
posted at Pul-i-lQiatxm— Russia displays the dispatch of General Zelenoi 
in order to push further toward Herat — Occupation of the Zulfikar Pass, 
Ak Robat, and Pul-i-khisti. 

When, in the early parbof 1881, exciting telegrams were arrivmg 
'Svery day from Russia, describing Skobeleff's terrible conflict with 
the Tekkes at Geok Tepe, it may be remembered timt one ot those 
messages recorded the deatnof a general, who fell in a night assault 
upon the fortress. The name of that general was Petrusevitch. So 
iar as I am aware, he was the first to suggest the idea of thrusting 
the Turcoman wedge frorh Merv to the Paropamisus mountains, 
;and under cover of it securing the gates of Herat. 

Petrusevitch was quite a different type of officer from Alikhanoff 
=or Koraaroft. Honest, truthful, averse to intrigue, and devoted to 
his duty; he was, in one word, a representative iu actual life of that 
ideal of an Indian administrator which is commonly held in this 
country. The district he governed in the Caucasus for many years 
was a model ot good order, and he was so deeply respected by the 
hill tribes, although not a fighting man, that when he fell at Geok 
Tepe they sent a deputation to the scene of the conflict, to beg 
Skobeleff the body of the deceased general, to bury it in their 
midst. 

Petrusevitch was first dispatched to the Transcaspian region in 
1874, and there is every reason to believe that he pushed his explora- 
tions into Afghanistan as far south of Herat as Seistan. In subse- 
aquent years he undertook other journeys along the Perso-Turcoman 
frontier, from the Caspian to Sarakhs. and in 1879, just before he 
received the appointment of Governor of Krasnovodsk, in succession 
to tlie defeated general, Lomakin, he penned an exhaustive report 
upon the Turcomans. 

In this report he traced, in dealing with the Turcoman tribes of 



not received them, and Mr. Marvin, who was in the lobby, dispatched a special 
inessenger for a hundred more. In this manner, when the debate actually did 
>come off, nearly everybody used it as a hand-book, and there can be hardly a 
doubt that it secured a very important effect upon the speeches, observable in 
the unanimity with which the members of both parties insisted on the necessity 
■of trusting Russia no more, and the imperative need of firm and decisive meas- 
ures on the part of the Government. Dm-mg the debate, Mr. Marvin sat under 
the gaUery, watching the effect of his pamphlet.'' — Neiocastle Chronicle, Feb- 
ruary 28, 1884. The pamphlet was translated into German; and in India an 
^eminent military officer, well known for his patriotic interest in the Central 
Asia Question, pubhshed, at his own cost, an edition at Bombay, and distributed 
•eopies throughout the Peninsula. 



34 THE EUSSIAifS AT THE GATES OF HEKAT. 

the Merv -Herat reo;ion, the Afghan and Persian frontiers in such a 
fashion as to leave open the gap which Russia has just occupied. 
Up to then it had been accepted both in England and Russia that 
the Afghan dominions extended from the Oxus to Sarakhs. Pe- 
trusevitch was the first to bulge back the frontier to the hills at the 
rear of Penjdeh, less than one hundred miles from Herat. 

A copy of this report reached me from the Caucasus, and 1 made 
it the backbone of a work 1 was then preparing on the Turcomans. 
To me this hint or claim of Petrusevitch's seemed so ominous, that 
1 drew a series of maps to illustrate the menace it conveyed to the 
security of Meshed and Herat. 

Respecting his contention 1 said, in translating his words in full:: 
"Particular attention should be paid to this passage by political 
writers. The attempt to force a recognition of a ' no man's land ' 
between Meshed and Herat is, in reality, nothing more than an 
effort to extend the Turcoman region wedge-faehion between Persia 
and Afghanistan. Russia, in occupying Merv, will inevitably claim 
the right to extend Tier 'power along this wedge also. The conquest of 
Akhal extends her rule to Gyaoors — the conquest of Merv will extend' 
it to Penjdeh."* 

My work tvas published in 1881, and was purchased for the 
Government Departments in London and iSimla. It can not, there- 
fore, be said that the Government were unaware as to the serious 
results that would inevitably attend an occupation of Merv. To 
prevent all possibility of Russia advancing her present claims to 
Penjdeh and other gates of Herat, 1 urged That the Afghan trontier 
from Sarakhs to the Oxus should be organized without delay, and 
the gap indicated by Petrusevitch closed up before the Russians 
occupied Merv. 

" Do what we can," 1 wrote, " we can never prevent the inevita- 
ble junction of the Russian and English frontiers in Asia. It would 
be difficult to do so, even with Russia's help. It is impossible with- 
out it. . . . If we wait till Russia enters Merv and posts Cossacks 
on the Paropamisus ridge, we shall have to accept, at the dictation, 
of Russia, Jier delimitation of tlie two empires, with the dishonora- 
ble drawback of having to cede the best of the India-menacing 
points to her — as the power in possession. Since the junction of the 
frontiers of the two empires must some day take place; since we 
know that on the occasion of the next great war between the two 
powers, Russia will attempt to strike at our empire in India; since 
we have evidence beyond dispute that there exists an easy road of 
invasion — is it too much to demand of the rulers of our empire that 
they arrange at once our border line in Central Asia? Is it too 
much 1o ask of thinking Englishmen that they shall individually do 
their utmost to preserve the empire from the madness of masterly 
inactivity?" 

These words were written four years ago, but they produced no 
effect upon the Government. Theimpressiou prevailed that a great 
mountain barrier, 10,000 or 15,000 feet high, intervened between 

* "Merv, the Queen of the V/orld; and the Scoui-ge of the Man-Stealing Tur- 
comans." 450 pp., 11 maps. London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1881. 



THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 35 

Merv and Herat, and that even when the Russians secured the 
former they would fail to have easy access to the latter. 

Yet our ablest authorities had done their utmost to disabuse the 
minds of Englisli statesmen of this disastrous error. Colonel Valen- 
tine Baker, on his return irom the Perso-Turcoman frontier in 1873, 
iiad pointed out the ease with which a military movement could 
take place from Merv to Herat, up tlie valley ot the Murghab. 

"Merv/' he said, "with its M^ater communication nearly com- 
plete, lies only 240 miles from Herat, to which place it is the 
key. There can be no doubt that Merv is the natural outwork 
of Herat, with the advantage of water supply all the way between 
the two cities. Strategically, the Russian occupation of Merv would 
be, so to say, the formation of a lodgment on the glacis of Herat. It 
would place Herat completely at her mercy," 

General Sir Charles MacGregor, chief of Roberts's staff at Canda- 
har, and since then Quartermaster General ot India, went closer to 
the Paiopaniisus ridge than Baker, penetrating in 1875 to within a 
few miles of Herat. What he wrote on his return was plain enough 
for any man to understand. 

" A Russian authority, M. Tchichacheff," he observed in his 
JDiorassan, '* declares' that Herat would be in no danger even if the 
Hussians were in possession of Merv, because the road between these 
places lies over an impracticable range ot mountains. 1 must, how- 
ever, take leave to deny ihis statement in tlie most decided manner. 
1 have been to the Herat valley, and have followed a considerable 
part of one ot the roads to Merv, and 1 have made the most careful 
inquiries from people on the spot who were in the constant habit of 
riding over the rest of the distance. Yet there is so little impression 
of difficulty on my mind, that 1 would undertake to drive a mail 
coach from Merv to Herat by this road." 

Still, English statesmen persisted in placing faith in great mount- 
ain barriers between Merv and Herat, and the Duke of Argyll, 
pooh-poohing Yalentine Baker and MacGregor, cracked an ele- 
phantine Joke by telling the public not to be " Mervous " about the 
fate of " a few mud huts." The Russians were welcome to Merv: 
when they got there they would be as far off India as ever. 

Much of the bad statesmanship of the time, as Ihave already said, 
must be ascribed to the confusion existing in tne minds of English 
politicians with regard 'to the double character ot the Russian ad- 
vance. There were ttvo movements, from bases thousands of miles 
apart, running in tlie direction of India; one from Orenburg and 
Tashkent over a colossal range, 15,000 to 20,000 feet high; the 
other, from the Caspian over a plain and occasional hills English 
politicians. Conservative as well as Liberal, mixed up one with an- 
other. Because the Turkestan line of advance was difficult, there- 
fore the Caspian line of advance was more or less impracticable. 
One has only to read the Candahar debates to see how widespread 
this confusion was, and how little even talented Conservative poli- 
ticians realized the real bearings of the new advance. Lord Salis- 
bury was the only one tvho thoroughly grasped the facts of the situ- 
ation. 

The " Paropamisus bugbear " was finally disposed of in 1882, 
when Lessar explored the country from Sarakhs to Herat, and dis- 



36 THE RUSSIAN'S AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

covered the iBOunlaia range, 15,000 feet high, to be simply a ridge 
of hills, with passes only 900 feet above Ihe surrounding locality. 
Across those passes from Sarakhs toHeiat, and from Merv to Herat, 
he found that a vehicle could be driven without the slightest diffi- 
culty. Practically, there was no barrier at all intervening between 
Herat and Merv. 

Lsssar's discovery provoked great attention on the part of experts 
in this country, but nothing was done by the Government to fill in 
the gap to which Petrusevitch had given prominence.* The Mar 
Quis of Eipon, ignoring General Roberts's appeal that he should do 
so, gave the Ameer a subsidy and some arms, but this was all. Na 
steps appear to have been taken to induce the Ameer to bulge out 
his Herati administration to the proportions indicated on English- 
official maps, until after the occupation of Merv. 

We thus see that the Government were well warned as to the- 
danger the gates of Herat would run of being captured after the- 
conquest of Merv, and upon the Marquis of Kipon and the Glad- 
stone cabinet must rest the blame of having refused lo take any steps- 
to protect them. From the time Petrusevitch crave England the hint 
of what Russia would do with the Turcoman wedge, up to the 
actual seizure of Merv, was a clear interval of three years. That 
precious period was allowed to pass away without the slightest effort 
to organize the Afghan frontier north of Herat. 

Consequently, when Komaroff occupied Merv in force on the 16tb 
of March, 1884, and turned his face toward Herat, the country lay 
practically open to him to the very walls of the Key of India. 

It was the consciousness of this that rendered the annexation of 
such serious import to me. I knew that Petrusevitch's suggestion 
that Russia should advance from Merv to the gates of Herat had 
been borne well in mind by the Russian Government, and I was well 
aware that the Marquis of Ripon had done nothing to anticipate this- 
movement. It was for this reason that, in issuing my new pam- 
phlet, 1 printed in capital letters the warning that *' The annexation 
of Merv, being inevitably attended with the incorporation of the 
ISarak Turcomans, will extend Russian rule to Penjdeh, or to within 
140 miles of the Key of India." 

The warning had but very slight effect upon the Government. 
Four or five months later the Ameer occupied Penjdeh, but— if the 
Times is to be believed— entirely on his own initiative. Con 
sidering the importance the Government suddenly attached to the 
gates of Herat alter the Russians had occupied them, would it not 
have been more sensible to have forestalled the aggressors? There 
was no one to prevent the Afghans occupying Ak Robat, Zulflkar, 
and Pul-i-Khatum months and months before the advance from- 
Merv took place; and, had the Government given the RussiaD men- 
ace adequate heed, they would have advised the Ameer to have done 
so instead of leaving him to act upon his own initiative. 

To prevent England adopting a course of this kind the Russian 
Government embarked upon a series of negotiations, which dawdled 

* A full account of Lessar's explorations, together with Alikhanoff \s narra- 
tive of his journey in disguise to Merv, was published in " The Russians at Mer-y- 
and Herat " in the spring of 1883 by the writer. Most of the twenty-two illus- 
trations accompanying it are from the talented pencil of Alikhanoff. 



THE KUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 



37 



on through the summer and enabled it to consolidate its position at 
Merv. 

As miojht be expected, when Koraaroff occupied Merv in March, 
the feeling ot the people for a time ran very strong against the Rus- 
sians. The least impulse from without would have set the Tur- 
comans in revolt This was the proper period for the A.meer ta 
have moved down the Hari Rud and Murghabto the limits assigned 
him on the Russian official maps — Sarakhs and Imam Bukash — and 
the question of delimitation could have been settled afterward. 




GENERAL ALEXANDER KOMAROFP. 



Such a move could have been easily accomplished in a.week or ten 
days. On neither river was there a man to oppose this advance, 
and it could have been eftected without spilling a drop of blood or 
wasting a singJe rupee. Under the supervision of two or three En- 
glish officers, the occupation of the Badgheis territory could have 
been carried out in such a manner that Russia would have been left 
without the slightest cause tor just complaint. 

The Turcomans of Merv would not have resented the approxima- 
tion of the Afghans, and if Russia. had sought to oppose the step, 
W3 could have responded to her threats by an intimation of the ease 



38 THE EUSSIAN"S AT THE GATES OE HERAT. 

with which she could be turned out of the district she had just an- 
nexed, contrary to the feeling ot the inhabitants. 

But a manly and statesmanlike policy was hardly to be expected 
Irom a Cabinet which by its vacillation had involved us in so many 
<lifficulties. In India it is an open secret that Sir Frederick Rob- 
erts, Sir Charles MacGregor, and other eminent generals, appealed 
in the strongest terms to the Marquis of Ripon to secure the gates 
of Herat before the Russians had time to advance from Merv. The 
Viceioy refused to take any action in the matter. " 

Thus the sore and hostile feeling of the Tekkes was allowed to 
die away, and Komarofit was left unchecked to consolidate his hold 
upon the newly conquered country. 

As soon as possible, the troops that had been concentrated in 
Khiva were dispatched to Merv. The Caucasus Regiment of Kuban 
Cossacks was also dispatched from the Caucasus to re-eoforce the 
garrison. In May Prince Dondukoft-Korsakoff, ihe Governor- 
general of the Caucasus, himself set out to visit Merv. The prince 
traveled through Turkmenia in a calash, and it may be interesting 
lo mention, that it, when he quitted 'Askabad, he had turned his 
course toward India, instead of t.owara Merv, he could have traveled 
^11 the way in that same calash to the Chaman outposts of Quetta, 

Advantage was taken ot the presence of the prince to accept the 
submission of the Sarik Turcomans dwelling at Youletan. This 
place naturally belongs to the Merv oasis, and the annexation of 
the few thousand Sarik families dwelling there, consequently, was 
■almost a matter of course. 

The case was different with Old Sarakhs, which was formally 
annexed by General Komaroff immediately afterward. Sarakhs, 
like Merv, had been dubbed by military men the key ot Herat. To 
a force advancing from Turkestan to Herat Merv is the key; to a 
torce advancing from the Caspian the key is Sarakhs. The two 
points are about 80 miles apart; Merv is 240 miles from Herat, and 
Sarakhs 202. Whatever may be the views of party politicians, the 
leading military men ot England and Russia have long regarded 
Sarakhs and Merv as the t;vo iieys of Herat— the two points where 
troops could concentrate and rest before maing their final advance 
upon the Key of India. 

Russia, through her diplomatic organs, intimated her intention of 
annexing Old Sarakhs in advance of the actual occupation. The 
news excited interest second onlj' to that provoked by the seizure of 
Merv. At this juncture. Lord Fitzmaurice exhibited a lamentable 
amount of flippant ignorance in replying to questions put to him in 
the House of Commons. First, he did not appear to know that 
there was such a place as Old Sarakhs, although it had been marked 
on Russian maps for years. Then, when the Foreign Office dis- 
covered the whereabouts of Old Sarakhs, the excuse was gratui- 
tously put forward on behalf of Russia tliat the point annexed was 
of very little importance. It was onl}^ a heap of ruins! 

What J. said at the time, in contending with this view, will he^x 
repetition now.* " From a strategical point of view, the one town 
is as good a base as another. To put the matter plainly, if London 

* Morning Post Leader, May 26, 1884. 



THE EUSSIAITS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 3^ 

were Herat, and North and South Woolwich Old and New Sarakhs 
respectively, the menace to the city would bt just as great from the 
W"ool«vich on the one side ot the river as from the Woolwich on the 
other. The circumstance of Old Sarakhs having been the first site 
occupied in ancient times, would appear to indicate that it is the besfe 
spot in the localitj^ tor a town. New Sarakhs was simply erected 
on the west side of the river by the Persians (who besieged and de- 
stroyed Old Sarakhs fifty years ago), because the river formed a 
prelection against the Turcomans of Merv. Rence, although the 
Russians are taking possession of a lot of ruins, they have presuma- 
bly secured the best site for an administrative center, where they 
will be able to draw away all the importance from the dirty, strag- 
gling Persian town lying across the water to the west." 

The error current at the moment was the ascribing of the strate- 
gical significance of Sarakhs to the site of the actual town instead of 
to the locality generally. There is a danger that this may be repeat- 
ed in the case of Herat also, and what 1 said in continuation may 
therefore be appropriately repeated: 

" Even had the Russians annexed the new town, they would have 
had to build their own cantonments,^ as at Tashkent; hence it is an 
altogether immaterial point whether they have got Old or New 
Sarakhs. They have secured all that they wanted, and all that En- 
glish strategists sought to deprive them of — a lodgment in the 
Sarakhs district — and from this new base they wilT be only 202 
miles, or five marches, distant from Herat. Of these tT» o hundred 
and two miles, 130 are uninhabited; consequently, the Russians can 
roam over the plain to Kusan, 70 miles from Herat, without being 
checked by a single Persian, Turcoman, or Afghan. Lord Fitz- 
maurice seems to imagine that English diplomacy has done enough 
in preserving New Sarakhs from Russia, or, rather, that Russia has 
been considerate enough in taking the old site — for English diplo- 
macy preserves nothing. Never was there a greater error. So lit- 
tle is Persian Sarakhs important as a fortified point, so little ad- 
vantage has it over half a dozen other spots in the same locality, 
that General MacGregor recommended that the Persians should shift 
the iort some miles from the present spot. 

" Hence it is no gain whatever to England that Russia should 
have spared New Sarakhs. If she be allowed to settle down on tne 
old site, she might just as well be allowed to have the new town as 
well. Seven hundred Persian soldiers are no menace to Russia, and 
directly she establishes herself at Old Sarakhs the Persian fort will 
become as valueless as the Martello towers on the Engiisn coast. 
On this account, looking at the matter from a broad, compiehen- 
sive, military and political point of view, and' ignoring the barley- 
corn measurements of English diplomacy, the occupation of Old 
Sarakhs by Russia possesses all the significance, and embodies all 
the menace, that has been ascribed to the act by the ablest generals. 
of England and Russia." 

Apart from its military significance, Old Sarakhs. was important 
politically, owing to the circumstance that the Afghan frontier was 
supposed to touch the Persian border near this point. For years 
the Persians had controlled the district, and Old Sarakhs was looked 



40 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HEKAT. 

upon as indisputably theirs. The Afghan frontier was regarded as 
commencing alongside it. 

By the submispioii of Youletan and Old Sarakhs, Russia secured 
the whole of the region of Central Asia lying outside the Afghan 
frontier marked on Russian and English official maps. She ob- 
tained thereby an excellent frontier, well rounded off, and there was 
absolutely no reason why she should have stepped across it into 
Afghanistan. England was angry that she should have seized Merv 
and Sarakhs in violation of her promises, but still, now that Central 
Asia was blotted out, the public were ready to condone the past. 
They admitted that there were plenty of excellent reasons to justify 
the annexation of the steppes aud khanates of Central Asia, and so 
long as the Afghan frontier was respected, they were prepared to 
overlook all that had been done to bring the Cossack cordon flush 
with the Ameer's dominions. 

On tliis account, England received with satisfaction the announce- 
ment that Sir Peter Lumsden had been appointed to proceed to 
Sarakhs to define the Russo-Afghan frontier to the Oxus. In order 
that the work might be well done, the Government assigned the 
envoy a brilliant siafl: of assistants. 

Sir Peter Lumsden was an officer of thirty-seven years' standing. 
He had seen seivice in various indlan frontier expeditions, the Cen- 
tral Indian campaign, under General R. Napier, and in the China 
war. irle served with several expeditions against the fronlier Iribcs 
between 1852 and 1856; was present as deputy quartermaster-general 
at the action of Punjhao in April, 1852; at Nowadund and other 
operations in the Renanzi valley in May, 1852; against the Bori 
Afridis in 1853; at Shah Mooseh Kheyl jigainst the Meranzi tribe in 
April, 1855; against Bussy Khilut Alum in 1855; and the Meranzi 
and Kooroon expedition in 1856 (tor which he received the special 
thanks of the Local and Supreme Governments). He was a mem- 
ber of the special military commission to Afghanistan in 1857--58, 
and again received the thanks of the Supreme Government, and was 
awarded a medal with clasp. He accompanied the expedition to 
China in 1860, and was present at the actions of Singho and Jan- 
chow, the assault and capture of the Taku forts, and the advance 
on Pekin, in connection with which operations he was mentioned in. 
the dispatches, received a medal with two clasps, and obtained the 
brevet of major. His latest active service was with the Bhotan field 
force in 1865, where he gained an additional clasp. From the fore- 
going summary of his career it will be seen that the commissioner 
possessed a considerable experience of Afghanistan and frontier 
affairs. He was also a member of tlie Indian Council. 

In India the appointment provoked expressions of disappoint- 
ment. The press, almost without exception, had selected General 
Sir Charles MacGregor for the task. This gallant and distinauished 
officer, the Skobeleff of India, possessed special qualifications for 
the mission. He had seen as much fighting service as Lumsden, 
and while the active military operations of the latter had terminatsd 
in 1860, MacGregor had participated in warfare so recently as 1879- 
81, acting as chiet of the stafC to General Roberts in Afghanistan. 
His reputation, theretore, stood high in Russia. 

1 say " therefore," because, while for oui- Afghan war as a whole 



THE EUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 41 

Eussia entertains a contempt, Roberts's operations liave always been 
singled out for special admiration. Skobeleft, and all of Skobeleff 's 
set, were never tired of extolling the march from Cabul to Canda- 
liar. " It was a splendid march," said Skobelell to me. " It wa& 
a grand operation of war," said Grodekofl. When 1 attended Sko- 
belefl's funeral, 1 was repeatedly questioned about the march by 
his officers, and Roberts's name was never mentioned without re- 
spect and admiration. 

Skobeleff always thought that he should some day lead an army 
against India His opponent in that case, he believed^ would be 
Roberts. Being a great man, in every sense of the terra, and not a 
mere military wasp, lil^e our arch-hater General Soboleff, he took 
a generous interest in the fortunes of his Indian rival, and 1 have 
every reason to believe that this generosity was reciprocated. I 
can say, at least, that the feeling was prevalent among Roberts's 
lieutenants. Shortly after Skobeleff's death. Sir Charles MacGreiror, 
in expressing to me his regret at his untimel}'' end, said that he ad- 
mired the brilliant young Russian general so much, that he had been 
anxious to undertake a journey to Europe solely and expressly for 
the purpose of making his acquaintance. 

Besides being Roberts's ablest lieutenant, MacGregor was the 
hero of an exploit which should endear him to every patriotic En- 
glishman. In 1875, having just finished for the Indian Government 
an elaboiate gazetteer of Afghanistan and Central Asia, which re- 
vealed the many serious gaps that existed in our knowledge of that 
region, he set out, at his own cost and risk, to make a survey with- 
out precedent in modern times. Riding from the Persian Gulf, he 
made his way to Herat, then worked round to Sarakhs, afterward 
pushed along the Turcoman frontier to the Caspian; and when this 
3,000 miles' ride was done, he quietly traveled on to the Caucasus 
and South Russia, and effected a survey of the Russian base also. 
Had he not been foolishly ordered home by the Government, he 
meant to have surveyed the country just seized by Russia, from 
Herat to Merv, and in that case the Paropamisus bugbear would have 
been exploded long before the Afghan war, and the evacuation of 
Candahar. rendered impossible. 

After this giand survey, for which, I may add, he was snubbed 
instead of being thanked by the authorities, he explored Beluchistan, 
fought alongside Roberts, and was then made head of the Intelli- 
gence Branch and Quartermaster-General ot India. In India it was 
a matter of notoriety that MacGregor had studied the Central Asian 
Question more thoroughly than any military man living, and hav- 
ing a keen perception of good strategical points, it was felt that he 
would have secured for Afghanistan the strongest possible frontier. 
Hence, when the Government selected Lumsden, a comparatively ' 
unknown man, there was a cry of bitter disappointment in India. 
The Government, it was said, was going tu patch up the Afghan 
frontier anyhow, as they had patched up everything else. 

As 1 do not know the actual reasons thaf mpelled the Government 
to choose Lumsden and reject MacGregor, I shold be sorry to con- 
demn the selection. I have always had a warm admiration for Mac 
Gregor, which has been repeatedly expressed in my works, and 1 
considered him the right man for the task. But the Government 



42 THE KUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

having, from reasons of their own, selected Sir Peter ]jumsden, it 
would have been unpatriotic and ungenerous to have caviled at the 
appointment. 

Before 8ir Peter Lumsden left for the frontier, 1 had the pleasure 
of a long conversation with him on Central Asian affairs generally. 
In order that it should be free and unrestricted, it was agreed that 
the discussion should be confidential. 1 am, therefore, precluded 
from going into details, but 1 may state that 1 was thoroughly 
pleased \\ith the Commissioner's clear appreciation of the issues at 
stake, and his determination to safeguard English interests. There 
were no traces of Russophobia in his talk, and 1 felt that it Russia 
were as really desirous of harmoiiiously arranging the frontier as 
she made out, there could be no possible hitch between him and his 
Muscovite colleague. 

1 may point out one very important advantage that has resulted 
from sending Lumsden to the frontier instead of MacGregor. The 
former had published nothing on Russia tnat intriguers in this coun- 
try could use against him, while the latter had expressed opinions 
in his books which, if detached and garbled, could have been made 
to convict him of Russophobia. Had the Skobcleff of India been 
therefore sent, all the complications that subsequently arose on the 
frontier would have been laid to his door, as a hater of Russia. This 
possibility was prevented by sending Lumsden, and not being able 
to blacken that prudent officer, the Russians have had to pile all the 
"blame on the Afghans and his subordinates. 

Very luckily, as events turned out, the Government provided the 
envoy with a splendid staff. Let me describe some of the members. 
Among those who proceeded from England, or joined the General 
on the way to Sarakhs, were Major Napier, Colonel Patrick Stewart, 
*^lr. Condie Stephen, and Captain Barrow, Napier, as 1 have al- 
ready said, had been to the Perso-Turcoman frontier in 1874. He 
"was there repeatedly in subsequent years on behalf of the Govern- 
ment, and thus was not only familiar with the region, but was also 
intimate with the leading Turcoman chiefs, and knew thoroughly 
the recent history of the contested country. 

Colonel Patrick Stewart was an Indian officer who had done a 
very patriotic thing in 1880. At that lime StiobeleS was massing 
his forces for the purpose, it was believed, of marching to Merv; 
and, in spite of the excitement provoked in this country thereby, the 
Government resolutely refused to send anybody to the frontier to 
"fijid out what he was actually doing. Whereupon, Colonel Patrick 
"Stewart, being at home on furlough, quietly proceeded lia Turkey, 
at his own expense, to the East, and, having by a circuitous route 
reached Ispahan, doffed his European garb, and departed disguised 
as an Armenian liorse-dealer. Speaking Armenian well, and being 
thoroughly acquainted with Eastern habits, Stewart preserved his 
disguise so well, that when, after twenty-six days' riding, he reached 
the frontier, close to Geok Tepe, and took a shop in the bazaar, he 
lived alongside Mr. O 'Donovan three weeks without the latter being 
aware that he was an Englishman. 

At length the Government got to know that he was stalking 
8Robelefl, and, to conciliate Russia, ordered him home; but they 
were so pleased with his conduct that they sent him out soon after 



THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 45 

to Khaf, a Persian town near Herat, "where lie could act as English 
agent for Western Afghanistan and watch Russia's operations with- 
out exposing Englana to the danger that might arise from having a 
political resident installed in the key of India. 

Stewart was acquainted with the Russian language, and so also- 
was Captain Barrow, another Indian officer of great ability, who, 
after studying it at the Staff College, had gone to Russia and buried 




MAJOK-GENERAL SIR PETER STARK I>UMSDEN, K.C.B., C.S L. 

COMMANDER OF THE AFGHAN BOUNDARY COMMISSION. 

himself for three months at Moscow to render his knowledge more 
perfect. There is little doubt that a distinguished career lies before 
him. The official Russian scholar, however, was Mr. Condie 
Stephen, Second Secretary to the Legation at Teheran. He had 
acquired the language so perfectly while attached to the Embassy at 
St. Petersburg, that he had been able to render into English a 
splendidly spirited translation of Lermantofl's great poem, " The 
Demon." He likewise had traveled along the Sarakhs frontier, and 
had been grossly insulted by a Russian olficial in 1883 in making 



44 THE KUSSIAKS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

liis way to the Atak oasis, for which M. de G-iers had made a lame 
and inadequate apology. Napier, Stewart, and Condie Stephen were 
thus three frontier experts, equal in knowledge and experience to 
any Russia could dispatch to confront them. Russia was perfectly 
aware of this. She therefore made no attempt to send any at all, 
and, instead, shot Gospodin Lessar into London. 

The escort and the surveying staff were furnished by India, and 
had to march thiough Afghanistan to Herat, and join Sir Peter 
Lumsden on the Perso- Afghan frontier. The contingent was com- 
posed of the following persons: 

Chief Political Officer: Lieutenant-colonel J. West Ridge ivay. 
Political Officers: Captain E. L. Luraud, Captain C. E. Yate, Mr. 
W. K. Merk, (Captain de Scessoi. Survey Officers: Major J. Hill, 
R.E.; Captain St. G. Gore, R.B.; Lieutenant the Hon. M. G. Tal- 
bot, R.E. intelli2:ence Department: Captain P. J. Maitland, Bom-" 
bay Staff Corps; Captain W. Peacock, R.E. Naturalists: Dr. J. 
E. T. Aitchison, CLE. Medical Officers: Dr. C.'Owen, CLE.; 
Dr. Charles. Native Attaches: Sirdar Mahomeii Aslam Khan, 
Rissaldai Baha-ud-kin Khan, Rissaldar Major Mahomed Hussain 
Khan, Sirdar Sher Ahmed Khan. 

Colonel Ridgeway, the officer in charge, was a man of great ex- 
perience. He received his military training in the 98th Regiment, 
and was appointed to the political service fifteen years ago by Lord 
Mayo, During the Afghan war he acted as political officer to Sir 
Frederick Roberts, and toolc part in all his military operations. At 
the close of the campaign he was made Foreign Under-Secretary to 
the Government of India. In this manner he was intimately ac- 
quainted with the outer politics of India, and knew thoroughly the 
views of the Government. 

Captain Duraud was a son of the hero Sir Henry Durand, and for 
several years had been acting as political agent attached to the ex- 
Ameer ^akcob Khan, the ruler who connived at Cavagnari's mur- 
der at Cabul. Captain Yate had been political agent at Kelat-i-ghilzai 
during the Afghan war, and had been besieged there by the enemy. 
Merli was a wonderful linguist, and was noted for nis skill in deal- 
ing with hill tribes. Scessoi was a Danish officer, who had once 
served in the Shah's army. Maitland and Talbot, Gore and Talbot, 
were Intelligence and Survey officers, noted for their pluck and 
capacity. The whole of the officers were picked men, and there 
was not one who had not participated more or less in hard fighting. 

As regards ihe naiive members, the}'- were all gentlemen of dis- 
tinguished character and antecedents, and most of them were 
Afghans. Sirdar Mahomed Aslam Khan was a brother of the 
British agent at Cabul, and had charge of the local tribal levies of 
the Khyber. Rissalder Major Mahomed Hussain Khan had been 
employed for years on various delicate political missions. Rissalder 
Major Baha-ud-din Khan had served in every Indian campalga for 
thirty years, and was Sir Frederick Roberts's faithful henchman at 
Sherpur and Candahar. Sirdar Sher Ahmed Khan was a cousin of 
the Ameer and a son of the present Afghan Governor of Candahar, 
and had served as Rideway's assistant at Cabul. These native 
colleagues of the English " politicals " were thus not only most of 
Ihera old personal friends and fellow-workers of tne latter, but were 



, THE EUSSIANS. AT THE GATES OE HEKAT. 45 

also closely connected with the Ameer's officials at Cabiil and 
Candahar. This was au immense advantage. 

But (his was not all. The Afghan Governor of Herat, the Naib-el- 
Hakmut Mahomed Sarwar Khan, was likewise an old friend of 
Hidgeway's. The mission was thus certain of a warm reception at 
Herat, Some troublesome tribes had to be passed at one section of 
-the road (a very small and insignificant section), but every assistance 
was to be expected from the Ameer's officials. 

To protect it against those tribes and any troubles that might arise 
on the Turcoman frontier, the mission was furnished with an escort 
composed of 200 men, splendidly mounted, of the 11th Bengal 
Lancers (better known as " Probyn's Horse ") and 250 bayonets of 
the 20th Punjab Infantry, than which no native regimeiit in the 
service contain? men of finer physique and bearing. Major Ironside 
Bax was placed in command, 

A correspondent who accompanied the mission says of these In- 
dian troops, "The infantry were almost all light-hearted, cheery 
Afreedees of the Khyber Pass. They walk with extraordinary 
xaiDidity, and are big men. Their march is as quick as the ordinary 
pace of the cavalry; they-are fine, high-spirited, tiee-spoken men. 
who cheer to the pipes' tunes as they march, and they come in at a 
swinging pace, with pipes playing, on each camping ground. The 
cavalry, Sikhs and Eajputs, are also splendid men, possessing ex- 
cellent spirits, and are well equipped for the journey." 

As usual, there were a large number of followers, and these swelled 
the total to 35 Europeans, and 1,300 natives. The transport consisted 
of 1,300 camels and 400 mules. 

To avoid any chance of complications, the mission was ordered 
to proceed to Herat, not by the direct Candahar road, but by a more 
circuitous route through country comparatively unpopulated, and 
consequently free from fanatics. 

Quitting Quetta on the 22d September, the party reached Herat 
on November 17th, having traversed over 700 miles,* at the average 
rate of eighteen miles a day, with relatively little hardship, and 
without any unpleasantness to speak of with the natives. The march 
was attended with a very important discovery. A route which had 
been hitherto treated as almost impracticable, was found to be 
available for the advance of a large army. 

In other words, if the Kussians penetrated to Herat by the easy 
roads Lessar had discovered, and we allo>ved them to remain there, 
they would be able with very little difficulty to advance into the 
heart of Afghanistan by the route opened up by Ridge tvay's party. 
Hence the discovery of the practicability of the Nushki route for a 
large force rendered Herat all the more significant as the Key of 
India, 

Arrived at Herat, Ridgeway was received in the heartiest manner 
by the Afghan Governor. "The two," says an eye-witness, 
^' shook each other warmly by the hands. The Naib was in the 
best of humoi ; his full jovial face, of an olive tint, had a merry 
look, and his lar^e soft eyes beamed a genial welcome. He looked 
such a Governoi as he was reported to be — mild in his rule, and in 

* 767 from Quetta to Kusan. 



46 THE RUSSIAi^S AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

his acts showing good sense and practical justice. The good spirits 
of the Naib appeared to have aflected the soldiers and irregular 
troops. They performed the exercises which we could see ihey 
thought would please us most. They were very anxious to win our 
opinion, and there was something very naive in the manner in which 
they tried to gain it. After the Naib and Colonel Ridgeway had 
shaken hands, the Afghan infantry were put in fours and marched 
by companies in front of the mission, with the cavalry in the rear- 
with each movement the bugles — sweet sounds they were, too — 
sounded. As the troops marched by, the buglers began to play a 
lively martial air with a French ring. The little we heara of the 
bugle march was most eftective. Many of the men wore woolly 
hats, which gave them a swaggering look. They were warmly clad 
and a large number had Sniders. The cavalry were well (^quipped 
and capable of going anywhere." 

Another officer present says: " The artillery, consisting of mount- 
ain guns, marched past first. The guns appeared to be in good 
order. The cavalry were rather mounted infantry, and, so far as 
dress and horse accouterments, they were perfectly equipped and 
were much admired by our officers. The irregular horse were bet- 
ter mounted, having larger horses, and had a gallant appearance. 
They rode by in a free easy pace, moving as if carefully trained. The 
officers were of manj'" types, but the one who attracted our attention 
most was a captain, who wore a felt hat, which, if not disrespect- 
ful, 1 should call a billycock hat with a stiff rim and a gold-colored 
spike on the top. The other portions of the captain's dress were 
equally original and displayed much character. He had an Irish- 
American look, which was exaggerated by a chin tuft, for the cap- 
tain shaved his cheeks, it was a much-disputed point whether the 
captain was an Irishman or not. 1 think he was not; but what dc 
ye faithful of Hind say to this? The captain had a bulldog, and an 
excellent one, that ran at his heels and followed him at the side ot 
his Herat regiment. And all this under the shade ot ISheik AbduUa 
Ansari in the Herat valley! It only shows in another way that the 
Afghans are not all the intoleraut fanatics they are supposed to be 
in England." 

Between 2,000 and 3,000 troops mustered on the ground, and 
their march past was an event of the highest political significance. 
For the first time, after two generations ot war, the Afghans passed 
in review befoie and saluted a British officer. 

While the Afghans and the Indian contingent were fraternizing in 
sight of Herat, Sir Peter Luuisaen was hastening to join them from 
Sarakhs. On the 19th of November, after a journey of 1,000 miles 
from Resht, on the Caspian, he joined Ridgeway's party at Kusan, 
70 miles west of Herat, close to the Persian frontier, greatly to , 
the relief of the Afghan Governor, for already events had occurred 
which had occasioned him deep anxiet3\ 

"Without waiting for the English and Russian fnmtier commis- 
sions to arrive upon the spot. General Komarolt had occupied Puh- 
K.hatun, on the, Hari Rud, and Alikhanoft was advancing up the 
Murghab. The gates of Herat were in danger. 

It has been said that the Afghans provoked this advance by seiz- 
ing Penjdeh, but there are one or two tacts that will eftectually 



THE EUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF. HEKAT. 47 

^clear the ground of this cuntentioD, Fenjdeh was occupied by the 
Afghans in June or July, 1884. Lumsden lett London in Septem- 
ber. The occupation ot Penjdeh had been announced in English 
papers a long lime before he left, and had been otficially admitted 
by the English Government. There was no secret whatever about 
it. Why did not the Russian Government raise and settle the ques- 
tion before Lumsden left England? They had already selected 
their commissioner, General Zelenoi,* and liiere was no reason why 
he should not have arrived at Sarakhs in advance ot Sir Peter 
Lumsden. Instead ot which they kept him back on various pre- 
texts, and when ours began to approach the frontier from Teheran, 
they pushed on their troops to Pul-i-Khatun, and endeavored to 
carry Penjdeh by a cowp de- main. 

Why the Russians sbould have made this dash at the gates of 
Herat is capable of simple explanation. 

We have seen that for some time after their seizure of Merv their 
position at Merv was unsafe. It was in March when they effected 
their swoop; it was in May that Youletan submitted — the Afgtiaus 
occupied Penjdeh late in June or early in July. Writing from Merv 
in May a correspondent of the Tifiis KavTcaz stated that there 
was slill a considerable amount of discontent in the Tekke oasis. 
Until this feeling subsided more, it was hardly safe to make a fresh 
advance. 

Still, Alikhanoff was not a man to rest inactive. The moment 
the Sariks of Youletan submitted, he commenced intrigues with the 
Sariks of Penjdeh. As I have already stated, Youletan is geo- 
graphically part of the Merv oasis. The 4,000 SariR families dwell- 
ing there consequently had always been on good terms with the 
Merv I'ekkes, and the fortunes of the two consequently traveled to- 
gether. But Penjdeh is 80 miles distant from Youletan, and the 
interval is an interval of desert. The fertile ground lies behind 
Penjdeh toward Herat. Thus, geograph it-ally, Penjdeh is to Herat 
what Youletan is to Merv, and the 8,000 Sarik families dwelling 
there had not only paid tribute to the Ameer for years, but were the 
fiercest enemies of tiie Merv Tekkes.f In this manner the submis- 
sion of the Youletan Sariks in no wise carried with it the submis- 
sion of tiie Sariks of Penjdeh. Had Alikhanotf advanced at once up 
the Murghab, the Afghan Sariks would have doubtless resisted his 
attempts to annex them. 

Aware of this, Alikhanoft sought to buy them over. He sent 
agents to Penjdeh to endeavor to persuade the people to declare for 
Russia. Reports of this reaching the Afghan Governor of Herat, 
he marched a small force to the place, and, with the perfect con- 
currence ot the inhabitants, erected a fort at Ak Tepe to protect 
them from Alikhanofl. 

Considerins the treacherous trick Alikhanoff had played 8d the 
people of Merv, and which was better known to the surrounding 

* It was erroneously stated, shortly after Lumsden left, that Russia had in- 
sulted England by appointing Alikhanoff as the frontier commissioner. There 
was no ground for this statement. Sir Peter Lumsden himself told me, before 
his departure, that Zelenoi had been chosen for the post. 

t See Petrusevitch's report in " Merv, the Queen of the World," and Lessar's 
accounts of his own explorations, in the " Russians at Merv." 



48 THE EUSSIAK'S AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

people than to this country, was there anything aggressive or ud- 
■warrantaDle in this? To my view, it was an unostentatious measure 
of detense of the most legitimate character, and no more carried 
with it any menace to the security of Merv than the English occu- 
pation of Cairo iu 1881 interfered with the interests of Timhuctoo. 
Russia was chagrined at the failure of her intrigues at Penjdeh, bu^ 
she masked her anger for the moment. She allowed two months to 
pass, apparently acquiescing in the occupation of Penjdeh. and at 
any rate refraining from the projected swoop upon the other gate& 
of the Key of India. She refrained, partly because she wanted to< 
make her Merv base safer, but mainly because she believed that the 
Indian contingent wouldnever traverse Afglianistan without a com- 
plication of some kind with the natives. 

It may be remembered that just before the departure of Ridge- 
way, frequent reports reached India of the presence of Russian se- 
cret agents at Cabul. How far these were true it is difficult to say*. 
One thing, however, is certain. Russian officers in disguise have 
unquestionably visited Cabul since we installed Abdurrahman as 
Ameer,* and as their presence was attended by the receipt of similar 
reports iu India, it is not improbable that some were there again last 
year. At any rale Russia believed for a long time that the Ameer 
would refuse to allow the Indian mission to pass through his do- 
minions and when his permission was given thej' relied upon the 
tieachery of his officials and the hostility of the people to prfvent it 
ever reaching Herat. When these expectations failed to be real- 
ized, decisive action was decided upon. Moving 40 miles south of 
Old Sarakhs, where he had established 200 infantry and several 
hundred Turcoman horse. General Komaroff placed a Cossack out- 
post at Pul-i-Khatun. 

This marked the beginning of the Russian advance from the 
Merv-Sarakhs bases upon the gates of the Key of India. 

Lumsden first heard of the movement at Meshed. Proceeding to 
Pul-i-Khatun he found the Cossacks established there, and pushing 
on to Sarakhs (Nov. 8) obtained a promise froln Komaroft that there 
should not be any further advance, pen fling the settlement of the 
frontier question by their respective governments. Alikhanoft was 
with Komaiofl at the time, and rode right thiough the English 
camp one day without taking any notice of the Commissioner. This 
insult caused a great talk at Sarakhs. Directly Lumsden left 
Sarakhs Alikhanoff set oil for Merv, and, taking with him several 
hundrea horsemen, pushed up to the Murghab, and tried to capture 
Penjdeh. 

lire Afghans, however, were again equal to the occasion. The 
moment Yalunlush Khan, Governor of Penjdeh, heard of the ad- 
vance, he sent a message to Ghaus-ud-din, Governor of Bala Murg- 
hab ^n the road to Herat), and the latter, viilh laudable prompti- 
tude and energy, started off, accompanied by all his cavalry, with a 
foot soldier behind each trooper. At the same time he dispatched a 
courier to Herat for reinforcements. Arrived at Penjdeh, he found 
Alikhanoff posted at Pul-i-khisti, a few miles distant. To him he 

* See narrative of Samuel Gourovitch, interpreter to the Venkhovsky secret 
mission of 1882, in " The Region of Eternal Fire." 



THE KUSSIAKS AT THE GATES OE HERAT. 49 

at once sent a message, asking him if he meant to fight or not, 
trankly in terming him that he was ready tor the conflict. Ali- 
khanoff, disappointed at being outwitted, returned a savage and in- 
sulting ietter to the Afghan general, and withdrew. Had he nol 
done so, the Afghans were so excited that they would have proba- 
bly attacked him. According to a correspondent, their blood was 
up, and they were most anxious to fight. 

Russia, having now cast off the veil, no longer attempted conceal- 
ment. Her Cossacks were pushed forward as fast as they could,, 
and occupied in swift succession the Zulfikar Pass, Ak Robat, and 
otber avenues to Herat. 

It has been said that Afghan restlessness provoked this advance. 
This 1 am able to deny on unquestionable authority. The Ameer's 
right to Penjdeh will be dealt with directly. The annexation of 
that place, as 1 have demonstrated, provoked no feeling in Russia, 
and evoked no immediate reciprocal move. The real Afghan ad- 
vance that Russia puts forward as excusing her own advance, subse- 
quent to Sir Peter Lumsden's arrival, was the advance from Penj- 
deh to Sariyazi,,a short distance to the south. But what are the facts 
of the case? There was no occupation of Sariyazi in the annexa- 
tionist sense of the term. Hearing that the Russians had advanced 
from Sarakhs to Pul-i-Khatun, and tried to cut off some Afghan 
horsemen, led by an Afghan official, proceeding to join Sir Peter 
Lumsden, the plucky Governor of Bala Muighab 1 iiave just de- 
scribed thought that the Russians meant war. They w^ere advanc- 
ing up the Hari Rud toward Herat; perhaps they were also moving 
up the parallel River Murghab in the same direction. He was in 
charge of the Murghab line ot defense. It was his duty to bar the 
road to Herat. He, therefore like a good soldier, sent out an Afghan 
picket to Saiiyazi, so that Fort Ak Tepe at Penjdeh might know in 
time of the advance of the enemy. Sariyazi was not on Merv soil^ 
whether, it was Afghan or not. Thanks to this picket, when Ali- 
khano9 did advance with his horsemen, his approach was signaled 
in time, and his coup de main frustrated. 

Thus there w^as no restlessness, no aggression on the part ot the 
Afghans. They set an example of good order and good faith to the 
Russians, which would have done credit to any civilized power. 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE QUESTION OP THE BOUNDARIES. 

Bussia's claim to the gates of Herat — The original agreement between England 
and Russia as to the Afghan frontier— The disputed territory—Discrep- 
ancies in EngUsh official 'maps — The frontier generally recognized by the 
two countries — Skobeleff 's map of Merv and Herat, showing what Russia 
regarded as the frontier in 1881— Lessar's mission to London — The Russian 
claims impartially considered. 

Russia's claim to cave in the Afghan frontier appears to have 
been first oflicially made shortly after the annexation ot Merv, 
when the Russian General Staff issued a sixpenny map, showing 
the Saraklis-Oxus border bulged in to within 50 miles of Herat. 
This, 1 believe, was the first ofiicial intimation that Russia had 
adopted Petrusevitch's idea. 



50 THE EUSSIANS AT THE GATES OE HEUAT. 

1 issued a fac-simile copy of the map, which found its way into 
the principal English newspapers, and the Russian claim was indig- 
nantly denouDced, Still, none the less, the impression prevailed 
that the map was only a feeler. Russia had demanded a good deal, 
in the hope of getting at least some small concession. The English 
Oovernment had a reputal ion tor yielding to pressure. When Sir 
Peter Lumsden left England, it was generally believed by those be- 
hind the scenes that England had surrendered Pul-i-Khatun. I 
can not say how far this report was true. 1 simply record what 
impression prevailed at the time. 

Dn this account, when the news was telegaphed from Meshed^that 
the Russians had occupied Pul-i-Khatun, it fell to a certain extent 
flat. Russia had greedily taken in advance what had been promised 
her after the frontier was settled, and the move was simply another 
instance of her barbarous manners. It was-never imagined that she 
claimed all the Afghan territory to the gates of Herat, 

At length, after a deal of uneasiness and indignation had been ex- 
pressed at Zelenoi's unaccountable tardiness in proceeding to the 
Afghan frontier, it became suddenly known in London that Russia 
had pushed up to Penjdeh. While the excitement was still in prog- 
ress, the Russian Government unexpectedly dispatched the ex-rail- 
way engineer, Lessar, to London to expound its claims. The de- 
mands of Russia then became public, - 

An elaborate account of these demands, with the Russian argu- 
ments in favor, and the English arguments against them, would 
only tire the reader. Let me, therefore, put the case as shortly, but 
as plainly, as possible. 

In 1872 elaborate negotiations took place between the Russian 
and English Governments with regard to the north east Afghan 
frontier^ The Russian advance then lay through Turkestan, and 
the Orenburg Cossacks had reached the Oxus. It was necessary, 
therefore, to define in some manner the Oxus side of the Ameer's 
dominions. After long negotiations this was accomplished, and as 
since there has been no infringement of that frontier, we may dis- 
miss it without further remark. 

Respecting the north-west border, from the Oxus to Persia, the 
settlement was not so satisfactory, nor could it be so. The Russians 
even then had designs upon Merv, which we wished to treat as part 
of Afghanistan, and they, therefore desired to draw the line south 
of it. By assenting to this, it was thought at the time we should 
surrender ihe Tekhe oasis to Russia. Ultimately the matter was left 
open. 

Considering that the Turcoman barrier was still unbroken, that 
Herat was in a turbulent condition, and that the Merv region 
seethed with disorder, this course of action on the part of the two 
Governments can not be severely criticised. They had fixed the 
8tartina;-point of the line at Khoja h'aleh, on the Oxus, which no 
Russian has since contested, and if the term, "Persian frontier," 
or " Hari Rud," be not a precise termination, we must bear in mmJ 
that the gaze of the two Governments and the two nations was not 
fixed upon the end of the line, so much as upon the middle. There 
was no quarreling about the termination of the line, only whether 
the line itself should curve north or curve south. If it curved north 



THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 51 

Merv was included in Ati?hanistan; if south, it "was excluded from 
it. As time passed on, the English and Russian Governments de- 
cided to treat it as excluded from Afghanistan although this coun- 
try still reserved its right to watch the fortunes of the Tekkes. 

As regards the terminal point, discrepancies undoubtedly exist 
on the official maps of the two countries, hut an overwhelming 
majoritj'' of both fix it at Sarakhs, and it is particularly noteworthy 
that cartographical harmony was arrived at during the period iia 
mediately preceding the advance upon Merv. The map that Skobe- 
leff usea in his Turcoman war of 1881 traced the frontier from 
Khoja Saleh to Sarakhs identically with Arrowsmifh's map ot 1875, 
published in Kawlinson's "Englanl and Russia in the East '' — 
that English official text-book "of the early phases of the Central 
Asian question — and this line was practically admitted by ]lussian 
diplomacy. 

We may say, in short, that after Russia began to push seriously 
toward Merv, the Sarakhs-Khoja-Saleh line was tacitly adopted by 
the statesmen of the two countries as the north-west frontier of 
Afghanistan, It is well that there should be no misconception about 
this. Russia knew that England considered this line tne Afghan 
frontier, and, therefore, when her statesmen gave assurance after 
assurance that they would not violate the integrity of Afghanistan, 
they were aware that England accepted those assurances in good 
faith as implying that the Sarakhs-Khoja-Saleh boundary would be 
respected. 

!Nay, Russian statesmen themselves by their words fixed the line, 
and showed that they recognized Sarakhs as the terminal point. Let 
me quote one instance. Early in 1882, a year before the swoop on 
Merv took place, England endeavored to persuade Russia to come 
to some settlement about the Perso-Turcoman frontier, stretching 
from near Askabad to Sarakhs. Russia in reply said, in effect, that 
it was no business of England's, but, if she liked, she would dis- 
cuss the settlement ot the Afghan boundary beyond, from Sarakhs 
to Khoja Saleh. 

This recognition of the Sarakhs line was made during a special 
interview between Prince Lobanoff and Earl Granville on February 
22, 1882. Directly the Russian Embassador was gone. Earl Gran- 
ville wrote to Sir Edward Thornton as follows: " Prince Lobanoff 
said he had now received the reply of his Government, They ac- 
knowledged the continued validity of the agreement formerlj'- en- 
tered into by Prince Gortschakoff, by tvhich Afghanistan was ad- 
mitted to be beyond the sphere of Russian influence. That agreement 
was, however, as I had said, incomplete; and they were ready to 
supplement it by a settlement of the frontier of Afghanistan irom 
the point where it had been left undefined " {i.e., the Oxus at 
Khoja Saleh) '' as far as Sarakhs.'' Thus the Russian Embassa- 
dor in London treated Sarakhs as tne ending point. Five weeks 
later M. de Giers discussed the whole subject with Sir Edward 
Tiioruton, when the Russian statesman stated positively that " Rus- 
sia had no intention ot advancing toward Merv or Sarakhs, or oc- 
cupying any territory beyond what was already in her possession." 
At the end of the dispatch Sir Eilward Thornton observes: " M. de 
Giers added that, with a view to preventing disturbances on the 



§2 THE EUSSIAKS AT THE GATES OP HERAT. 

borders of Afghanistan, he considered it to be of great importance 
that the boundary of that country /r(9wz KJioja Saleh to the Persian 
frontier in the neighborhood of Sarakhs should be formally and 
definitely laid down, and thai he had instructed Prince Lobanoff to 
endeavor to induce her Majesty's Government to agree to the adop- 
tion of measures for that purpose,"* 

Thus Russian diplomatists, as well as the official military map- 
makers, regarded tiie Afghan frontier as running from Khoja Saleh 
to Sarakhs, and the only point really undetermined by diplomacy 
was, where it crossed the Murghab River; but here, again, as Rus- 
sian diplomatists followed their military map-makers as regards the 
two terminal points, it was a fair assumption that the.y followed 
them alsc> in regard to the Murghab section. When English states- 
men asked the statesmen os Russia for assurances, and the latter 
gave the solemn word of the Emperor that Afghanistan should be 
respected, those military maps, English and Russian, were, in al- 
most every instance, and probably in all, lying on the tables or 
placed on the walls of the rooms where those assurances were given, 
To say, tberefore, that Russian statesmen did not have the Sarakhs- 
Khoja-Saleh line in view, and in their minds, when they made 
those assurances, is to say that they were simply pla3'ing the part of 
blackleg lawyers, or Jesuits of the darkest hue. 

Now this line not only includes Penjdeh, which is a good forty 
miles^to the south of i(, and Sariyazi, which is at least twenty, but 
also every point claimed or occupied by Russia. The Ameer, in 
occupying Penjdeh, simply occupied what Russian maps showed to 
be in his dominions. On the other hand, when Komarofi, many 
weeks later, occupied Pnl-i-Khatun, 39 miles from Sarakhs; he oc- 
cupied what Russian maps excluded from Turkmenia and also 
placed in Afghanistan. He violated, in short, the integrity of the 
territory of the Ameer. And the further he subsequently advanced, 
to Zulfikar and Ak Robat, the more he violated tliat integrity. In 
one plain word, he invaded Afghanistan. Hb crossed the line which 
Russian statesmen, in giving their assurances, had always treated 
as the boundary of the Ameer's dominions. Had Skobelelt marched 
to Merv in 1881, his movements would have been regulate il by that 
line, for it was marked on the map which he used at the seat of 
war, and which is now in my possession. It bears the imprint of 
the Russian General Staff, 1881 (copies of it exist at the Foreign 
Office), and it was given me by General GrodekofT, the chief of his 
staff at Geok Tepe, in 1882. 

The occupation of Penjdeh by the Ameer having preceded by a 
considerable time the Russian annexation of Pul-i-Khatun, let me 
deal with it first. In starting, 1 would point out that while one or 
two Russian maps anterior to 1881 show discrepancies in crossing 
the Murghab, they all of them unanimously assign Penjdeii to Af- 
ghanistan. Nor Is this remarkable. Before the Sariks occupied the 
place it belonged to the Jemshidis, subjects of the Ameer. Tbe Sar- 
iks formerly dwelt at Merv. In 1856 the Tekkes migrated thither, 
and afte a struggle compelled the Sariks to withdraw higher up the 
Murghab, Pait of them, as I have said, stopped at Youletan, geo- 

* Blue Book, Central Asia, No. 1, 188i. 



THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 



53 







1 ' 

J, 



25 



r'Sariyazi; 



4>Pul-i-Klxatun 



PGnjdcli 



^^^2f5^^ 



^o\Zulfikar 



pBaia 
IMurghal 



%, % 

S """life 




^.J^Robat Pass 









^•-op 



^^^^ 



amisus Hills 
O HERAT 



^m.. 









RUO^ 



MAP SHOWING THE DISPUTED TERRITORIES. 



54 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

graphically part of the Merv oasis; but the rest, numbering over 
6,000 families, moved higher up, traversing the desert section of the 
Murghab, and drove the Jemshidis out of Penjdeh, The Jems- 
hidis, in their turn, also moved higher up, to vs^ithin a short dis- 
tance of Herat. 

But it is well to bear in mind that these Sariks, having seized 
Afghan lands, paid annually tribute to the Ameer for them. The 
receipts of the tribute received are contained in the books of the ad- 
ministrative of Herat, and there can be therefore no doubt on this 
point. It has been said that the tribute was not paid without the 
dispatch of troops to the district, but this does not invalidate the 
Ameer's claim. For instance, as I pen this very passage, the tax- 
gatherer has sent in lo say that it my taxes are not paid within three 
days he will distrain for them. 1 reply, telling him to be hanged, 
but this retort to his threat of force does not dispose of the right of 
the Government to treat me as a subject, and seize my property if 
the taxes are not paid. ]n Afghanistan, and, in fact, in all Eastern 
countries, the soldier is invariably the tax-gatherer. Throughout 
the whole of the Russian Asiatic dominions the Cossack goes round 
with the tax-gatherer, and, but for the Cossack, the taxes would 
very often not be paid. The collection of taxes or tribute at Penj- 
deh by the occasional dispatch of Herati horsemerr, therefore, was 
simpl}'- part and parcel of a prevailing system in the East, and not 
an exceptional case. The contention that Penjdeh was not an Af- 
ghan district because the Sariks (like myself) were sometimes remis& 
in paying their taxes, will not hold water one moment. 

Having treated Penjdeh as an administrative part of Herat &o 
many years, the Afghan authorities were consequently within their 
rights ivhen they sent a small force there in June or July, 1884, to 
protect it from seizure by Alikhanoft. They knew how treach- 
erously Russia had acted at Merv, and had every reason to believe 
that Alikhanoff was bent upon seizing Penjdeh. 

1 have already said that the subsequent advance twenty miles to 
Sariyazi was simply the pushing out of a picket to give warning of 
the expected Russian approach, and that had not Russia seized Pul- 
i-Khatuu, no such movement would have been made. There was, 
therefore, no provocation on the Afghan side. 

With regard to Russia the case was different. Pul-i-Khatun, and 
the rest of the uninhabited points up the Hari Rud south of Sarakhs, 
had never been part of the Merv territory, nor had the Mervie ever 
had control of the districts. Those districts were unprotected, 
simply because the raids of the Tekkesupon Persia had driven back 
the people to the Paroparaisus or elsewhere, or had exterminated 
them outright. But although the Mervis raided across the country 
in pushing toward Persia, they never attempted to hold it; for geo- 
graphically it had no connection with Merv whatever. The argu- 
ment has been put forward that the Russians had a right to seize it 
because it was " unoccupied," but if that argument were allowed to- 
pass, a large proportion of the coast line of Australia could be seized 
on the same grounds; and, applying it to Russia, hundreds of miles 
of coast line in the Pacific and on the White Sea would be open to 
seizure, not being occupied or administered. 

If the Afghans had been making preparalions to march to Pul-i- 



THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HEEAT. 55 

Khatun, there might have been some justification for Komaroff's 
occupation of it; but they were quietly posted at Fenjdeh, awaiting 
Lumsden's arrival. Before even Lumsden himself could make any 
preparations of the kind, and give provocation thereby, the Rus- 
sians had advanced and seized all the territory they could lay their 
liaDds on without actually dispossessing the Afghans. In some 
places they pushed behind the Afghans, as at Ak Robat, which is 
considerably to the rear of Penjdeh, and within eight miles of Herat, 

On this account, 1 hold that this rush to the gates of Herat was a 
violent and treacherous proceeding, having all the characteristics of 
the swoop upon Merv. 

While the movement was being made toward Herat, " by the ex- 
press orders of Prince Dondukoft-Korsakofi:," as Komarofi gave 
out, the Russian Government was effecting an operation of another 
kind, which indicates the kind of enemy jve have to deal with. Im- 
agining there were no experts in London, Liimsden having taken 
with him Stewart, ]Napier, and Condie Stephen to the frontier, it 
suddenly dispatched their own chief agent, Lessar, to this country. 
Russia delights in strokes of this sort. She always does " the unex- 
pected." in 1878, when we were Increasing our fleet to fight her, 
she suddenly dispatched sailors to America and bought ships, with 
the intention of slipping out of the Atlantic ports and preying on our 
commerce. Our fleet she did not, mean to notice at all. No country 
is more ready to discover the weak points of a rival, and to take ad- 
vantage of them, than Russia. She displayed this clearly enough 
when she sent Lessar to London. 

1 say this without making any reflection upon Lessar personally, 
for my high opinion of him has been repeatedly avowed in my books. 
1 may even go so far to claim that the reputation which he possessed 
in the eyes of the public and Government of this country, on his ar- 
rival in February, was largely a reputation of my own creation. 
When Lessar's name was first heard in this country in 1882, it was 
coupled with the epithet of " spy" and " secret agent." I defended 
Mm against those charges. Year after year, as 1 described his suc- 
cessive explorations in my books, ^ and expounded their impor- 
tance, 1 insisted upon the honest, sincere, and unaffected character 
of the clever young explorer. This opinion was not simply based 
upon what had been said to me bj'' his superiors in Russia, but upon 
what I had heard from Russian friends of mine, who knew him 
well. 1 may add that this attitude was not lost upon Lessar, for, 
shortly after his arrival in London, he thanked me warmly in a let- 
ler for the kindly manner 1 had always referred to his surveys. 

Hence, i wish it to be clearly understood that in saying what fol- 
lows, 1 am inspired by no animus against Lessar, nor do 1 wish to 
excite any prejudice against his person. 1 criticise his mission, and 
the Government that created it; if my remarks appear to touch Les- 
sar himself sometimes, I must ask that they be understood as apply- 
ing to him, not as the eminent explorer, hut as the mouthpiece of 
the Russian Foreign Oflice. 

Up to the time of the swoop upon Merv, Gospodin Lessar was 

*"The Eussian Advance," 1882; the "Eussians at Merv and Herat," 1883; 
■"Eeconnoitring Central Asia," 1884. 



56 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

simply a railway engineer. It was in that capacity lie had been dis- 
patched on his first smvey in the direction of India in 1881, and he 
was still a TclmwGnik attached to the Ministry ot Railways. The 
Russian Government was perfectly aware of the high estimation in 
which this railway engineer was held in England. It therefore 
suddenly turned him into a diplomatist, and, after a decent interval;, 
with equal suddenness seut him to London. 

His proper place, of couise, was on the Afghan frontier, as ad- 
viser to Zelenoi. Russia had no intention of sending Zelenoi 
thither. She had certainly appointed him before Lumsden left 
London, but she had only done this to gain tiiue to mature her mil- 
itary preparations for seizing the gates of Herat. Once those gates 
were seized, she no longer needed a delimitation commission. TV hat 
she needed was to break down English opposition to that seizure. 
For this purpose, it was necessary to create a " cave" in English 
opinion: to divide the country on the subject, and to force the Gov- 
ernment to yield to the pressure of accomplished facts. 

To realize this treacherous aim Lessar was sent to London. 

Without dipping too deeply into a very unpleasant subject, I may 
recall to the reader the very strong pro-Russian influence that was 
exercised in 1877-78, through books, pamphlets, and the press, by 
Madame de Novikofl, otherwise O. K., and the gioup of admirers 
she gathered around her. 1 will not discuss whether tbat influence 
was good or bad, but 1 will point out that it was a strong influence, 
and that it exeicised an effect upon English public opinion and upon 
the policj'^ of the Government. At any rate, that, at least, was the 
impression in Russia. 

What, therefore, M. de Giers had in view when he dispatched this 
amiable young traveler, Lessar, to London was, the formation of 
another pio-Kussian i)arty. He trusted to winning the battle of the 
boundaries, not on the frontier, but in the midst of distracted Eng- 
land. 

It was rather cruel, using such a weapon against Mr. Gladstone. 

Fortunate!}'-, party feeling did not run so high as in 1878, and 
Lessar found when he arrived a solid block of public opinion op- 
posed to his pretensions. Still, he was not altogether without suc- 
cess. The Pall Mall Gazette opened its columns to his pen and be- 
came his mouthpiece. The wires of the press were pulled, and all 
manner of charges raked up against the Afghans. Even Sir Peter 
Lumsden 's mission was assailed. 

Let me give an example ot some of these unscrupulous charges. 
On February 24th the Fall Mall Gazette published a long letter from 
Madame de Novikoff at St. Petersburg, in which that lady said that 
" one who is of the highest authority on all matters relating to the 
foreign policy of our Empire " had told her Penjdeh had been occu- 
pied by the Afghans at the instigation of Mr. Condie Stephen and 
other subordinates of Sir Peter Lumsden. " 1 have just had a most 
interesting conversation," said Madame de ISTovikoff, " with one 
who is of the highest authority on all matters relating to the foreign 
policy of our empire. . . . 1 asked him to tell me ([uite frankly 
the mrite wxiie about our alleged advance in Herat. * The question,' 
he replied, ' is as simple as possible. We do not want Herat, and 
we cannot get it. If we seized it, it would bring us into conflict not 



THE KUSSIAi^S AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 57 

only with the Afghans but also wilh Persia (sic), not to speals of 
England.' ' But,' 1 rejoined, ' have we not already made a toiward 
movement which we thought unnecessary!' ' Yes,' he ansv\'ered, 
* but do you know how this came to pass? Unfortunately, Sir Pe- 
ter Lumsden has taken with him two or three young fellows like 
Mr. Stephen, who speak Russian, and who imagine that they can 
serve their cause, or the cause of England, by inciting the Afghans 
to occupy positions in advance of their own frontier. The Afghans, 
acting under the instigation of these young Englishmen, occupied a po- 
sition at Penjdeh, in teiritory which had never been under Afghan 
rule. . . . Our military people, hearing and seeing everywhere 
evidences of English hostility and Eughsh intrigues, immediately 
responded to the Afghan advance by a further advance on their 
own account, and Ihey went further than was either prudent or use- 
ful. Thus a mistake has been made on both sides, but the initiative 
has been taken by the English or by those among them who pushed 
the Afghans forward to go where no Afghan had ever been be- 
fore.' " 

Now there Is only one English expression that will fitly describe 
all the foregoing. That expression is a strong one, but it is no 
stronger than any judge would apply to it at a court of law. The 
whole statement is a " pack of lies," 

It this expression seems severe it should be remembered that 
Ijumsden and his subordinates, honorable English gentlemen, and 
not intriguers like Alikhanoft, were far away from home when 
their character was thus grossly assailed, and that they were tra- 
duced by an intriguing agency planted in our midst for the purpose 
of enabling Lessar to secure for Russia what he could have never 
obtained by fair argument on the frontier. 

In the first place, it was announced in all the English and Rus- 
sian newspapers before Sir Peter Lumsden, with Mr. Stephen, left 
England, that the Afghans had occupied Penjdeh, so that the as-, 
sertion that Mr. Stephen instigated them to do it is absurdly men- 
dacious. Mr. Stephen traveled with Sir Peter Lumsden the whole 
way, and it was long before they reached the frontier that they 
heard Komaroff had seized Pul-i-Khatun. The two then proceeded 
straight to Sarakhs to see Komaroff and protest, and they were told 
that Komaroff had been ordered to advance by the orders of the 
Russian Government. Thus we see that the Russians advanced 
long before Sir Peter Lumsden and his rash " young Englishmen " 
arrived on the scene, and the statement 4heref ore tnat they egged 
on the Afghans, and thereby provoked it, is an obvious falsehood. 
What 1 say of Lumsden's own party applies equally to the Indian 
contingent. The Afghans did not advance an inch after the En- 
glish arrived at Herat, and as the Pul-i-Khatun movement of Russia 
was made anterior to our arrival, it is therefore false to say that we 
incited the Afghans to aggression. 

It is unpleasant to have to say it, but Madame de ISovikoff is given 
to making charges of this kind. It would be easy to mulilply in- 
stances of her " special pleading." Let me quote a characteiisl'.c 
instance. In 1881, while Skobeleff was besieging Geok Tepe a 
certain Captain Butler, out of a desire tor notoriety, wrote to the 
Globe, intim.ating that he had helped the Tekkes to fortify the 



58 THE^ RUSSIAl^S AT THE GATES OP HERAT. 

place. The assertion occasioned a good deal of annoyance to our 
government, and being altogether unlounded Butler was placed on 
the retired list. In Russia, what he said was never taken seriously, 
and not only did the press pooh-pooh his pretensions, but Skobeleff 
himself laughed at the idea. My conversation with him on the 
matter was published in " The Russian Advance Toward India,"^ 
which book contained further the opinions of Grodekoft, etc., com- 
pletely disposing of Butler's claim. Not long afterward Madame 
de Novikofl published a work called ' Skobeleft and the Panslavist 
Cause." In this she embodied the whole of my conversation with.. 
Skobeleff, but suppressed tbe bit about Butler. Then at the end, 
when she made an onslaught on Rawlinson and the Russophobes, 
she penned this assertion: " The Atrek frontier was the line along 
which your Central Asians and ours elected to fight. An English 
officer, Butler, foriified Geok Tepef" 

Yet O. K. knew when she penned this passage that Butler did 
not fortify Geok Tepe, and that her idol, Skobeleff, who was surely 
a good judge, had declared he had not. But she wanted to make 
a case against England, and was ready to write that black was 
white, and white was black, in order to further her ends. 

The Pall Mall Gazette proved an efficient organ for the pro- 
Russian party. Day after day it formulated the charges against the 
Afghans, and suppressed facts that clashed at all with its views. An 
illustration may be given of this. On February 27th it published 
an aiticle, entitled, " Is Penjdeh in Afghanistan?— by a Russian " 
(ascribed by the Moscow Gazette to Lessar), in which an elpborate 
attempt was made by references to faulty, obsolete English maps, 
and the works of two or three careless authors, to prove that Penj- 
deh was not in the Ameer's dominions. I thereupon wrote a short 
letter stating the facts about the Russian official maps 1 nave men- 
tioned, and which Lessar had ignored, and 1 inclosed a fac-simile 
sketch of the frontier on Skobeleff 's map. Both of these were sup- 
pressed. ^ 

But this was only a minor matter. On the 12th. of March it pub- 
lished a special article, with a map, in which it claimed that Lessar's 
demaads w^eie moderate, on the ground that 1 myself had assigned 
to Afghanistan a frontier line in 1881 further south than the one he 
proposed. 

I have already spoken of Petrusevitch's idea of thrusting a wedge 
from Merv and Sarakhs to the gates of Herat. That idea, 1 men- 
tioned, seemed to me so fraught with danger, that 1 wrote a book 
on it — " Merv the Queen of the World " — illustrating the serious, 
character of the claim in a series of maps. On those maps 1 drew 
the Afghan frontier as Petrusevitch desired it to be, and J said on 
the first of the series that the frontier was Petrusevitch's. The 
whole purport of the book, I should add, was to expose and de- 
nounce this pretension. "Well, the Pall Mall Gazette, \ snoring the 
whole book, tore out one of the maps, and declared that *' 1 " had. 
assigned the wedge frontier to Afghanistan, and had supported it! 

Now, if the Russian case was so sound why was all this lying 
needed? As a retort, let me mention something about the Pall Mall 
Gazette. On the 22d of February, 1884, it published an article with. 
a map, in which it denounced the fuss about the annexation ot 



THE EUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 59 

Merv, implying- it would lead to nothing further, and said that 
*' Mr. Charles Marvin and Mr. Ashmead Bartlett were the only ttvo 
alarmisis in the country." In that map the Pall Mall Gazette itself 
traced the Atghan trontier as running trom Sarakhs to Imam 
Bukush. north of all the country now occupied by Kussia. 

It was by such artifices as the manipulation of my maps that the 
pro-Russian party in London did their best to break down English 
•opposition to the Russian retention of the gates of Heiat. Lessar's 
mission was not wholly without success. If he did not create a 
-cave, he made a rift in English public opinion. When he first 
arrived the Gladstone Government angrily demanded that Russia 
should immediately withdraw from the gates of Herat. England 
virtually presented an ultimatum. Before he had been a month in 
London the^Government, yielding to the insidious pressure exercised 
at home, and the determined front made by Russia on the Afghaa 
frontier, withdrew that ultimatum. 



CHAPTER V. 

HOW HERAT IS THE KEY OF INDIA. 

Misconceptions respecting Herat — ^What Russian and English generals really 
mean when they call it the Key of India — The midway camping-ground 
between the Caspian and India — ^Russia's intrusion on the catnping-ground 
—Character of the country claimed or occupied by Russia— Impossibility of 
severing it from Herat — No mountain barrier whatever between Herat and 
the new Russian outposts — The tribes on the Russo-Afghan frontier — Rus- 
sia's design on Afghan Turkestan. 

"A BODY of European troops established at Herat, and standing 
"with its front to ihe south-east, would draw upon it the attention of 
the whole population ot India. In that lies the significance of a mili- 
tary occupation of Herat; and it is not without reason that a num- 
ber of English experts, knowing India well, have expressed their 
belief that were an enemy to occupy Herat with a powerful force, 
the English army, without having fired a shot, would consider itself 
lialf beaten," 

These words were penned by General Soboleff in 1882. He was 
then chief of the Asiatic branch of the General Staff, and exercised 
a large control over the Russian military advance in Central Asia, 
Subsequently he was appointed Minister of War in Bulgaria, where 
he diistinguished himself by his zeal in Russianizing the country, 
with the idea of hastening the time for a fresh advance upon Con- 
stantinople, More recently he has rendered himself notorious by a 
fierce tirade against England, publiplied in the Buss about a month 
after the time Komaroft and Alikanhofl insulted Sir Peter Lumsden 
at Sarakhs. 

" Herat is a very large city, and does not cede in size to Tash- 
kent. It contains 50,000 people. Among the cities of Central Asia 
and Khorassan, Herat, by its buildings, occupies a place next to 
Meshed, The city is surrounded by walls twelve feet high, with 
a shallow ditch outside. There are no outer defenses of any kind; 
nothing that would call to mind the fortifications of a European 
city. In its present condition Herat is not in a position to defend 



60 THE, RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

itsell against a European army, since at a mile to the norlh it is 
commanded by heights, from which it could be bombarded by 
artillery. It is reckoned to possess immense strategical importance, "^ 

This brief account was written some years ago by General Grode- 
koff, the officer appointed by Alexander 11. to act as chief of Kauf- 
mann's staff in 1878, when an attack upon India was projected. 
After peace was concluded at JBerlin, he rode home from Tashkent 
through Herat, and stayed at the place several days. The opinions- 
of Soboleff and Grodekoff, as military officers of high rank and 
capacity, are surely worth consideration, yet we have certain polit- 
ical flounderers in our midst who say that, " After all, they doubt 
whether Herat is of any real value to India." 

They say this, ignoring what Sir Henry Hamley, Sir Frederick: 
Roberts, Sir Charles MacGregor, Lord Napier of Magdala, and 
other great English generals have spoken or written respecting the 
" immense strategical importance of Herat. " The public have their 
choice. On the one hand are the carefully-weighed opinions of a 
great array of brilliant s^oldiers, who have fought and bled for the 
Empire; on the other is the hare-brained chatter of a few political 
babblers, who have done their utmost to involve that Empire in its 
present complications. Now is the time for England to make up 
her mind about Herat. She can safeguard it, or she can let it drift 
into Russia's possession. One thing, however, she would do well 
to realize in time — if she does not value Herat Russia does; and 
Russia values it so much that, by hook or by crook, she means io 
have it. 

1o a reporter of the Press Association Lessar said, March 15th:: 
" "We have no intentions on Herat, which is altogether out of I lie 
sphere of our action." 

The same Lessar wrote to the Nowe Vremya in November, 1883,. 
when the Russian troops were already massing on the Tejenri and 
in Khiva (or Alikanhoft's dash upon Merv: " The longer Merv re- 
mains independent the better for Russia, its occupation would not 
be difficult, while possession would be extremely unprofitable." 

On February 29th, 1882, M. de Giers said to Sir Edward Thorn- 
ton, using the very words employed by Lessar: " Russia has no in- 
tentions whatever of occupying Merv and Sarakhs." "Within two- 
years from this period of " no intentions " Merv was a Russian 
possession. 

So that it will not do to rely upon Russia's disinterestedness as a 
safeguard to Herat. The question, therefore, to consider is— Is 
Herat worth safeguarding, and can we safely allow Russia to re- 
main in possession of its gates? 

The city of Herat has found an eloquent historian in the person 
of Colonel Malleson, whose "Herat; the Granary and Garden of 
the East " ought to be read by everybody at this juncture. It is 
one of the oldest cities in the East, and was once one of the richest. 
To use the words of a Persian geographer, '* the city has been fifty 
times taken, fifty times destroyed, and fifty times has it risen from 
its ashes." Six hundred and sixty years ago it contained, accord- 
ing lo the records of the period, 12,000 retail shops, 6,000 public 
baths, caravanserais, and water mills, 350 schools and monastic in- 
stitutions, and 144,000 occupied houses, and was yearly visited bj 



THE EUSSIAN"S AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 61 

caravans from all parts ot Asia. When Chiugiz Khan passed across 
the East, devastating the region, Herat is said to liave suftered by 
the two stormings it experienced at his hands a loss of a million 
and a half of men. In subsequent ages its splendor revived, and it 
•was a great and flourishing city down to comparatively modern 
times. 

Summing up in his masterly m,anner the career of Herat, Colonel 
IMalleson says: " A glance at the record of the past will show that 
from time immemorial the city was regarded as an outlying bul- 
wark, the possession of which was necessary prior to atiempting 
the conquest of India; the holding of which by India or by quasi - 
vassal powers dependent on India, would render impossible an 
invasion of that country. It was so considered b}^ Alexander, by 
Mahmud and his successors, by Chineiz Khan, by Taimur, by Nadir 
Shah, by Ahmad Shah, and by Muhammad Shah, the Persian 
prince who attacked it in 1837. In the cases of all but the last the 
possession of Herat led to the conquest of India; in the case of the 
last the successful defense of that city rendered invasion impossible. 
** The hasty reader may object— what can the possession of one 
city signify? A question of this nature touches the real point of 
the argument. Herat is called the gate of India, because through 
jt, and through it alone, the valleys can be entered which lead to 
the oulj vulnerable part of India. Those valleys, running nearly 
north and south, are protected to the east by inaccessible ranges, to 
the west by impracticable deserts. Jso invading army could dare to 
attempt to traverse the great salt desert, and the desert immediately 
south of it, the Dasht-i-Naubad, while a British army held Herat. 
As long as that army should hold Herat, so long would au in- 
vasion of Inaia be impossible. In his masterly lecture at the 
Royal United Institution, in November, 1878, General Hamley 
laid down the broad principle that if England were to hold the 
w^estern line of communication with India, that by Herat and 
Candahar, she need not trouble herself much about the eastern, or 
the Cabul line. On the same occasion Sir Henry Eawlinson de- 
clared, in reply to a question put to him by Lord Elcho, that rather 
than allow the occupation of Herat by Russia he would venture the 
whole might of British India. That high authority saw clearly 
what 1 have feebly endeavored to demonstrate in these pages— thai 
the possession ot Herat by Russia means the possession of that one 
line by which India can be invaded; that the possession oi Herat 
by England means the annihilation of all the Russian hopes of nn 
invasion of India. Let the reader imagine that Candahar is the 
frontier British station; that between Herat and Candahar is a long 
lane, so protected on both sides that the man who may wish to 
traverse any part of it to Candahar must enter by Herat. Is it not 
obvious that the power which shall hold Herat will completely 
dominate the lane? It is this which makes the possession of Herat 
by England a matter of vital consequence. 

" Another fact illustrates the enormous value of Heiat. Place an 
army there, and nothing need be brought to it from Europe. Within 
the limits of the Herati territory all the great roads leading on India 
converge. The mines of the Herati district supply lead, iron, and 
sulphur; the surface of many parts Of the country is laden with 



62 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

saltpetre, the willow and the Doplar, which make the best charcoal, 
abound; the fields produce in abundance corn, and wine, and oil. 
From the population, attracted to Its new rulers by good government, 
splendid soldiers might be obtained. 

" Such are the military advantages presented by Herat to the 
power that shall occupy it. Should that power be an enemy, Herat 
would be to him an eye to see and an arm to strike — an eye to pry 
into every native court of Hindustan, to watch the discontents and 
the broodings of the rulers, the heart-burnings of their subordinates. 
From 'i^atcliing and noting to termenting and stirring up there is 
but one short s^ep. Evey court, every bazaar, in India, would note 
the presence on the frontier, in a position not only unassailable, but 
becoming every day mor3 and more capable of assailing:, of a tirst- 
class power, the secret enemy of England, and professing the most 
unselfish anxiety to relieve them in their distress. An arm to strike, 
because a few years of intelligent rule would render the valley of the 
Hari Rud capable of supporling and equipping an army strong 
■enough even to invade India. 

" In a third sense, likewise, the possession of Herat by an enemy 
would be not less dangerous to England. The roads converging on 
it, already alluded to, are traversed by caravans to which no other 
route is available. We may be sure that the city which successfully 
resisted the rivalry of Meshed, when Meshed was backed by all the 
influence ot the Shahs of Persia, will take a still higher position 
when supported by the might either of England or of Russia. The 
European power whose influence shall be paramount in Herat will 
rule the niarRets of Central Asia. More even than' that. The pos- 
session ot Herat by Russia means the exclusion ot England trom 
the markets of Central Asia." 

The city stands on the right bank of the Hari Rud, from which 
water is brought by several channels, it is built in the form of a 
rectangle, the north and south faces being about 1,500, and the east 
and west faces 1,600 yards in length. Inclosing the city is an im 
mense earthwork about 50 leet high, surmounted by a wall ranging 
from 25 to 30 feet, with a deep moat, which can be easily flooded 
from the Hari Rud. The citadel is situated in the center of the 
oity, and is also surrounded by a moat. There are five gates, of 
which one, however, is closed up, and each is flanked by two bas- 
tions. The city is bridged at each of the four gates by a wooden 
drawbridge, which is raised and lowered by mechanical appliances 
worked from inside the walls. Each face of the four walls is fur- 
nished with from 25 to 30 bastions. On the exterior slope of the 
embankment, supporting the wails, are two Imes of shelter trenches, 
one above the other, carried all around the city, except where the 
gates are A correspondent with Lumsden's mission describes the 
mounted armament as some " twenty guns ot varied calibers, be- 
sides numberless others lying dismounted on the ramparts. " Twenty 
guns to defend 3^ miles ot wall! The garrison consists of 4,000 or 
3,000 troops, exclusive of irregulars. 

It may be mentioned that the Russians have complete plans of 
the fortifications, obtained by General Grodekoff in 1878. 

The estimates of the population show considerable divergence. 
The first during the present century was Christie, who visited the 



THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 63 

place in 1809, and reckoned the population at 100,000. Burnes and 
Shakspeare called at Herat on their way north. ConoUy was there 
in 1828-30, and gives 65,000 as the figure; while Pottinger, in 
1837-8, states the number at about 40,000; and Ferrier, in 1845^ 
estimated it as low as 32,000. Whether any of the numbers, or all 
of them, 5vere correct, is impossible to say; but since Herat is a ren- 
dezvous for the country people when threatened by the enemy, each 
estimate may be quite correct for the year stated. Later, in 1865, 
Pollock again gave 100,000; and in 1878 General Grodekoff thought 
the approximate number was close on 50,000. The latter figure is 
now generally accepted by geographers. Candahar has also 50,000 
or 60,000 inhabitants. These are the only two towns lying between 
the Russians and India. 

To most Englishmen Herat is associated with the brilliant defense 
of the city which Eldred Puttinger maintained in 1837 against a 
Persian army of 40,000 men and 60 guns, commanded by Muhamad 
Shah. A large number of Eussian officers participated in the siege,, 
und an entire Russian regiment. Pottinger, a young Bombay mili- 
tary oflDcer, happened to be exploring intheneighborhood when they 
arrived, and persuading the Aghans to allow him to control the de- 
fense, maintained a desperate resistance of ten months, when the 
Persians retired. ]t may be noted that the Persians marched from, 
the Caspian md Askabad and Meshed to Herat, by a road 550 miles, 
long, running parallel with the one md Krasnovodsk and Askabad. 
This road was sispposed to be the best highway of invasion to India,^ 
but Lessar's discovery ot the easy section from Sarakhs to Herat 
proved the one now held by the Russians to be superior. As the 
Russians are almost certain before many years are past to absorb 
Khorassau, the second Transcaspian road will also come into their 
possession. 

In 1881, when English people were still incredulous as the prac- 
ticability of a Russian invasion, 1 put forward this argument: that 
Persia, having in 1837 marched 35,000 troops and 50 guns (com- 
posed of 18 and 24 pounders) from the Caspian to Herat, and in; 
1680, Ayoub Khan, 30,000 troops and 30 guns from Herat to Can- 
dahar, to tvhich poinc various JEnglish armies had advanced from 
the Indus with guns, therefore there was absolutely no physical ob- 
stacle to the marching of a powerful Russian force with heavy artil- 
lery all the way from the Caspian to India. Tlie terrific mountain 
barrier many Englisli politicians still believe in, 1 asserted to be sheer 
moonshine. Since then, this practicable line of invasion has been 
supplemented by the second that the Russians now hoia, and ot 
which 1 have said it is so flat and easy that one could drive a four- 
in-hand all the way to the outposts of Quetta. In the event of war, 
both routes would be used by Russia. 

Since 1856, when Persia advanced a second time and took Herat, 
for which we went to war with her and made her retire, the Shah's 
power has been rapidly declining in Khorassan. A detachment of 
2,000 or 3,000 Russian troops— even less— planted at Astrabad and 
Shahrood would sever all communication between Teheran and the 
rotting, misgoverned Transcaspian province of Khorassan, and 
Russia could utilize its resources to the fullest extent for an attack 
upon Herat. Considering how imbecile and corrupt the Shah's rule 



64 THE EUSSIA]S:S AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

is notoriously known to be, it has always seemed in my eyes an as- 
tounding piece of bad statesmanship that Lord Lytton should "liave 
enteitaiiied for one moment in 1879 the idea of severing Heiat from 
Afghanistan, and confiding it to the care of ISIassr-ed-din. One 
might as well have set a mouse to guard a piece of cat's-meat from 
a tabby. 

In its present condition the fortress of Herat is admittedly not 
strong, and it would require a considerable amount of exertion on 
the part of the officers attached to Lumsden's mission to render it 
secure from a Russian attack. This admitted weakness has given 
rise to the remark more than once of late that, such being the case, 
we could hardly call it the Key of India, 

But this contention, which is mainly put forward by men who 
liave not tal\;en the pains to lead the arguments ot Malleson and 
other authorities, or who, it they have, from lack of memory have 
forgotten them, will not bear serious examination one moment. A 
score of the ablest generals of the day, in Russia as well as in Eng- 
land, have declared Herat to be the Key of India. Do you think 
that they are likely to be wrong, because some mole-eyed man of 
peace has made the discovery that the defenses of Herat are a little 
bit out of repair? Admit that they are; what then? Are thencilitary 
resources of the Russian empire so meager that, after the Tsar had 
seized the place, he can not apply a few patches? 

But the issue raised is a totally false one. Concentrating their 
s;aze too much upon the town, men overlook the locality. VVhat is 
the Key of India? On this point a deal of misconception prevails, 
which 1 have been doing my utmost to dispel for a long time.* 

In England the impression is widespread that such English gen 
erals as MacGregor and Hamley, and such Russian commanders as 
Skobeleff and Kaufmann, have concurred in regarding Herat as the 
Key of India, solely because it is a great fortress, or because it may 
be made to be one. But these generals have always looked at Herat 
in a wider sense, as may be, indeed, almost inferred from the re- 
marks I have quoted ot Malleson. 

Our generals and the generals of Russia value Herat,. not solely on 
account of the city; but on account of the resources of the district 
in which it is situated — resources in corn and beef, which, if swept 
into any point of the Herat district, not necessarily to Herat itself, 
would feed an army of at least 100,C00 men, and sustain them during 
thft final advance upon India. It is this great campingc-ground, 
and not exclusively the town of Herat, that is the Key of India. If 
a line be drawn south of Herat 100 miles to Furrah, a second west 
70 miles to Kusan on the Persian frontier, and a third 120 miles 
north, behind the points occupied by the Russians, a rough ideamaj'' 
be formed of a district as fertile as England throughout, and pos- 
sessing marvelous mineral resources. This is the camping-ground, 

* Let me quote two instances. A correspondent of the Times of India, ar- 
companying Ridgeway's force, wrote, in November, that the sight of the Herat 
fortifications disappointed him; now he had seen the place, he doubted whether 
it was really the Key of India. On the 6th of March, Sir George Campbell, 
speaking at a lecture I gave at the Royal Aquarium, also questioned its iDeing 
the Key of India, because " the place is very weak, and could be easily taken by 
a, European enemy." 



THE KUSSIAi^S AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 65 

tliis is the place of arms, which Russia wants, in order that she may 
be always able to threaten India. There is no such camping-ground 
anywhere between the Caspian and Herat, and none again between 
Herat and India. Dence, not without reason, have the ablest gen- 
erals ot England and Russia designated thedistricttheKey of India. 

General MacGregor put this plainly enough in his " Khoras^ian," 
in 1875: " From the fort attached lo the village I had a fine view of 
the valley ot Herat, which stretched in every direction but the south, 
one sea of yellow fields and verdant trees. Without going further, 
it was easy to see the value of Herat to any power with intentions 
on India, and to recognize the justice of the dictum which termed it 
the gate of India. Just as in the minor operations of the capture of 
a city the wise commander will give his troops a breathe, on their 
l^aining the outer defenses, so must every general coming from the 
west rest his men awhile in this valley. And no better place could 
be found for this purpose; abundance of beautiful water, quantities 
of wheal and barley and rice, endless herds ot cattle and sheep, good 
forage, and a fine climate— all combine to make the Herat valley 
the most apt place for a halt before entering the desolate country 
between Furrah and Candahar/ "' 

The significance of the recent Russian advance consists in this — 
that the Russians have established tnemselves inside the very limils 
■of the Herat district; in other words, they have violated the integrity 
of the Key of India. Ak Robat, Pul-i-Khisti, etc., which Russia 
has seizea, are inseparable parts of the Key ot India. Penjdih, 
which they claim, is absolutely essential to its security. These places 
are included within the fertile zone of Herat. The Russians have 
crossed the desert zone and established themselves upon it. They 
have settled down on the edge ot the great camping-ground I have 
described. Shall they remain there? That is Ihe point which Eng- 
land has got to settle. If they do remain — if we resign to Russia the 
gates ot Herat — the Alikhan(>ffs and theKomaroffs will soon possess 
themselves of the rest of the great camping-ground, and hold the 
Key of India. 

Most unwarrantably, without provocation on the part of English- 

* MacGregor thus defined, in 1875, why Herat was the Key of India: "Because 
it is the nearest and best point at which an invader could concentrate and pre- 
pare for an invasion of that country — advantages which it gains from its beau- 
tiful valley, the fertility of which is unrivaled in Asia; from its strategical posi- 
tion, which gives it the command of all the important roads to India; from the 
great strength of its fortress, it being, in fact, the strongest place from the 
Caspian to the Indus; from its admirable chmate, and from the prestige it en- 
joys throughout Asia. The fertility of its valley, and its capability of main- 
taining large forces, is proved by the fact that it has been besieged oftener than 
any other city in Asia, and has always afforded supplies for the armies of both 
besiegers and besieged. And, it must be remembered, the first have some- 
times reached as many as 80,000 men, and have seldom fallen below 30,000; 
while both have always been composed of undisciplined men, who destroyed 
nearly as much as they consumed. Besides all the positive and patent advan- 
tages which the place itself possesses, Russia in Herat would have an unassail- 
able position from which to threaten us in India, so as to compel us to keep 
large forces always ready to meet the menace, while she would be able to cast 
abroad throughout India that ' seething, festering mass of disaffection,' the 
seeds of a rebellion, that would still further cripple us: she would altogether 
alienate from us the whole of the Afghans and the Pei'sian Khorassanese, and 
vrould practically control for her OAvn purposes nearly aU their mihtary re- 
sources.'" 

3 "" 



66 THE EUSSIAis^S AT THE GATES OE HEKAT. 

men or Afghans, Russia has intruded on Ihe fertile zone of Herat. 
Eno;lancl is within her right in demaading that she shall clear oft. 

To excuse her seizure, she asserts the necessity for a scientific 
frontier, and contends that the one she proposes is in every respect 
as good tor the Afghans as for herself. Let us see if that be the 
case. 

Round about Sarakhs, on the Hari Rud, is a certain margin oC 
very cultivable ground, broken by a stretch of less fertile or sterile 
ground, higher up the river toward, Zulfikar. Up the Murghab an- 
other, but more thoroughly desert district, separates the Merv zone 
from Penjdeh. The Sarakhs zone and the Merv zone thus formed 
two excellent links in the chain of a fortified frantier, running from. 
Askabad to Khoja Saleh, on the Oxus; and the line being that 
recognized by Russian diplomacy, ought to have been insisted upon 
as the frontier by the English Government. 

As 1 understand, this was formerly done, but in order not to 
restrict Russia to an arbitrary line, certain modifications were ad- 
mitted to be possible. The very utmost limit of those concessions 
was Pul-i-Khatun, in the Hari Rud, and Sariyazi, on the Murghab. 
This tvould have effectually secured Russia all the country belong- 
ing to the Sarakhs and Merv districts, with perhaps a trifle beyond; 
but the security of Herat would not have been so grossly assailed 
as it is now. 

This concession would not have altogether pleased England, for 
Pul-i-Khatun is a very important strategical point. It is only 80 
miles from Meshed, and controls the roads leading thither from 
Central Asia. Established there, Russia secured a lodgment, so to 
say, in the Meshed district; and as her designs on that rich city are 
well known, such proximity was not desirable. It further meant 
bringing the Cossack 39 miles nearer the Key of India. Still, as 1 
have'said, for the sake of an amicable settlement, the country might 
have tolerated this concession. 

But Russia was not content ^ith this. She stepped across this 
Puli-Khatun-Sariyazi line, and traversing the country beyond seized 
a new line of her own, beginning at Zulfikar and running through 
Ak Robat to Pul-i-Khisti. This^ new line was on purely Herati 
ground, and concentrating what 1 have to say upon it, 1 will show 
what this advanced position is, and how essential it is that Russia 
should be compelled to fall back to the line which the English 
Government was, as 1 imagine, prepared to cede to it. 

On the map Herat is shown to have lying north of it a mountain 
range, called the Paropamisus Mountains, which shields the lierat 
valley, and is claimed by Russia to be an effectual barrier to the 
city. Russia knows that the English public is slow in ridding itself 
of geographical errors, and she therefore talk-s plausibly of a " moun- 
tain barrier, with the passes in Afghan hands," as an admirable 
frontier for Herat. But this is a trifle. She audaciously puts for- 
ward as the spokesman of this pretension the ver}^ man who, three 
years ago. upset geography and the policy of Russia and England in 
Cential Asia, by demonstrating that the Paropamisus was no barrier 
at all I That man was Lessar. 

It is well known to politicians what a shock he administered to 



THE RUSSIAJS'S AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 67 

Ensfland in 1882, when be pushed on to Herat and found the Par- 
opamisus, hitlierto considered to be a mountain block, 15.000 or 
20,000 feet high, to be but hills 900 feet oi so above the surround- 
ing locality. Can one call a series of hills, three times the height 
of St. Paul's Cathedral, " a mountain barrier?" One might as 
well call Shooter's Hill Mont Blanc. 

Let me quote an extract from the Times correspondent accom- 
panying Sir Peter Lumsden, published March 12ih. He says: "You 
will see on the map that two branches of the Paropamisus run from 
Herat ji cross Badgheis to the Hari Rud— one north- west (the Barkhut 
Hilis), and the other west. In reality, only the former exists— the 
southern branch of the Paropamisus is a shadow, unless, indeed, it 
is represented bj^-the gentle undulations of gravelly soil, covered with 
camel thorn and assafcetida, which intervene between Herai valley 
and the latter. Thus melts away one of those stupendous natural 
obstacles to the invasion of Herat, among which optimist imagina- 
tions have hitherto gan^bolled so gayly. " 

Let us have this clear. Between the Russian position, stretching 
from Zulfikar to Pul-i-Tvhisti, north of the Paropamisus, and the 
Herat valley south of it, there is only one " range." That range is 
full of passes, and on one of them (the Sar-i Chashma) the corre- 
spondent stood, and he tells us what he saw, gazing in the direction 
of the Russian position. " A striliing panorama unfolded itself 
betoi'e us, A vast sea of grassy billowy downs swept to the foot 
of the Djam mountains in the far west, and to the north rolled away 
as far as the eye could see, its undulating surface being only broken 
by the island hills which inclose the island of Penjdeh. This, 
then, was the bleak, sterile, mountainous country which we had 
thought of with a shiver, when orrr eyes, tired of etaring, glaring 
deserts, were enjoying the rich fertility of the Herat valley. Moun- 
tainous — as mountainous as the Brighton Downs! Bleak— the cli- 
mate of the Enoadine in August! Sterile — groves of pistDchio and 
mulberry trees, wild rose trees, real Enolish blackberry bushes, wild 
carrots, testified to the richness of the soil, irrigated in manv places 
by mountain streams of the purest water, alive witli fls^h! And this 
was autumn, the eve of winter; what then must Badgheis be in 
gprina:? Wliy it should be named Badgheis (" windy ") 1 know not, 
for since we have crossed tlie Sich Bubak we have been sheltered in 
its kindly bosom from the fierce biting blasts which never ceased to 
assail us from Seistan to Kusan. Howit has obtained its reputation 
for sterility is not difficult to say. Scarcely an acre of this rich soil 
IS cultivated; scarcely, 1 say, for a few acres to the north of the 
Chashma Sabz Pass are rudely tilled by a Turcoman, who acquainted 
us with his existence by rushino; into oui camp and throwing him- 
self on the ground with loud cries. It transpired that he was a serv- 
ant of one Aziz Sirdar, an ex-Tekke chief of Merv, with whom he 
had fled from Merv wlien the Russian occupation was imminent. 
He had left his wife and children behind him, and was anxious that 
wnen we turned the Russians out of Merv we should restore them 
to him. As for Aziz Sirdar, he befriended the Ameer when he fled 
from Afghanistan and passed through Merv on his way toEhiva. 
When trouble befell Aziz Su'dar, and he harl to leave Merv, he ap- 
pealed to the gratitude of Abdurrahman Khan, who had become 



68 THE KUSSIANS AT THE GATES OE HEUAT. 

Ameer of Afghanistan, and not in vain, for he was presented -with 
'' a village in the Herat valley and "with some land in Badgheis. " 

To speak, therefore, of a mountain barrier protecting Herat from 

• the Eussian outposts is nonsense. It is a series of downs, traversed 
by numerous roads, which are only of any difficulty in one or two 
instances in the section immediately north of Herat. But there is 
no reason why Kussia should take these one or two difficult roads, 
when there are, as Lessar admits, ascoreof better ones further west, 
where an advance can be made more easily. It would be impossible 
for the Afghans to protect the whole length of the Paropamisus, and 
the closer, therefore, the Russians get to the downs the more quick- 
ly they will be able to step across them into the Herat valley. If 
they retain what they have, and secure what they claim, the Herat 
valley will be practically at their mercy. 

The fertile country immediately north of the Paropamisus is 
known as Badgheis, and has always been treated as part and parcel 
of the district of Herat, it was once a populous, well-cultivated 
country, and now that the raids of the "Merv Tfkkes have ceased^ 
tribesmen are flowing to it from all parts of Western Atghanistan. 
It has no natural connection with the Merv district, nor yet again 
- with that of Sarakhs. On the other hand, there is an inseparable 
connection between Badgheis and the valley of Herat. 

Standing on the summit of the Paropamisus, as the Times corre- 
spondent recently did, the observer would naturally divide Badgheis> 
into two sections. Gazing down the slopes, he would have on the 
right hand the Kuskh-Murghab region, tiie objective of the Russian 
advance from Merv, and the Hari Rud region, the objective of that 
from Sarakhs. The latter Russia claims because the Salors pasture 
, their flocks there; the former she demands with the Sariks. This 
is what she calls her " ethnographical claim." She has annexed a. 
number of the Turcoman tribes (in the case of Merv fraudulently), 
therefore she has a right to the rest. If they are not annexed, she 
says that ttie frontier "will be in a state of constant tumult. 

How, let us see what these turbulent tribes really are. First, let 
us take tiie Salors, on whose behalf the Russians demand the Hart 
Rud section of Badgheis. 

Once a great tribe, the Salors were shattered by the Persians in 
.1833 in punishment for their raids. After tiiis they migrated f( r a 
time to Murghab from Sarakhs, where they had heen long estab- 
lished, and tiien settled at Zurabad, a district in Persia, on the west 
side of the Hari Rud, not far from Zulfikar. After a while thej 

* got tired of Zurabful, and returned to Saralchs. Here the Tekkes 
fell upon them, seized their cattle and property, and carried the 
tribe off to Merv. This was in 1871. The tribe then numbered 
about 3,000 families. 

These are tacts taken from Petrusevitch's report, which is given 
in full in my " Merv." While O'Donovan ^as at Merv, in 1881^ 
the Salors, with the consent of the Tekkes, took their departure. 
Their proper home was Old Sarakhs, but tne Persians would not let 
them settle there, and made them pass on to Zurabad. 

In 1882 Lessar paid them a visit and published a report, whicli is 
also given in full in my " Russians at Merv," He confirmed Pet- 
rusevitch's statements, and added that they were tniserably poor. 



THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HEEAT. 69 

Altogether the whole Salor tribe did not number more than 4,000 
families, of whom 2,000only were at Zurabad; 1,000 were encamped 
with the Sariks on theMiirgliab (a number of whom appear to have 
subsequently migrated to Zurabad), 400 were on Russian soil at 
Tchardjui, 200 on Afghan soil at Maimene, and 100 at Pul-i-Salar, 
close to Herat. 

On the 17tb of December, 1884, Lessar delivered a lecture at St. 
Petersburg on Merv, which 1 Lave before me now, and in this lie 
added to the foregoing: " The fcialors are extremely poor ; they have 
scarcely any tents; they live in reed huts; cattle they have scarcely 
any. and their principal occupation is agriculture." 

I^ow we can smash into the lies that have gathered about the 
Russian claim. First let us put that claim in precise language. 
Russia demands the whole of the Hari Kud, or western half of Bad- 
gheis. including Pul-i-Khatun, Zulfikar, JSIihalshini, and practically 
the whole country south of Sarakhs, to the Paropamisus, and east 
to Ak Robat, hecause, (1) the Saltjr tribe has from time immemoral 
pastured their herds there; (2) because the people can not do with- 
out that pasture land; (3) and because the tribe is so turbulent that 
if it were not annexed there would be no peace on the frontier. 

In reply, England, basing her rejoinder on Russian facts, cfin say 
this: That the Balors belong to Old Sarakhs, and as that is their favor- 
ite district and home and there is plenty of land there, thither they 
ought to return. That the tact of their having from time im- 
memorial pastured their flocks in Badgheis is untrue; for it is only 
since 1881 that they have been dwelling at Zurabad, excluding a 
very brief interval twenty years ago. That the}'^ have hardly any 
cattle nov\% and therefore do not need the pasture lands. That they 
are so poor and shattered that they have not perpetrated a raid, or 
been guilty of turbulence, for nearly a quarter of a century. 
Finally, that they are not camped (at Zurabad) on Afghan soil at 
all. but on Persian, and can not be held to have the slightest claim to 
the unoccupied Badgheis district east of the Hari Rud. 

1 might add that, bo far as is known, the 2,000 or 3,000 miserable 
Salor peasants at Zurabad have displayed no desire to become Rus- 
sian subjects. But even supposing they have acquiesced, are we to 
surrender the whole of the west Badgheis district to Russia on that 
account, with Zulfikar and other gates of Herat? 1 say no; and 
if you, readf^r, say no with equal firmness, the Russians shall never 
retain them. 

Parenthetically, but none the less seriously, let me point out a 
great and growing danger arising out of thi.^ claim to the Salor 
Turcomansr It Russia "retains the west Badgheis district she will 
also annex, obviously, Zurabad, on the Persian side of the Hari Rud, 
and we have no knowledge as to how far that annexation may 
stretch. In all probability it will extend up to within a short dis- 
tance of Meshed, because Petrusevitch, who first gave the hint to 
Russia to push the wedge from Sarakhs and Merv to Herat, ur2:ed 
also that the Persian frontier should be bulged in from the Hari 
Rud to the capital of Khorassan.* 

Therefore, let it be clearly understood that if we yield Zulfikar 

* This is shown in several maps in my " Merv.'" 



70 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OE HERAT. 

and the western gales of Herat, we not only give Russia control 
over avenues within one hundred miles of the Key of India, but we 
also seal the tate of Meshed and the great Persian dependency of 
Khorassau — the golden country, the granaij' of Transcaspia, 

On that account, when England is aslied to surrender a " few 
miles of barren country " and a " mere bit of pasture land '' on 
" ethnographical grounds," it is well she should clearly realize what 
she is really asJ^ed to do. 

No diplomatists, as she should surely know by this time, surpass 
those of Russia in the art of wrapping up mendacious claims in col- 
ton wool. 

Having disposed of the Hari Rud section of the Badgheis district, 
let us deal with the Murghab. The principal feeder of this river is 
the Kushk, which rises in the Paropamisus immediately north of 
Herat, within fortj^ miles, and, flowing parallel with the Hari Rud, 
joins the Murgbab where Fort Ak Tepe controls the Penjdeh dis- 
trict. 

The eastern section of Badgheis is claimed with the Sarik tribe 
and because of that tiibe. 

Now, 1 have already shown that the Penjdeh Sariks have never 
had any wish to be Russian subjects, that tney hate the people of 
Merv, that they are naturally separated from them by a band of 
desert intersecting the Murghab, which the Russians have crossed • 
that they have long been subjects of the Ameer, and that the lands 
they nold are Afghan lands. The Russians, therefore, have not the 
shadow of a claim to this section. The Sariks of Penjdeh number 
eight thousand f amilips. and, although they were once great raiders 
— they were always fighting with the Merv Tekkes — they have be- 
come so tame since the Russians occupied Merv and the Afghans 
Ak Tepe, that the frontier is totally tree from turbulence and crime. 
A correspondent writes from there that scarcely any carry arms; 
that they are a happy, contented, hard-work'ng people, and that 
English ofBcers are able to ride about the country provided with no 
weapons for self-defense. 

Russian writers have stated over and over again since 1881 that 
directly Russia suppressed the raids carried on by the Tekkes of 
Akhal, the people subsided into hard-working peasants. The same 
lias been the case with the Sariks at Penjdeh, The contention, 
therefoie, that Russia must annex the Sariks, to keep them quiet, is 
preposterous. What is really wanted is some one to annex the Rus- 
sians, to keep them quiet. They are the *' turbulent tribes " on the 
Afghan frontier. 

The special correspondent of the Dail?/ Neics writes from 
Penjdeh, December 7, that he arrived there, expecting to find the 
Sariks savage monsters. "There ILey were before us working in 
their fields, peaceable, good-natured, and smiling fellows. We had 
seen them at work some days back, and found them a sircple, harm- 
less people. The chiefs of the Sariks have manifested the moRt 
Iriendly feelings toward us. They all express themselves as being 
most friendly, not only to the Ameer, but also to the British Gov- 
ernment." 

Now, since the eight thousand Sarik families at Penjdeh are quite 
content with Afghan rule, and are altogether averse to Russia, why 



THE EUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 71 

should this country hand them over to the Czar, on " ethnographical 
grounds," for the sake of a frontier which Russian officials candidly 
admit among themselves is only temporary? ]f o\xv prestige had not 
fallen so low, such a monstrous demand would have never been 
made. Russia has not the slightest right to Penjdeh, and if English- 
men put themselves shoulder to shoulder at this crisis she shall never 
have it. But there is one thing which must not be lost sight ot. In 
withholding JPenideh from Russia, we must insist on the evacuation 
of Ak Robat and Pul-i-Khisti, the retention of which by Russia 
would render Penjdeh practically wortnless. 

It is between the Hari Rud and Kushk rivers that the salt lalies lie, 
which Russia claims with the Sarik Turcomans. If she has no 
right to the one she has none to the other. It is said that the tribes — 
men ruled by Russia can not do without these lakes, but this is a 
wide and hazy pretension. There is any amount of salt in the Cas- 
pian region, and eastward of it toward Merv, thus securing Bussia's 
Transcaspian subjects, while, as the Sariks of Penjdeh have been the 
principal users of those lakes, " the indispensable necessity " of 
Russia coniroUing theai does not appear very apparent. The 
amount of salt used by the frontier tribesmen is extremely insig- 
nificant, and the fact that Russia should include the claim at all 
among her pretensions indicates how weak her case is. 

Before dismissing Russia's demand for Penjdeh, a few particulars 
about the locality may not be out ot place. . 

Ak Tepe is the controlling point of the Penjdeh district, and it 
was there that the Afghans built a. fort when they occupied the 
Sarik locality last year. It is situated on a huge mound (hence its 
name " White Hill ") on a piece of fiat alluvial ground, round 
which the Murghab passes ia a winding course before joining the 
KushK. The site is on thu east, not on the west side of the Kushk 
River, as represented in some maps; hence, it will be seen, the tort 
not only controls the junction of the Kushk and the Murghab, but 
the whole country inside the two rivers up to the hills overlooking 
Herat. Fort Ak Tepe, with its seventeen guns, is thus in every 
sense a gate to Herat. That gate the Russians would have seized if 
the Afghans had not forestalled them. It is included within tne 
territory demanded by Russia. Tbe Pall Mall Gazette of March 
5 thus described Port Ak Tepe: " The squabble about this trumpery 
little Afghan sentry-box placed in the middle ot the Sariks, the 
majority of whom are under Russian authority, is simply gro- 
tesque." This is the pro-Russian way of putting the case. There 
are 4.000 Sariks under Russia, and 8,000 under the Ameer. The 
figures 1 take from Lessar's lecture delivered last year. 

Tlie Penjdeh settlements lie south of the tort , toward Herat, 
thickly disposed round the village of Penjdeh six miles from Ak 
Tepe, ana afterward stretching forty miles or so higher up the Murg- 
hab to within sight of the Afghan stronghold ot Bala Murghab. 

When Russian statesmen speak of Penjdeh they do not mean 
simply the village of that name, but the whole Sarik district, with 
Fort Ak Tepe. As that fort is the prmcipal military point of the 
district, it would have saved some mistakes (?) if more prominence 
had been given to Ak Tepe and less to Penjdeh. Let me cite one 
of inese ** mistakes. " To excuse the Russian advance, a certain Rad-- 



72 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

ical paper declared tlaat the Afghans had advanced thrice toward 
Merv— first from Herat to Pen jdeh, second from Penideh to Ak Tepe, 
and third from Ak Tepe to Sariyazi ! As a matter of fact, the A-fghans 
have only maae one advance. They planted themselves at Ak Tepe 
last year, and it was only to " feel " a rumored Russian advance, 
after the seizure of Pul-i-Khatun, that the}^ threw ahead the tem- 
porary Sariyazi picket that successfully heralded Alikhanofl's raid, 
and saved Ak Tepe from a surprise. 

Subsequently, however, the Russians seized Pul-iKhisti, or the 
Brick Bridge, a bridge of nine arches spanning the Kushk a few 
miles f rom'Fort Ak Tepe; and leading to the entire Penjdeh district. 
Its retention would render the Afghan fort almost untenable. But 
this is not the worst. They claim Chaman-i-Bed, between thirty 
and forty miles up the Kushk, and have already seized Ak Robat, a 
place possessmg an amazing supply of water between it and the 
Hari Rud at Zulfikar. If they be allowed to remain at Ak Robat 
they might just as well have Penjdeh, for they will be able to sever 
it from Herat at any moment. At Ak Robat they are within eighty 
miles of Herat. Penjdeh is variously stated to be from 100 to 140 
miles from the Key of India. The Russians, thus, are a long way 
to the rear of the Afghans. 

Penjdeh is not a simple oasis, like Merv, that can be dissevered 
from Herat. The Sarik settlements stretch up to those of the 
Jemshidis, and the Jemshidis, again practically up to Herat. One 
might as well assert that the French located at Canterbury would 
not endanger London, as that the Russians at Penjdeh would not 
be a menace to Herat. 

The Jemshidis are very different from what they were when Vam- 
hery Irudged through their country to Herat. Even Grodekoff in 
1878 spoke highly of them. "^Vriting from the spot, the Times 
correspondent attached to Lumsden's iorce says of them: "They 
resemble the Turcomans in dress and manners, but they are ap- 
parently a quiet, peaceable people. An English otBcer might saiely 
live amon.ii them without ^nj guard, and if they have only respite 
from raids and war they will doubtless spread over and multiply in 
the more healthy but deserted lands of Badgheis. They are hardy, 
clever horsemen, and every household breeds its own norses, "When" 
we were in Kushk the weekly fair was held ; it was attended by many 
Turcomans from Penjdeh and by some Firuzkuhis, but by very few 
Hazaras, with whom the Jemshidis are not on very friendly terms. 
The Turcomans brought salr, rice, soap, carpets, horses, sheep, and 
found for sale in the bazaar plowshares (of cast iron) and hatchets 
from Maimene; Russian and French loaf sugar, Austrian matches, 
also Bryant and May's, Meshed and Bokhara silk and cotton goods. 
The greater part ot the latter was Russian, not English — let Man- 
chester draw its own conclusion." 

Kushk is the central point or capital of the Jemshidis, and it is 
situated on the Paropamisus, close to Herat, There are about 4,000 
families in the place. Telegraphing from it some time ago the cor- 
respondent of the Times Jf India said: " The climate and tem- 
perature are delightful. The soil is capable of immense fertility, 
and could support a large population." Even forty years ago, Ab- 



THE EUSSIA]S"S AT THE GATES OF HEJiAT. 73' 

l30tt, who traversed the Kiishk valle5^ described it to be " highly 
susceptible of cuftnre, and has been ouce well tilled. " 

It the Russians secure Peojdeh, they will have practically no ob- 
struction up to Herat, except the Kushk Pass, vvhich might be 
avoided in time ot war, while in time of peace the intercoume exist- 
ing between Penjdehand the adjacent Afghan country would enable 
them to diffuse their influence far to the south of Herat. This in- 
tercourse is not to be lost sight of. The Saiiks are not within the 
commercial orbit of Merv but within that of Herat. It requires 
little imagination to realize the advantage Russia would gain for 
intrigue if we allowed her to obtain the district. 

On the Murghab itself Russia demands Marutchak, an old Afglian 
town tweniy-eight miles above the settlement of Penjdeh, and eight- 
een from tiie Afghan fort of Bala Murghab. Marutchak, on the 
right or east bank of the Murghab, was anciently a large and pros- 
perous town; " now," says Mr Simpson, "it is nothing but ruins. 
The Afghans are at present placing it in a state of repair. The outer 
wall i& only of mud, or sun-dried bricks, and is, in some parts, in a 
very decayed condition. Over these walls the top of the citadel may 
be seen. This is one of the old mounds, of which we have observed 
similar remains in this country. It measures about eighty by 
seventy yards on the top. The old walls and towers are now being 
put in a condition of defense. From this citadel there is a great 
ramp, which runs in a circular form, from the north-east corner to 
the south-east corner. It is most probably the old wall, inclosing 
what had been the town at one period; the lamp has much the ap- 
pearance of being the remains of a mud wall which has crumbled 
down into dust. The Afghans Lire now repairing it all round, so as 
to make it an enceinte for barracks, so that it will accommodate 
troops. The outer wall, already described, is to be leveled, as being 
too large for the garrison which the Afghans can afford to keep in 
it. There are the remains of a few mud houses within the outer 
"wall; but, with the exception of the Afghans employed on the fort, 
there are no inhabitants." 

Bala Murghab is situated «^n the high road from Afghan Turkes- 
tan (Balkh, etc.) to Herat, and thus controls a Russian advance 
from that direction. The Ameer has recently located 1,000 Jemshidi 
families there, and is doing his best to make it a great stronghold. 
If, however, the Russians retain Puli-Khisti, and secure Penjdeh. 
they will be able to sever Bala Murghab from Herat, and the whole 
of Afghan Turkestan will lie open to them. In securing the east- 
ern gates of Herat, therefore, Russia will obtain a basis for grasp- 
ing, in turn, the whole of the Ameer's dominions north of the Hin- 
doo Koosh. 

The occupation of West Badgheis is a menace to Meshed; the oc- 
cupation of East Badgheis a menace to Maimene, Balkh, and other 
outposts of CabuL The occupation of the two districts jointly is a 
menace to the security of Heraf. Thus the wedge which Russia has 
driven from Sarakhs and Merv to the gates of Herat opens up a 
vista of intrigue and annexation to her Komaroffs and Alikhanoffs, 
which, must be to them and to her statesmen positively thrilling. 

Hence the quarrel is something more than a mere squabble over 
an "Afghan sentry box." AVithout going into the wider issues, 



74 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

and conliniog ourselves to Herat, we might, to all practical pur- 
poses, allow the Russians to occupj"" the suburbs ot Herat as weii as 
let them remain where they are. All that would be necessary for 
Russia at any time would be to blockade Herat with a small force, 
and Irom her numerous new positions she could sweep up in a tew 
days the svhole ot the resources tliat render Herat of value without 
taking the trouble to fiie a shot at the city. Were the resources of 
the Key ot India contained inside the city of Herat there would be 
some excuse for leaving the Russians at Ak Robat and other Afghan 
points, and contenting ourselves with replacing the mud walls with 
impregnable tortiflcations; but, since the resources lie spread over 
the great camping-ground I have described, stretching north and 
south of the Paropamisus Downs, England can not but resent at- 
tempts to fasten a hold upon any part of it. To violate the integrity 
of one part of the Key ot India-is to impairthe value of the whole 
of it. If we ought to fight for the whole we ought to fight for the 
part; and, since Russia seems determined to follow up every con- 
cession by making still more exacting demands, she really leaves us 
no othei alternative than to resist her claims to the utmost. 

England is most decidedly in the right, and Russia most decidedly 
in the wrong. It is better that we should fight her now, when she 
Las only got 10,000 troops in the Tianscaspian region, and has not 
thoroughly established herself in the Herat district, than give in 
now, and have to fight her next year, or the year after, when she 
has seized the whole ot the camping -ground, and concentrated 
100,000 troops upon it to drive us out of India. 



CHAPTER VI. 

SKOBELEFF's plan for the invasion of INDIA. 

Skobeleff ''s great aim in life— The solution of the Eastern Question on the Indian 
frontier— His plan for invading India in 1876— Adopted before the walls of 
Constantinople ui 1878 — Kaufmann's advance toward India— Great changes 
in Central Asia since — ^T\''ere Skobeleff alive, his plan would be totally differ- 
ent now— What it would probably be— Feasibility of the invasion of India 
from the point of view of various Russian generals. 

" The probability of our having to struggle for Herat, or to de- 
fend India from Candahar, is so remote, that its possibility is hardly 
worth considering." 

These words were penned by Sir Henry INorman, in a memoran- 
dum against the retention ot Candahar, September 20, 1880, They 
illustrale, in a plain and forcible manner, the view ot the few, and 
now utterly discredited experts, who raised their voice in favor of 
the " scuttle " from Candahar, and invoked the spirit of faction to 
sanction it. 

io-day England is not only morally struggling tor Herat, but her 
Sikhs with Ridgeway at Penjdeh confront the Cossacks with Ali- 
khanoB at Pul-i-khisti. At any moment shots may be fired, and 
then the troops that scuttled from Candahar will have to rush back 
** to defend India from it." 

On the 10th of January, 1881, the Duke of Argyll said, in de- 
nouncing Lord Salisbury's avowal of alarm at the advance of Sko- 



THE EUSSIANS AT THE GATES OE HERAT. 75 

bele3 to Geok Tepe: " We are told by the lale Government that the 
danger they wished to guard against was the danger of a military 
basis to be formed by Russia on the Caspian. 1 hold that to be one 
of the wildest dreams ever entertained." 

In four short years the '' wildest dream," which, 1 should point 
out, was simply the sober military opinion of Valentine Baker, 
■ Major Napier, and General Sir Charles MacGregor, who had sur- 
veyed the proposed line of advance — in four short years that " wild- 
est dream " has become a practical reality, and the public read, 
quite as a matter of course, of Russia's preparations for the inva- 
sion of India, 

Whether the evacuation from Candahar was politic or not in 1881, 
one thing is certain. Down almost to the very last days of his 
Viceroj^alty, the Marquis of Ripon refused to take serious steps to 
render the Afghan barrier a real bulwark to our Eastern Empire. 
The Cabinet in Loudon moved somewhat with the limes but, Lord 
Ripon and Sir Evelyn Baring resisted every chanff(3. It is a matter 
of common notoriety at Simla Kiat the appeals of our greatest 
generals were pooh-poohed, and thai to the very moment of the de- 
parture of the Baboo Viceroy from Bombay, the advice of heroes 
who would have to defend Afghanistan to-morrow, if attacked, was 
contemptuously rejected for the ear-whisperings of two or three in- 
significant men, of ignominious sentiments. 

Why those generals— who, by the way, are now the chief advisers 
of Lord Ripon 's sagacious successor— should have been so uneasy 
during the last few years, will be apparent in the following pages. 

Until the time of the arrival of the Stolietoff Embassy at Cabul, the 
idea of a Russian attach upon India was generally scouted in this 
country; and even those who urged the stemming of the Russian 
advance did not treat an expedilion against us as a matter of the 
immediate present, but as belonging to the future. In Russia, mili- 
tary opinion was more advanced. While war was still undeclared 
against Turkey in 1876, and England w^as hoping that the conflict 
might be averted by peaceful diplomatic means, General Skobeleff, 
then Governor of Ferghana, the Turkestan district nearest India, 
forwarded to Kauf mann an elaborate plan for a Central Asian cam- 
paign. Even when summoned to Europe to take part in the opera- 
tions there, he used his utmost influence at Court to put the Turkes- 
tan forces in motion, and finally achieved his object in sight of 
Constantinople, when, after several councils of war, it was decided 
that if the Congress at Berlin failed, an attack should be made upon 
India. 

Accordingly, Colonels Stolietoff and Grodekoff left the camp for 
Central Asia, the former charged with a mission to Shere Ali, and 
the latter— Skobeleft's oldest and most trusted friend — carrying 
Skobeleff s secret plans, and for himself the special appointment as 
chief of Kauf mann's staff. One other agent was also sent from the 
camp— Pashino, an ex-diplomate, who had served as interpreter at 
Samarcand to the present Ameer, Abdurrahman Khan, and pos- 
sessed a knowledge of India from a journey he had undertaken 
through the peninsula a few years earlier. Hi& mission was to pro- 
ceed tc India and secretly ascertain the condition of military and 



76 THE RUSSIAlfS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

tribal affairs on the frontier, and afterward push his way through 
tbe Khyber and join the Russian mission at Cabul. 

The outcome ot the enterprise is well known. Kaufmann 
marched with the invading force to Djam, on the Bokharan fron- 
tier, and marched back again when the Treaty ot Berlin became 
known. Stolietoff penetrated to Cabul, and occasioned the Afghan 
war. Groclekofit returned to Europe by a famous ride through 
Herat, and is now Acting- Governor of Turkestan. Finally Pashino 
ivas arrested at Peshawur, and, in spite of his outcry, was sent back 
to Russia. 

Most of these facts are known to the public, but Skobeleff's pro- 
posed plan of operations has never received due attention, even at 
the hands ot those commonly supposed to be interested in Central 
Asian affairs. Briefly, the plan was this: Kaufmann was to have 
led an army to Cabul, almost denuding" Turkestan of its garrison, 
and was to have there organized the Afflchan forces for an attack 
upon India, while Russian emissaries stirred up the natives to a 
mutinv. It the people tailed to respond to the Russian appeal, 
-Kaufmann was to tie the English army to India by threatening it 
from Cabul, and, in the event of a rising, he was to push on to the 
frontier, and attack the English on one side while the mutineers ad- 
vanced and harried them on the other. Supposing the attempt 
tailed, Kaufmann i?v'as to retreat, not upon Turkestan, In case the 
sight of his shattered forces should cause Bokhara to rise, but upon 
Herat and the Caspian; being met on the way by a succoring army 
advancing vid Askabad and Meshed. 

Such was Skobeleff's daring scheme, the revelation of which, 
since his death, has exercised a remarkable effect upon the imagina. 
tion of Russian generals, and caused a longing to lead or participata 
in a campaign offering so many ch?inces ot distinction and glory. 
Had the Congress of Berlin tailed, the impression is general among 
Russian military men that Skobeleff's plan -would have been 
crowned with success. Their belief in the certainty of a mutiny in 
India is one that Englishmen will not generally share, and hence 
the probability of an actual irruption into India will be contested; 
but there is one matter upon which not much difference ot opinion 
can prevail. The Afghans would have doubtless fallen in with the 
Russian plans, and by their co-operation tied the English troops to 
tiie frontier; thereby preventing the re-enforcements being sent to 
Europe. This alone would have been a success of no mean order, 
for it is no secret that Russia was greatly disturbed b}^ the idea of 
'Sepoys being dispatched to Turkey to assist in the defense of Con- 
stantinople. 

Strangely enough Skobeleff's plan of invasion has only excited 
Russia and England since his death. The actual march by Kauf- 
mann toward India provoked little or no attention in this country, 
and, the details being suppressed in Russia, it was treated as a sim- 
ple demonstration intended to give weight to Stolietofl's mission. 
That it was really a serious move, inspired by the deadliest inten- 
tions against our rule in India, was only to the most limited degree 
realized even by the oldest politicians in this country. The military 
movement was looked upon as subsidiary to the political mission at 
Cabul, instead ot the latter being, as it leally was, a pioneering 



THE EUSSIA:NS at the gates OE HERAT, 77 

feeler of the former. This indiflerence to Kaufmann's march was 
increased by the En.2;lish disasters in Afghanistan and Lomakin's 
failure to conquer the Turcomans. It was asserled that while the 
Afghan and Turcoman barriers existed India was perfectly safe 
Irom attack. Then stress was laid upon the Hindoo Koosh, and 
politicians overlooked the looming advance from the Caspian., Even 
Skobeleff's deci^sive success at Goek Tope did not shake the belief 
of the Gladstone Cabinet in the sound and permanent character of 
the barriers beyond, interveuing between Askabad and India, The 
Duke of Argyll said that the new advance was not to be compared 
with the older ones, and that we had nothing to fear from Sko- 
beleflt's triumph. But for the energy displayed by Lord Salisbury, 
the fall back from Candahar would have been followed by the 
evacuation of Quetta. 

It was while things were in Ihis-condition that Mr. Joseph Cowen, 
M.P., asked me to proceed to St, Petersburg to ascertain the Rus- 
sian view of the position in Central Asia from the lips of the prin- 
cipal generals and statesmen. Of all the generals 1 saw, Soboleff 
was the only one who would agree with the opinion 1 strongl)' held 
at the time, and which was well known to them, that a Russian at- 
tack could be made upon India from the Caspian. General Skobeleff 
was the most incredulous of all. He would not hear of a Russian 
attack. "The Central Asian difBculty is all humbug," he said. 
*' 1 do not think a Russian invasion of India would be feasible. 1 
do not understand military men in England writing in the Army 
and Navy Gazette, which 1 take in and read, of a Russian invasion 
of India. 1 should not like to be commander of such an expedition. 
The difficulties would be enormous. To subjugate Akhal we had 
onlj^ 5,000 men, and needed 20,000 camels. To get that transport 
we had to send to Orenburg, to Khiva, to Bokhara, and to Mangish- 
lak for animals. The trouble was enormous. To invade India we 
should need 150,000 troops— 60,000 to enter India with and 90,000 
to guard the communications. If 5,000 men needed 20,000 camels, 
what must 150,000 need ! And where could we get the transport? We 
should require vast supplies, for Afghanistan is a poor country, and, 
could not feed 60,000 men; and we should have to fight the Afghans 
as well as you. IE we bribed one Sirdar, you would bribe another; 
if we offered one rouble, you would offer two; if we offered two, 
you would offer five — you could beat us in this. No; the Afghans 
would fight us as readily as they fougLt you. I believe the new 
frontier is quite permanent, and that we shall hear no more about 
Central Asia for many years to come." 

" But. in regard to the possibility of invading India, General Sobo- 
leff expressed to me a clear conviction that Rus.sia could march an 
army on India if she chose." 

" That was diplomacy," replied Skobeleff. " Of course it is pos- 
sible—all things are possible to a good general— but 1 should not like 
to undertake the task, and I do not think Russia would. Of course, 
if you enraged Russia — if, by your policy, you excited her— if you 
made her wild— that is the word — we might attempt it, even in spite 
of all the difficulties. For my part, I would only make a demon- 
stration against India, but 1 would fight you at Herat." He said 
this with great animation, but very good-humoredly. " Do you 



78 THE KUSSIANS AT THE. GATES OF HERAT. 

know, 1 was very much interested during your war whether you 
would occupy Herat or not. It would hax'^e been a misty ke if you 
nad done so. It would be difficult to march an army from the Cas- 
pian to Herat to tio'ht you there, but we should be tempted to do it • 
in the event of a war." * 

Whether these were really the sentiments of Skobeleff at the mo- 
ment, or whether he was purposely minimizing the poivsibiliiy of 
attacking India, in order "ihat England might n<.t be terrified into 
preparing against it in time, is a matter over which mucli ara-ument 
might be expended without leading to any satisfactory result. 1 
will not attempt to discuss the point. 1 will simply point out one 
or two facts, which are of more importance at the present moment. 
A-fter Skobelefl had finished his conversation with me he repeated 
it to Captain Masloft, one of his favorite' otflcers. Masloft published 
an account of it in the Novoe Vremya which tallied with my own, 
and he 8ubsequentl3' told me that SkobeleS had spoken of my report 
as perfectly accurate. The part 1 have repeated in this book was 
triumphantly quoted by Madame de Novikofit (otherwise O. K.), 
two years ago as demonstrating the madness of the Russian scare in 
this country. But O. K. has never said since that these utterances 
of Skobeleff fell completely flat in Russia, l^o Russian newspaper, 
and no Russian military writer has ever reciprocated those views,. 
or, indeed, ever noticed them at all. On the other hand, Skobcleft's 
opposite opinions in favor of an expedition !o India, which began to 
appear a few months after his death and have been seeing the liirht 
at intervals since, have exercised an enormous influence on the 
Russian military mind. Many of the documents published were 
written anterior to his conversation with me, but while the latter is 
ignored and forgotten, the former are incessantly being cited in 
proof af what Russia can effect against India. 

Several other circumstances nave contributed to add to the effect 
of Skobeleff''s aggressive views. A few months after his death Gen- 
eral Soboleff published his "Anglo- Afghan Conflict," a bulky 
three-volume work, compiled by the Chief of the Asiatic branch of 
the General Staff before proceeding to Bulgaria as Minister of IVar. 
This work was a sort of official history of our Afghan campaign, 
based on English sources, and was recommended by the General 
Staff as a standard work for militaiy libraries. His recent ut- 
terances in the Buss have shown that General Soboleff looks at 
things through very peculiar spectacle?. He is dominated by the 
bitterest hatred against England, and believes everything said or 
written to her disadvantage. In this history he sought to make out, 
or, it would be better to say, did make out, to his own satisfaction, 
that the Afghan war was too large an enterprise for us, that w^e were 
defeated by the Afghans throughout the campaign instead of being 
mostly victors, and that we were compelled at last to withdraw 
owing to the damage inflicted on our prestige and the tear of a rising 
in India. f 
An English reviewer, noticing Soboleff 's work, said it was made 

* "The Russian advance toward India,"" page 105. 

t A translation of all that is essential in tliis work is given in " The Russians 
at Mei'v and Herat."" 



THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 79 

up of " lies and nonsense." Upon him, of course, the work made 
no favorable impression, and be was disposed to minimize its im- 
portauce. But. as a matter of tact, the book exercised an influence 
which is displayed pretty clearly to day. To Russian olflcers who 
had not studied the subject, or who had only derived their impres- 
sions of the war from the jaundiced statements in the Russian press, 
the book appeared aa worthy of credence as an}^ official work could 
possibly be. It had been compiled by the Chief of the Asiatic branch 
of the General Staff, whose express duty it was to watch the war on 
behalf of the Government and obtain all possible information from 
En2:land~perh{ips India — bearing upon it. If such an official did 
not know what he was writing about, who in Russia was more com- 
petent than he? Thus Soboleff's book was eagerly read and widely 
read, and strengthened to a remarkable degree the feeling already 
prevailing that we were a very weak military power, and only main- 
tained our hold on India by a miracle. 

Skobeleff's opinion that we could be expelled from the peninsula 
by means of a hard blow struck in front, simultaneously with a 
fomented mutiny at the rear of the Indus, has excited more and 
more attention as Russia has approached nearer our outposts. The 
beliet in its feasibility that has steadily developed in Russia, since 
his plan of 1876 became known in 188^, h,as received a considerable 
impulse from the disappearance of the physical obstacles already 
existing. Skobeleff's main argument against the feasibility of an 
invasion, when he discussed the subiect with me, was the difficulty 
of transport, but this is a difficulty that has been daily wearing away 
ever since. When he proceeded to Geok lepe in 1880 it took nearly 
a month for the troops of the Caucasus army to march from Tiflis to 
the Caspian to join. By the opening of the Tiflis-Baku railway, 
since his death, the journey can now be done between sunrise and 
sunset. "When he ferried those troops across the Caspian he'had to 
contend with a very limited marine. By the development of the 
Baku petroleum industry fifty powerful steamers, 150 to 250 feet 
long, have been added during the last few years to the shipping of 
the Caspian, and can now convey the largest conceivable army across 
the sea to Krasnovodsk. The Transcaspian railway, aarain, was not 
finished to Kizil Arvat until long after he left GeokTepe. It is now 
"being pushed on to Askabad, and Lessar has stated that whether 
there be peace or war, it will be continued to Sarakhs— within six 
marches of the Key of India. Finally, Skobeleff imagined, or paid 
he imagined, a difficult road to exist between Askabad and Herat. 
Lessar has since discovered that it is one of the easiest in Asia. 

Thus, by Russia's resolute destruction of the Turcoman barrier, 
and by the rapid disappearance of a series of obstacles, things have 
come to this pass — that a land march upon India to day is an enter- 
prise less difficult to the Russian military mind than the march upon 
Constantinople in 1877. 

Such an enterprise might take two forms. Either Russia might 
adopt Skobeleff's idea of a fomented mutiny, and advance with 
merely sufficient troops to cleave a passage through the Afghan 
barrier, or she might ignore for tlie moment the people of India, and 
push on with some such army of mammoth porportions as she em- 
ployed in the last Russo-Turkish war. 



80 THE RUSSIA:N^S at the gates of HERAT. 

Let me deal with the former first. 

At the outset 1 must point out that a wide difierence of opinioa 
exists between English politicians and Russians.as to the possibility 
of a mutiny in India, and that this deserves more attention than 
light-hearted publicists in this country are disposed to give it. En- 
glish politicians generally assume that India is safe, oi sufficiently 
safe, from the danger of another mutiny. Disturbances, it is ad- 
mitted, might arise on the Russian appioach, but the country gen- 
erally would stand by us. 1 'do not say that all politicians sliare 
this optimist view, but the majority do— or at any rate, they conceal 
their uneasiness and keep it from the public. 

Now Russian Geneials, and the entire Russian Press, inch"ne to a 
totally different opinion. Geneial Skobele:6t, General Soboleft, General 
Tchernayeff, General Kaufmann, General Grodekofi, General An- 
nenkolf. General Petrusevitch, and otliers less known, may be cited 
as eminent representative Russian military men who never enter- 
tained a doubt on the subject. I have discussed the Auglo-Russian 
conflict with many Russian officers — some of them personal friends 
of mine— but have never met one who diQered from them in this 
matter. Yet some have made a special study of India. Skobeleff 
was always purchasing English books on the country, and I question 
■whether there are halt a dozen Members of Parliament who have 
such a good collection of Englisii and foreign books on India as I 
have pulled about in the library of General Annenkoff. 

If we examine more closely the plans of Skobeleft and others, we 
shall see how important this factor of a general rising really is. 
Skobeleff put the wants of Russia in a neat, compact form the other 
day when he declared that " Russia does not want India: she wants 
the Bosphorus." The Russian invasion of India is commonly ridi- 
culed by certain Radicals on the ground of the hugeness of the en- 
terprise. They assert that the people would never exchange En- 
glish for Russian masters, and that it woula require a larger army 
than ever Russia could spare to occupy and hold the country. But 
such assertions are based not upon facts, but illusions. Russia does 
not propose to occupy and hold India 1 have never met a Russian 
who x>roposed — at any rate, for the present — such a difficult enter- 
prise as that. Russia does not aim at replacing our administration 
by her own. None of the Russian generals ever susgested saaaling 
their country with such a burden. What Skobeleff reall}^ planned 
and advocated was, that the 250,000,000 people should be encour- 
aged and helped to throw the 100,000 English off their backs, and 
that during the universal collapse of our supremacy throughout the 
world that would ensue (in his opinion), Russia should occupy Con- 
stantinople 

Such an enteiprise is quite a small affair, compared with the un- 
dertaking imagined by those Radicals 1 have referred to. To secure 
its success, supposing India to be ready to rise and throw us off. 
all that is needed is to march to Candahar a force sufficiently stiong* 
to overcome the English force holding the frontier; after w^hich the 
Princes and the mutinous Sepoys themselves could be left to deal 
with the small garrisons located on the plains and plateaux of , 
India, aided, perhaps, by a few Russian officers. When Skobeleff 
proposed his plan in 1876, the Russian outposts were too tar from 



THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 81 

tlie Indian frontier, and the communications connecting them with 
Russia proper too extended and ili-developed to allow of more than 
a small force being sent to attack India. He, therefore, had to rely 
upon Afghan help on the one hand, and an Indian mutiny on the 
other. 

It is well to notice that he providea for two kinds of assistance in 
his plan.* It the Afghan co-operation had been slight, he would 
have stimulated a general rising in India. If, on the other hand, 
he had considered himself sufficieully strong with Afghan help, to 
break through the frontier, he would only have " manipulated the 
disaffected elements in India to Russia's advantage." The possibili- 
ty of a general rising in India may be questioned by English politi- 
cians; but there is not one who can deny that " disafiected ele- 
ments " do exist in the country. 

The genuine belief of Russia in the' probability of a mutiny in 
India on the approach of a small force against us, is too serious a 
factor in politics to be brusquel}'' treated as an illusion. The more 
feasible a Russian attack upon our rule in India appears tu the Rus- 
sian Government, the less disposed will it be to treat us with diplo- 
matic deference in Europe, and retrain from aggressive acts in Asia. 
Further, the greater the chances seem to it of a successful campa'gn 
on the Indifm frontier than in Europe, the stronger the impulse to 
break through the Afghan frontier, at -any cost and secure Herat. 
"What would Russia care for the Ameer's ill will at seizing Herat if 
she were sure of an Indian mutiny? The more, therefore, she relies 
on an Indian revolt the less she may be expected to care for Afghan 
susceptibilities. 

Russia, in a word, has two cards to play — the Afghans and people 
of India. If she finds she can not accomplish her aims with the one, 
she will try to effect them with the other. 

" England lays a heavy hand on her dependent peoples," wrote 
General Sobolefl in the Buss last January, when he was already 
aware that Russia had seized the approaches to Herat. " IShe re- 
duces them to a state of slavery; only that English trade may profit 
and Englishmen grow rich. The deaths of millions in India from 
starvation have been caused indirectly by English despotism. And 
then the press of England disseminates far and wide ih3 idea of 
Russia being a country of barbarians. Thousands of natives in 
india only await Russia's crusade of deliverance! 

" tf Englishmen would only throw aside their misplaced pride,, 
and study a little deeper the foundation of Russia's rule in Central 
Asia, comparing it with their own, they would soon see plainly why 
the name of Russia has such prestige in Asia, and why the natives 
of India hate the dominion of England, and set their hopes of free- 
dom upon Russia, Russia gives full liberty to native manners, and 
not only does not overburden her subjects withtresh taxes, but even 
allows them exemptions and privileges of a most extensive char- 
acter. England, on the contrary, is a vampire, sucking the last 
diop of blood Qut of India. 

" As to our course of antagonism in Asia, England herself threw 

* I may state that his plans are given in full in " The Region of the Eternal 
Fire.^; London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1884. 



82 THE KUSSIAN'S AT THE GATES OE HERAT. 

down the glove at Sebastopol, and if the Russian flajr now floats 
ovei Merv, the English have themselves to blame. We accepted 
their challenge; it now rests with them whether there is to be a 
Russian invasion of India or not. But w^e hope the time has come 
when English strategists will take into consideration the 200,000 
troops of the Caucasus, and the 100,000 in reserve of Turkestan and 
Western Siberia, besides another army of half a million behind in 
European Russia, and will look on the map and see what must hap- 
pen if a Russian corps of 200,000 men, accompanied by another of 
100.000 of splendid irregular cavalry, pass through Herat andBulah 
into India, and proclaim the independence of the native population. 
Let England think well of the consequence of Russia deciding to 
take up arms against her. " 

By ignorant or interested writers these threats were represented as 
merely the casual frantic outpourings of a headstrong and harmless 
general. But it is well there should be no misconception on this 
score. Boboleff is an oflQcer of very considerable weight and stand- 
ing in Russia, and what he said represents fairly the feeling of the 
whole army and the greater part of the press at the present mo- 
ment. 

All the more reason, therefore, why we should cling to our hold 
upon Herat, and insist on a settlement of the frontier dispute be- 
fore Russia masses a force at its gates capable of crushing Lumsden 
and his Afghan allies. 

Let us now consider the second form an attack upon India might 
t«,ke — i.e., a blow delivered by a large army instead of by a relative- 
ly small force, and operating without reliance upon a simultaneous 
rising on the part of the Indian people. 

It is no secret that the Government are perfectly aware that Rus- 
sia could dispatch a very strong expedition to the gates of Herat, 
and that the calculations as to what slie could really do have been 
scientifically worked out by the ablest English military authorities. 
in a manner very alarming to those who hold the reins of power in 
this country. Soboleff's sneeiing suggestion that English strategists 
should take into consideration what Russia could accomplish from 
her Caspian base, in the event of war, has already been anticipated 
by our generals. They demonstrated, before even Merv was an- 
nexed and the gates of Pleiat were won, that Russia could in 77 
days mass 23,000 troops at Herat, and in six weeks afterward at least 
as many more, while in from 70 to 100 days she could put 13,000 
men into Cabul, and in 90 days push 11,000 more into the northern 
passes of India. Without counting the latt<?r, we may therefore say 
that before even the last two advances took p^ace in Central Asia, 
from Askabad to Merv and from Merv to the Paropamisus ap- 
proaches, oirr military authorities knew that in less than four months 
Russia could mass nearly 50,000 men — all Russian Iroops-^on the 
camping-ground of the Key of India. 

A year ago, before these calculations became bruited abroad, I 
drew attention, in a pamphlet,* to the facility with which Russia, 
"sid the Volga and the Caspian base, could thrust a large army along 

* " Russia's power of seizing Herat and concentrating a force to thi'eaten 
India.'' London: W. H. AUen & Co., 1884. 



THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 



83 



the Askabad-Herat route to C(3nfront us at Candaliar, iu the event 
of European complications. Fresh evidence has accumulated since 
of the aggressive stren.2:th of this line of operations, and it may be 
that events will practically test it before long. 

The Kussian array, on a peace footing, numbers between 800,000 
and 900,000 men. In time of war two or three millions may be' 
summoned under the flag. Every year nearly 300,000 recruits are 
drafted into the army. 




GENERAL SIR F. S. ROBERTS, V.C, K.C.B. 



Moscow and the contiguous provinces are generally regarded as 
constituling the heart of Russia. 11 one will take a map, he will see 
that the distance is no further from this center of strength to Kras- 
novodsk, on the Caspian, than to Constantinople. In 1877-8 Russia 
dispatched nearly Lalf a million men, with an enormous quantity of 
stores, in the direction of the latter place. To day it would be as 
easy, or rather, easier, to deflect that number upon the Caspian. 

Most of the troops sent to the Balkan peninsula, in 1877, proceed- 



S4: THE RUSSIAls^S AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

€d by rail, and it is welL known thgt half of Russia's difficulties 
arose from the restricted character of his means of communication, 
JBut the Volga and its tributaries drain the heart of Kussia I have 
referred to, and constitute a magnificent waterway to the Caspian 
Sea. 

Although frequently described by travelers, the grandeur of this 
Volga waterway has never been properly appreciated by English 
politicians. Within a few short hours' railway ride from St. Peters- 
burg, the Volga can be touched at a navigable point, and from there 
troops can go in steamers or barges down the Caspian Rea. From 
the Caspian Sea runs the easy level road from Micbaelovsk (near 
Ivrasnovodsk) via Askabad and Sarakhs, to the gates of Herat and 
to India. 

The resources of the Volga may be gathered from the fact that the 
traffic on the river amounts to over ten million tons annually, con- 
ducted by 650 cargo steamers and 3,000 barges, having the united 
capacity of nearly 3.000,000 tons. The value of these steamers and 
l^arges is estimated at £8,000,000 sterling. In excess of the 3,000 
permanent barges of 1,000 tons capacity each, there are hundreds of 
tercpomry ones constructed to convey cargoes to Nijni Novgorod, 
or other destinations, and then broken up. On the Volga and 
Kama 100 such barcres are yearly constructed, with a cargo capac- 
ity each of from 300 to 500 tons, and 200 with a capacity of 
irom 5,000 to 8,000 tons. These huge vessels, the size o£ ocean-go- 
ing steamers, and the 300- foot permanent barges, are too large to 
pass through the canal system to the River Neva, the locks of 
which do not admit the passage of craft exceeding in Ipngtii 147 
leet; hence 1,000 smaller barges, 100 feet long, and having a capac- 
ity of 200 or 300 tons apiece, are yearly constructed simplv for the 
transport of goods from the Volga to the Neva. Besides the exten- 
sive shipbuildino; above referred to, 4,000 barges, wherries, and 
:flshing-boats are annually built on the Volga for the lower course 
of the river and the Caspian. The central point of the traffic on the 
^olga is Nijni Novgorod, wliere there is an annual turn-over at tiie 
Great Fair of from twenty to twentj-^-five millions sterling. Astra- 
khan, at the mouth, does a trade of £5,000,000 a year. The traffic 
passing through the mouth of the Volga amounted to a million tons 
in 1882. 

These are some of the transport resources of the river Volga, 
liown M'hich Russia is dispatchmg troops to re-enforce Komaroff's 
army at the gates of Herat. Besides the navigable waterway from 
Tver, the railway sj'stem touches the river at four great points — 
Nijni Novgorod, Samara, Saratoff, and Tsaritzin. To each of 
these, troops could be dispatched from Middle and Western Russia, 
and, on their arrival at the river, find plenty of transport to carry 
them down to the sea. 

That sea— the Caspian — associated in most Englishmen's mioda 
with sands and scorpions, is now a great basin of busy commerce. 
Over 200,000,000 herrings are caught in it every year. The petro- 
leum trade of Baku, opposite Michaelovsl^, employs fift}'' large 
steamers and hundreds of sailing vessels. Seven thousand vessels 
enter and leave the port every year. The port of Baku contains 
pier accommodation for 100 steamers at one and the same time. 



THE KUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HEEAT. 85 

-while the petroleum refineries eive the means of drawinp^ largely 
upon ensineerin^ resources. Without experiencing anything like 
the diflSculty she encountered in 1877, Russia could assemble in the 
magnificent harbor of Baku an army quite as large as she invaded 
Turkey with then. It would have better transport, the troops would 
arrive at the base in better trim, and Ihey would have the enormous 
food supply of the Volga to sustain them in their campaign. 

The army of the Caucasus, 100,000 strong on a peace footing, 
is for the most part concentrated in Transcaucasia. Through 
Transcaucasia runs a railway fiom Batoum, on the Black Sea, to this 
same Baku on the Caspian. Baku, therefore, would serve as the 
concentrating point of the forces of the Caucasus as well as those 
from Kussia proper. 

Baku, which in 1879 only contained 15,000 people, now has a 
population ot 50,000, and is becoming a great city. There are 5,000 
houses in the place, and 1,500 shops, and 200 oil refineries turning 
out a quarter of a million tons of burning oil every year. 

Across the water to Michaelovsk is a day's journey; then comes 
the railway triptoKizil Arvat terminus, 144 miles inland, where the 
Transcaspian desert ends, and the fertile country commences, run- 
ning all the way to Herat. As 1 have said, the transport power of 
the Caspian is now such that Russia could rapidly move, not sim- 
ply thousands of troops, but tens of thousands; for the fifty steamers 
are new^ and large, and the hundred sailing vessels ships of great 
capacity. 

We may therefore say, so far as the collection of troops and stores 
in the Caspian is concerned, Russia could surpass any efforts we 
could make on the Quetta side of India. But there is another great 
fact. This assembly could go on secretly, and almost witliout our 
knowledge— at least, definite information could be suppressed — 
while we could not move a soldier from England wiUiout the cir- 
cumstance being known to Russia, Further, while ni>t a soldier 
could get to India without the liability of being attacked on the 
way, for Russia might be able to secure allies in Europe, she her- 
self could assemble a vast army in the Caspian, benind the screen 
of the Caucasus, without having to detach a single man to protect 
it. 

In 1877 KishineS was the concentrating point from which Russia 
invaded Turkey. For her troops to proceed to that point, the diffi- 
culties of transport'ahd food supply were infinitely greater than they 
would be from the present terminal point ot the Transcaspian rail- 
way system at Kizil Arvat. I say present terminal point, because 
although her engineers have been engaged extending the line since 
last autumn, nothing is known as fo the amount of new railway 
now open for traffic. JNow, from Kishineff to Constantinople, the 
troops of the Shipka column had to march 750 miles, and of the 
Sophia column, 970 miles. If we treat Kizil A-rvat as a Kishineft, 
the distance thence to Herat is only 523 miles, as compared with 
the distances traversed by the Russians in 1877, given above. But 
perhaps an objection may be raised to treating Kizil Arvat as a 
KishinefT — then start from the decks of the transports in the Cas- 
pian. The distance even then is only 667 miles, as compared with 



86 THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

ibe 1,000 miles many Russians trudged on foot before they got to 
Constantinople. 

And maik this difference. Eussia, in invading Turkey, had 
Austria to threaten her flank, Tiiere would be no such enemy in 
the Caspian. Russia, tuittier, had to cross the Danube — one of the 
largest rivers in Europe— in face of Turks. She bad to encounter 
large armies at Plevna, and traverse the almost impregnable Balkan 
rano;e, meeting, on the other side, armies again before she got to 
Constantinople. In the case of Herat, nothing of the kind exists. 
There is not a single river of any magnitude the whole distance from 
the Caspian to Herat. There is no mountain range — only the Paro- 
pamisus Downs, containing, according to Gospodin Lessar, at least 
twenty good crossings. And instead of great armies, the Russians 
would find no enemy at all the wbole way to their prtsent outposts, 
and could now utilize the 50,000 Turcoman irregular horse lo assist 
them in their undertaking. 

Thus the defense of Herat, in the tace of such odds, is a very seri- 
. ous matt(ir. It is no permanent advantage to us that the forces at 
persent in the Transcaspian region should be relatively small, com- 
pared with the larger invading army 1 have referred to. Said a 
Russian general to me, during a conversation at Moscow during the 
Coronation festivities, " We have now such a good road to the heart 
of Afghanistan, and the communications with the Caspian base, 
and from the Caspian base to AsKabad, are so perfect, and admit 
of such a ready movement of troops, that we need only a handful 
of men to garrison the Turcoman region. It is cheaper to maintain 
50,000 men in the Tiflis district than at GeoK Tepe and Askabad; 
and we can throw them from the one point to the otner at a mo- 
ment's notice." 

Had Skobeleft been alive to-day, his plan for the invasion of India 
would have undoubtedly been the massing, on a large scale, of 
troops in the Caspian basin, and their dispatch to Herat via the 
Askabad-Sarakhs road and the parallel one from Astrabad via 
Meshed. The second is the old highway of invasion, and runs 
through the richest districts of Khorassan. On reaching the Hari 
Rud at Kusan, the Astrabad column would march to the south of 
Herat, leaving on its left flank the Paropamisus hills, and sever the 
Afgban fortress from India. 

It must not be forgotten that the Russians at Pul-i-Khatun an I 
Zulflkar have only to make three marches to the west, and the occu- 
pation of Meshed would provide them at a stroke with resources 
in transport, food, and supplies generally, equal to those at Herat, 
^5uch an occupation might be made by arrangement with the 8hah, 
who is notoriously anti-English, or without it; for if war arose, 
Russia would not hesitate a moment to cut off Khorassan from 
Persia at Shahrood, and use the Golden province as a line of advance 
and base of operations. 

Hence the invasion of India, or the smaller operation of an attack 
on Herat, is an enterprise which seems perfectly feasible to Russian' 
military men, and it is the conviction that the conflict would end in 
their favor that renders the Russian seizure ot the gates of Herat so 
ommous. If Russia had cot felt that she could safely affront 



THE EUSSIAiq^S AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 87 

this country, she would have never moved a Cossack across the 
Sarakhs-Khoja-Saleh boundary to the northern pasture lands of the 
Key of India. 



CHA.PTER VII. 

THE RUSSIAN BAELWAY TO HERAT AND INDIA. 

The advance of the Russian locomotive— Immense changes it will occasion in 
Central Asia— Inevitable junction of the Indian and European railway sys- 
tems via Candahar and Herat' — Only £4,000,000 needed to complete the 
link— Charing Cross to India in nine days— Statistics of the Une. 

A VERY great factor in the Kusso-lndian question is the Trans- 
oaspian railway, which is sanctioned tor construction as far as Ask- 
abad, and, according to Russian reports, is to be afterward continued 
to Sarakhs. If we allow the Russians to maintain their hold on the 
gates of Herat, and ourselves subsequently retire from safeguarding 
the fortress with English officers and troops, it will be always pos- 
sible, after the place'has been carried by a coup de main, for Russia 
to connect it with her railway system in a few months. The men- 
ace to India would then be perfect. 

To a correspondent of the Cologne Gazette Lessar is reported to 
have said as follows, the second week in March: " People attribute 
to us the idea of continuing the Transcaspian railway from Ask- 
abad to Sarakhs and Herat — a twofold absurdity. I have studied 
those regions in all directions and am convinced that a line to Herat 
by Merv must follow the course of the Murghab, tor a desert rail- 
way must, if possible, keep close to water. From a technical stand 
point the railway from Merv to Herat would be easy, for there is a 
gentle rise, and the chain of mountains, or rather hills, called the 
Paropamisus, has at least 20 good passes, and its loftiest peak is 
no( l,00t5 meters high. During the Russo-Turkish w ar 1 took part 
in laying down the much more diflBcult line from Bender to Galatz, 
and I believe the line from Merv to Herat would scarcely take more 
than three weeks. I should, however, be the last to recommend 
such a line. What we require in Central Asia is a line going from 
Askabad tc Merv, and thence north-eastward to Bokhara, so as to 
connect the markets together, facilitate the exchange of products, 
and open up new outlets for our Russian industry. When once we 
were at Herat with our line, the connection with the Indian lines 
at Quetta would only be a question of time, and then farewell to 
our dreams of our Central Asian culture and industry. Manchester 
and Birmingham would soon find their way by Quetta and Herat 
to Merv, glutting the Bokharau markets with their ctieap goods, 
and we should see that we had merely labored for the English. The 
line to Herat held up as a bugbear in the English newspapers, is only 
an imaginary evil for the English, but a real one for us Russians, 
for so far from implying the entrance of the Russians into India, it 
would rather imply the entrance of English goods into the Central 
Asian markets, and no military advantages could guard us against 
this economic danger." 

In interviewing, unless the interviewer knows a little of the sub- 
ject he is discussing, he is always sure to involve his " subject *' ia 



88 THE KUSSIAKS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

mistakes. Hence it would be untair, in the present instance, to 
charge some of tlie above absurdities to Lessar himself. The inter- 
viewer implies tliat Lessar said that Russia had no idea of running 
the line to ISarakhs (as well as to Herat), and also puts the matter 
as though Lessar stated that the railway ought to run from Merv ta 
Herat, not via ISarakhs. This, of course, is nonsense. What Lessar 
meant was that Russia, in pushina; the line to Sarakhs and Merv, 
had no idea of extending it to Herat and India; and he was only 
saying what was commonplace when he told the interviewer that 
from Merv to Herat a line must follow the Murghab. Of course he 
would object to such a liue, because it is not on the route to India: 
the railway ought to turn oft at Barak hs to do that. As for its be- 
ing possible to make a railway from Merv to Herat in three weeks^ 
that was a statement Lessar could obviously never have made, for 
the construction of 240 miles of railway is not to be done by any 
human power at present existing at the rate of eleven or twelve 
miles a day. 

1 take notice of this interview at all, simply to point out one or 
two important facts which are not j'et properly appreciated by the 
British public. In the first place, it is an established fact that can 
not be in any way contesteti, that it is possible to construct a rail- 
way from Askbakad to Herat, and thence to India. Secondly, it is 
equally beyond dispute that the two railway systems of Russia' and 
India are pushing toward each other In such a manner, that unless 
one of them suspends the advance, they will be infalliably within a 
few short hundred miles of each other in a j'ear or two's time. 
Further, that when this comes about, all that will be needed will be 
the construction of this short section to unite India with Europe by 
railway, and provide the world with a rival route to that vidihe 
Suez Canal. Finally, that as this new route will give Europe the 
means of getting to India in nine da_ys or so, and India the means 
of returning the compliment, the traffic passing along the line 
through Afghanistan to India and back again will set up an amount 
of local progress and movement, altogether changing the cpnditions 
on the Afghan frontier. 

Rusj^ia, who is the creator of this new route, and who is doing 
her best to enforce its opening up, is now posing as its opponent, so 
as to lull England until she seizes Herat. And she selects as the 
mouthpiece of this opposition the very man who has done more than 
any one living to bring about the inevitable junction of the Indian 
and Russian railways! 

Before describing the line, let me define what she is doing, and 
•what she is ^^^oing to do. She is going to build the railwa}" as far 
as Saiakhs, for that is an admitted fact in Russia, and Lessar him- 
self told me as much a few days after his arrival in London. From 
Sarakhs, however, she does not mean to push on to Herat or its 
gales, not because it is impossible or difficult, but because England 
would regard it as a menace. To allay our uneasiness on this score 
she says that she is going to turn oft from Sarakhs to Merv, and 
afterward extend the line to Turkestan. Therefore, she asks that 
we shall not be disturbed by any bugbear of a railway to Herat, but 
allow her to retain the gates of that place without tear of the loco- 
motive pushing up thither. 



THE RUSSIAN'S AT THE GATES OE HERAT. 89 

It is well we should clearly appreciate the reasons of this attitude. 
She does not want us rendered more determined to dispossess her 
of the gates of Herat by the fears excited by the advance of her 
locomotive, and she does not desire that we ourselves should rush 
on our Quetta line to Candahar and the Key of India. In her view 
that would be a calamity, it would strengthen our defense of Herat 
too much. But it would not do for her to say this; therefore a 
commercial objection is trotted out, and she expresses a tear that if 
the two railway systems were joined, England would deluge the 
markets of Central Asia with her cheap produce. 

To my view there is something delightfully audacious in this last 
contention. It is a well-known fact that every Russian advance 
means the exclusion of English goods from more markets In Cen- 
tral Asia, and that this is accomplished, not by the establishment 
•of superior transport, but by the short and summary method of 
ordering our manufactures out of the country altogether. At 
present no English manufactured goods whatever aie allowed to 
cross the frontier hi Central Asia from India; an:l the produce ol 
India, such as tea, indigo, etc., is subjected to the heaviest duties. 
Tlie fear expressed by Lessar, therefore, is grotesquely absurd. Al!, 
that Russia would require to do, on the junction of the Russo- 
Indian lines, would be to frame an edict and place a custom-houso 
officer at the connecting point, and English commerce with the 
markets of Turkestan and Turkmeuia would be effectually gripped 
and held in tether. Nobody knows this better than Russia herself. 

On this account we must not be lured into surrendering the gatCi^ 
of Herat, because Russia is only going to extend the Transcaspian 
railway to Sarakhs and Merv for the moment. As tlinse two point3 
form the bases of her present position, that simple extension alone 
would be a most serious matter; because Russia would have her 
railway system running to within 202 and 240 miles of Herat, while 
ours at Pishin would be 469 miles distant. It docs not need much 
knowledge of military affairs to appreciate how great an advantage 
the Russian generals would possess over our own, if no correspond- 
ing movement M'ere made by this country. 

In this manner the Russian railway advance provokes and com- 
pels the advance ot the English locomotive into Afghanistan. This 
is a serious annoyance to Russia, for she wants to get as close to" 
India as she can, and secure as much of the future highway as pos- 
sible. She would like the junction to take place not further from 
India than, say, Candahar. She does not want England to push on 
the line to Herat, and thereby prevent her securing the Key of 
India. Hence the utmost efforts are being made to allay our fears, 
and prevent us, when the railwa;^ is finished to Pishin, from ad- 
vancing for the moment any further. 

" Don't talk about the Transcaspian railway," said Skobeleff to 
me in 1882. " That's a fad of Annenkoff's. Nothing will ever 
■come of it." 

Yet it has been since revealed in Grodekofl's history of the Tur- 
coman war, that Skobeleff did attach an enormous value to the line, 
and took the deepest interest in its construction. He realized at thQ 
very outset how vastly it would improve the Russian position at the 
gates of the Key of India. 



90 THE KUSSIAKS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

The notion ot a Transcaspian railway did not crop up until after 
Lomakin's defeat at Geok Tepe in 1879. But tor that defeat it is a 
question whether it would hav'e been constructed at all. The dis- 
aster at Geok Tepe shook the power of Russia in Central Asia^ 
and rendered a campaign of revenge uuavoidable. The principal 
ditlicult.v in the second expedition consisted in the scarcity east ot 
the Caspian ot transport animals, to convey the stores of the army 
across the narrow band of desert lying between the Caspian and 
KizilArvat. To overcome this a service of traction engines and 
fourgons was projected by General Petrusevitch, and later on, the 
construction of a tramway. Ultimately, at the suggestion of General 
Annenkotf, the Controller of Russian military transport, SkobelefE" 
decided on a regular railway, and induced the Government to send 
him the 100 miles ot railway lying idle in store at Bender. 

At first the railway works were meant to Ue only temporary, but 
Anneukofl conceiving the idea of some day earning for himself the 
reputation of .a second Lesseps, by pushing on the line to India, and 
giving the world a new route to the East, made the line so strong 
that, when at last it was finished to Kizil Arvat, 144 miles from the 
Caspian, the five-foot metal way was as good as any in Russia. 

On Annenkoff 's return from the seat of war he issued a pamphlet 
in support of his idea. This was exposed to a deal of ridicule in 
f'ussia, as well as in England; and not only did the Marquis of 
Hartington pooh-pooh the idea in the House of Commons, but even 
Sir Henry Rawlinson, Sir Richard Temple, and other so-called 
" alarmists " put it aside with disdain, as not entering the sphere 
of practical politics. 

On myself, however, the pamphlet made a very different impres- 
sion. So subversive of the condition of things in Central Asia did 
it promise to be, in my estimation, that 1 published a pamphlet on 
the subject, with ^Jac-simUe of Annenkoii's map, and issued 1,000 
copies to Parliament and the press. In this pamphlet 1 demon- 
strated, by calculations based on Lessar's discoveries, that the ex- 
tension of the line from Kizil Arvat to Herat would only cost Russia 
£2,192,000, while the complete junction of the Russian and Indian 
railway systems could be effected lor a little over £6,000,000 ster- 
ling.* 

Even, this failed to move the lethargy of the Government beyond 
causing the improvement of the Bolan route to be taken in hand„ 
which, 1 have been informed, was due to this pamphlet; but in 
Russia it had the fact of dissipating much of the ridicule to whicli 
Annenkoft" had been exposed by the press, with which he was not 
popular, and when in 1883 tlie Transcaucasian railway was finished 
from Batoum on the Black Sea to Baku on the Caspian, it was at 
once seen how natural a continuation of this trade route Annen- 
koft's line was across the Caspian. 

Still nothing was done by England as a countei poise until Merr 
was annexed. Then the Government, whicli had stopped the Can- 
dahar railway, and literally pitched a part of tUe line all over the 
country, gave orders for the same railway to be rushed on with all 

* " The Russian Railway to Herat and India.'' 



THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 91 

possible speed, and to be carried to the Pishin plateau beyond 
<^uetta. 

As soon as this order was _^iven Russia retorted by sanctioning 
the extension of her own line tiom Kizil Arvat to Askabad. 

In this manner, even if the advance had not subsequently taken 
place to the gates ot Herat, two further sections of the Kusso-lndian 
railway would have been constructed all the same. Wheiher Ens- 
land wijl retort od the extension to Askabad by a fresh advance on 
Candahar remains to be seen. The generality ot English politicians 
assert that it will be absolutely essential if the Russian line be car- 
ried on to Sarakhs. 

At the outset, let us see how the Russo-lndian line will stand if 
no further advances be made beyond those actually sanctioned — 
that is to say, as far as Askabad on the Russian side, and Pishin on 
the Enghsh. 

Miles. Cost per mile. Total. 

^Askabad to Sarakhs . . , 1853^ £4,000 £742,000 

Sarakhs to Herat ]lOO^:;;;; 5;000 [ ^^^,000 



Askabad to Herat 388 miles £1,652,000 



The cost of the line is based upon the calculations of Annenkoff 
and Lessar. Between Askabad and Sarakhs, according to Lessar, 
the country is quite flat, and without a single obstacle to a railway. 
As re.E^ards the country from Sarakhs to Herat, Lessar, after his 
S!urvey in 1882, divided it into two sections. A half, he sai3, would 
be as level as the Askabad- Sarakhs district, and the remaiuina: half 
identical with the country commonly met with in Russia — that is 
to say, easy to traverse, but less easy than the rest, because of some 
hills and undulations. 1 have increased the cost of this by £1,000 
a mile. I should say that no one has more insisted upon the feasi- 
bility of the line to Herat than Lessar himself, and it is he himself 
who has selected the Askabad- Sarakhs route as the best from the 
Caspian. 

Thus, for less than the price of a couple of ironclads Russia could 
carry her railway system right into the very Key of India. Con- 
sidering that she has just spent £9,000,000 in completing her rail- 
way communication between the Caspian and the Black Sea, this is 
a very insignificant outlay. 

On the Indian side, when tlie Candahar railway was recommenced 
the terminal point was Sibi, 599 miles from Herat The sanctioned 
extension to iPishin will carry the line to within 100 miles of Can- 
dahar, or 469' miles of the Key of India. Thus, if we go no further, 
Russia will be 81 miles nearer Herat with her locomotive than our- 
selves. 

At £5,000 a mile, the estimated cost of the Candahar railway, the 
outlay on our section to Herat, 469 miles, would be £2,345.000 the 
country being more difficult between Candahar and Herat than be- 
tween AsKabad and Sarakhs. In this manner, when the sanctioned 
extensions are finished, all the expenditure that will be needed to 



92 THE EUSSIAi^S AT THE GATES OE. HERAT. 

establish through communicatioii between Europe and India by rail- 
way will be less than £4,000,000 sterling. 

_ Miles. Cost or Section, 

Askabad to Herat 388 £1,652.000 

Pishin to Herat 469 2,3*5,000 



Total length and cost 857 , £3,997,000 

Considering the revohition that would be accomplished by the 
possibility of proceeding from Charing Cross to India in nine days, 
this outlay is, relatively, an absurii tritle. It no political con.'-idera- 
tions hindered its accomplishment, a company might be formed and 
the money raised in London for the railway in a few hours. 

At the present moment Russia is going -to spend, in extending 
the Vladikavkaz railway to the Caspian and Black Sea, a sum ot 
money nearly equal to that which 1 have given above as all that is 
needed to render it possible for English people to proceed to India 
in nine days. Wheu this Vladikavkaz line is finished it will still 
further improve the proposed line ot communications. At present 
the route would be Calais, Berlin, Odessa, Batoum, Baku, Michael- 
ovsk, Askabad, Herat, Candahar, and Pishin; the water-breaks being 
from Dover to Calais, Odessa to Batoum, and Baku to Michaelovslv. 
When, however, the Vladikavkaz line is completed the 'water-breaks 
U'ili be only two. The traveler will proceed direct from Calais to 
Pelrovsk, on the Caspian, and cross over thence to Michaelovsk, 
thus saving the journey across the Black Sea. .This Vladikavkaz- 
Petrovsk link will be completed next year, so that by the time the 
Afghan railway is open the line of steam communication from 
London to Calcutta, tva Herat, will be perfect throughout. 

1 have said that in Russia it is stated on the best authority that a 
decision has already been arrived at to push on the Transcaspian 
Rail way ,_ when finished to Askabad, still further, to Sarakhs. This 
has been practically confirmed by Lessar. "Whether it will turn off 
then to Merv or not we need not discuss. 1 do not believe it wil:. 
1 am persuaded Russia will make a dash then for Herat. But let 
us simply accept Russia's admission that the line will cease ad- 
vancing toward India when it attains Sarakhs. Even if she goes no 
further, one thing is already certain — England will inevitably push 
on her Pishin Ime to Candahar. 

You may possibly tliink that events are not likely to be ripe for 
some time to come for a return to Candahar; but every houi they 
are tending to an English occupation of Herat, and, whether the com- 
munications be maintained through Candahar or not, the connection 
between Herat and Pishin will inevitably take the form of a railway. 
H Russia pushes on her locomotive to Sarakhs, to within 202 miles of 
Herat, it will not do for our locomotive to be 469 miles sh(>rt of if. 
Public opinion will compel the Government to push on the Indian 
railway system to Candahar. 

In that case, the position will be this: 

Miles. Total cost. 

Sarakhs to Herat 202^^ £910.(300 

Candkhar to Herat 369 1.^45,000 



Totallength and cost 571i^ £2,755,000 



THE EUSSIAXS AT THE GATES OF HEBAT. 93 

Thus, whether Russia turns off afterward to Merv or not. the ex- 
tension of her railway system to Saraklis will have the effect of re- 
ducing the gap between the railways of Europe and India to less than 
600 mileSc But 1 do not believe that the public would be satisfied 
with this state of affairs. Relatively the Russian locomotive would 
be far too close to Herat, and consequently our Candahar line would 
be pushed on absolutely to Herat. This done, the gap would be 
reduced to a paltry 200 miles, and there can be hardly a doubt that 
the moment a period of peace ensued the pressure of commerce 
•would quickly bring about a junction. 

Bence, 1 hold that in a very few years' tiaie India and Europe will 
be joined together by a quick route of railway running through 
Herat, and ihe traffic speeding along it, even it it be only passenger, 
will revolutionize the Russo-iudian region, and efface the soutbera 
portion of the Afghan barrier. 

If it be urged that I am too sanguine, T reply that the changes 1 
prognoslicate are notLina compared with what has been accomplished 
since 1880. Take Merv. It was then as mysterious as Timbucioo,and 
common report affirmed that it was instant death lor any European, 
to penetrate lo the haunt of the man-stealing Turcomans. To-day, 
the postman goes his rounds in the oasis, the policeman guards the 
shops in the bazaar, and a site is already staked off for a permanent 
telegraph office. Take Herat. Less than eighteen months ago no 
Englishman thought of the Sepoy and Cossack confronting each 
other on the Paropamisus slopes, Herat was as much out^^of the 
world, so far as European intercourse was concerned as the Arctic 
region. To-day some of its gates are in the Postal I]nir)n, and a 
post-card can be sent "by Lessar from London to Alikhanoff at Pul-i- 
Khisti for a penny. 

Strange as it may seem, the opening up of Ihis short cut to India, 
on the importance of which 1 have been insisting for years, without 
having produced much effect on the British public, is nothing more 
than a revival of a scheme that excited a mania in England 150 years 
ago. The Russians are only trying to do to-day what the English 
sought to accomplish in the reign of George 11. 

One hundred and Utiy ye^rs ago the merchants of England were 
bitten with the idea ot establishing trade relations with India «/« 
Russia and the Caspian Sea. The goods were to be conveyed to St. 
Petersburg or some other Baltic port; they were then to be sent by 
canal or road to the upper course of the Volga, and they were after- 
ward to float down the river 2,000 miles in barges to its mouth. Here 
they were to be placed on ships and taken to AstrabadBay, and from 
this point dispatched by caravan through Persia and Afghanistan to 
India. 

If the conditions of trade and travel in Russia at the time could be 
adequately realized, people would be amazed at the wonderful enter- 
prise ot these merchants In the Baltic there was constant war, the 
Volga Bwarmed with pirates, the Ct^pian was a Persian lake with 
rapine and disorder seething round its shores, and the whole of the 
country thence to India was as turbulent and untamed as the worst 
parts of Afghanistan to-day. Finally, in India itseli, France was 
still the stronger power, and Clive had not commenced the career ot 
conquest destined to convert the country into the magnificent de- 



94 THE ETJSSIAlJ^S AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

pendency ot the Empire we find it to-day. Such were a few ot the 
conditions oi the time tlie Russia Company sought to open up the 
Transcaspian route to India. In the interval that has elapsed the 
English, who only held a few points on the east coast of India (ex- 
chiding the then insignificant port, without territory, of Bombay), 
have moved toward Europe from Calcutta to Quetta 2,000 miles. 
The whole of this country they have conquered and organized, and 
railway communication runs right througii it, or will do so when 
the Pishin railway is finished. The Russians, on their part, whose 
final stronghold was Astrakhan, have advanced toward India as tar 
as Ak Robat and other gates of Herat, or 1,200 miles, the entire 
length ot which is open to trade, and the greater portion traversed 
by steam communication. 

In this manner, instead of the Russians at Astrakhan and the En- 
glish at Calcutta bein": over 3,700 miles apart from one another, and 
exercising no control over the intervening country, as was the case 
when Jonas Hanway tried to push English goods to India 150 years 
ago, they are now, measuring from the Russian position at Ak Robat 
to the English at Pishin, only a little over 500 miles apart, while 
some of their soldiers face each other. Yet, forgetful of the past, 
and blind to the forces at work at the present, Euirlish statesmen for 
years have been acting as though the trumpery Afghan barrier were 
destined to last tor centuries. 



CHAPTER VIll. 

THE FUTURE OF THE AFGHAN BARRIEE,. 

Impossibility of maintaining the Afghan barrier as it is— The Sepoy must con- 
front the Cossaclf— The expansion of Russia— Will Russia let us gaiTison 
Herat? — Skobeleff's Afghan programme— England must herself organize 
the Afghan frontier, and man it with troops. 

The Czar rules 100 million subjects; the Queen controls in India 
251) millions. Between the tu'o empires lies the Afghan barrier. 

"What is the Afghan barrier? To the majority of Englishmen it 
is a vast mountainous region, extremely inaccessible, and peooled 
throughout with fierce tribes averse to any. inteicourse with the 
Feringhi. To conquer it would be a task equal to the Ru-ssian con- 
quest of the Caucasus, To attempt commercial intercourse would 
be to expose England to the risk of having to perpetually avenge 
brutal murders. For Russia to try to march an army into any part 
of the Ameer's dominions would be to involve her in those disasters 
and losses which maiked our last Afghan War. If given to strife 
among themselves, the people are welded together by a common feel- 
ing of patriotism against the attacks of outsiders, Irreclaimably 
cruel, they are best let alone; and even if Russia tore her way 
through the tribesmen, and broke the Ameer's levies, England could 
confront the wearied and mauled invaders in the Khyber and Bolan 
Passes, and effectually check an inrush into India. 

Thus, to the view ot most Englishmen, Afghanistan is a material 
as well as a moral barrier. To my view it is neither. 

There is only one possible solution of the Central Asian Question. 



THE EUSSIANS AT THE GATES OE HERAT. 95 

If the Russian advance is to be permanently arrested, we must con- 
Iront the Cossack with the feilih. Unless we move up to Russia, 
Rus^a will move down upon India. There can be no permanent zone 
maintained between the two empires. 

We shall see what a breakable barrier this Afgnanistan is, if we 
look at a few plain facts plainly. All 1 ask, as the outset, is that 
you look at them with your own ej^es, and not through the specta- 
cles of 1842 or 1878; nor yet, again, through the lenses of political 
old fogies, or, worse still, of m'ere party hacks, who, because they 
or their leaders expressed such and such opinions — five, ten, or 
twenty years ago — would rather see the empire perish than change 
them. 

The Russians are posted at the gates of Herat; the English are 
posted on the hills dominating the avenues to Candahar. Between 
them lies the A.fghan barrier. 

Ttiat barrier, physically, is of such a character, that the Russians 
could drive a four-in-hand fiom their own Cossack outposts to ours, 
and, during the 549 miles' ride, they would pass only two towns on 
the road — Herat with 50,000, and Candahar with 60,000 people. 
There are bad roads in Afghanistan, but they do not lie between 
the Russians and the English. There are fierce tribes, but they lie 
the thinnest between the Czar's soldiers and the Queen's. Tliere are 
patriotic Afghans, but the least sentimental and the most amenable 
to European influence, lie between the Cossack and the Sikh. There 
aie fearful mountains, but they do not lie along the road I mention. 
Horrible deserts exist, but in this case the most fertile parts of 
Afghanistan mark I he route. In one word, there is no barrier at 
all between the Russians and the English, except such as we our- 
selves may try and create, and inteipose to check the advance of the 
Cossack. 

Let me put the matter more plainly in the shape of a parable. 

A certain man stood at the junction of two roads: one, a level rail- 
way, along wliich, in the distance, could be seen a locomotive ad- 
vancing, and the other a winding post road which disappeared over 
a lofty hill. Seeing him standing on Ihe metals, people shouted to 
the man to beware of the advancing train. But the man refused to 
look along the line; he kept his gaze fixed on the old post road, and 
replied, "i can see no stage-coach coming over the mountain: 1 
don't believe in yonr warnings." And so he stood obstinately on 
the metals, refusing to move, until the train come up and cut him 
to pieces. 

Such has been the attitude of England nnd her statesmen in regard 
to the Russian advance upon India. That advance was formerly 
through Orenburg and the deserts of Central Asia. When English 
statesmen looked in those days toward the advanciog Cossack, they 
gazed at Cabul and the lofty Hindoo Koosh in its rear. There was 
a barrier then. But since 1869 the Russians have been advancing in 
another direction. They have been rattling along the almost level 
road from the Caspian to Candahar. Still, with woful perversity, 
English statesmen have refused to divert their gaze from the old 
mountain road, and have kept looking at Cabul, when they ought 
1o have been watching Herat. To-day, they are beginning to glance 
in the right direction, but unless they rid themselves of all the old- 



96 THE EUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

fashioned notions about the Afghans and the Afghan barrier, !he 
Russians will smash their way into India. 

In discussing the Russo-lndian question, politicians frequently 
quote the opinions expressed by Wellington in 1843, and bytLaw- 
rt-nce and others in 1860-70, when Russia was conquering the 
deserts of Turi?estan. They might just as well quote the Talmud. 
All the conditions have changed since those opinfons were expressed; 
everything has been turned topsy-turvy in Afghanistan and Central 
Asia, and" the authorities cited for parsing p&rty purposes by shal- 
low politicians w(»uld be the first to disown the erroneous hppiication 
of these opinions if they were alive to-day. 

To the Russian official or officer who has made the journey of 
3,000 miles to get from St. Petersburg to the gates of Herat, what 
is the trumper}'- 549 miles of easy road intervening between him and 
the Pishiu outjposis! The Herat-Candahar-region may be a barrier 
to politicians who have passed their lives in babble and barleycorn 
measurements, l)ut to Russians, accustomed to think no more of a 
thousand miles' journey than the Londoner does of a 'bus ride to the 
Bank, the distance separating the Cossack from India is grotesquely 
insignificant. 

I'lie defect of the xVfghan barrier is this — that it is weakest where 
it ought to be most strong; and we can only remedy that detect by 
taking the organization of the defense into our own hands. In 
plainer words, we ourselves must hold tlie gates of Herat. 

All discussions about the return to Candahar are beside the mark. 
We can occupy Candahar whenever we like, and we need not con- 
cern ourselves about its security. The whole of our efforts must be 
conr-entrated upon the safeguarding of Herat. 

We must make sure of the bulwarks of Afghanistan. The ques- 
tion of the inner defenses can be settled at our leisure afterward. 

To hear some people talk, the installation of an Indian garrison at 
Herat would appear to be the most difficult task that has tver tested 
the resources of our empire. As a matter of fact, the army con- 
centrated at Pishin would simply have to march 400 odd miles to get 
to Herat, and that by a broad wagon road. To a nation that has just 
sent, in face of fearful obstacles, a force from Cairo to Khartoum 
(1,500 miles), such an expedition should be relatively a comiuon- 
place enterprise. Ten ttiousand Indian troops, aided by tribal levies, 
would be all that would be needed tor the moment to safeguard the 
Key of India. The real difficulty consists, not in getting those 
troops there, but in making sure that Russia will not issue an ulti- 
matum forbidding their advance. 

It may be opportune to repeat what transpired fluring a discussion 
1 had with Professor Martens on the subject in 1882. The connec- 
tion of Professor Martens with the Russian Foreign Office is well 
known, and some of his utterances appeared to me, at the time, so 
fraught with warning that Iprinted them in italics. 1 give the con- 
versation and my comment just as 1 published it in 1882,* and 1 
think it will be found to possess significance of an undoubted chat- 
acter at the present moment. 

* "The Russian Advance toward India: Conversations with Russian States- 
men and Generals on the Central Asian Question, page SOT." 



THE KUSSIAifS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 97 

The conversation was udod the features of Afghanistan. 1 men- 
lioned that General Annenkoff had said, "Take Afghanistan, tor 
sake of peace." 

" But Professor Martens declared that England would not he able 
to annex Afghanistan irAthout Bussia's permission, or as he more 
delicately put it, ' without informing her flist of her intentions;' 
while as to Herat, he said that Russia would vieto an English occupatiorb 
of the place with displcasui'e. 

" He vvould not allow that we enjoyed supremacy in Afghanistan; 
nor yet that we could regard it as a second Bokhara. He said 
Afghanistan was an independent State, and a neutral one; and, 
with leterence to Lord tlartington's declaration last year, 'that 
England would not allow any power to mterteie with the internal 
and external affairs of Afghanistan,' which 1 quoted, to show what 
our Government thought of Russian pretensions, he said that the 
declaration was contrary to the views which Russia and England 
diplomatically expressed upon the matter, previous to the Marquis's 
speecii. He would not agree tljat the Afghan war had canceled 
those vietvs. ' Herat,' he said, ' is quite as important to Russia as 
to England. If it is the Key of India it is also the Key of Central 
Asia. If we were there we conld threaten you in India; it you 
were there you could threaten us in Central Asia.' 

"This opinion was expressed also by Baron Jomini, one of the 
Under-Secretaries of State at the Russian Foreign Office, to Lord 
Dufierin in 1879. Writing on July 16th in that year, he states that 
Baron Jomini said to him: ' Although we don't intend to go to 
Merv, or to do anything which may be interpreted as a menace to 
England, you must not deceive yourself, for the result of our pres- 
ent proceedings' (i.e., the operations of General Lazareff for con- 
quering and annexing Akhal) ' tcill be to furnish us with a base of 
o'Qerations against England hereafter, should the British Oovernment, 
by the occwpation of Herat, threaten 'our present position m- Central 
Asia.' 

" Professor Martens would not admit that Herat was as much a 
"pait of Afghanistan as Cabul or Candahar, and thought that Persia 
ought to have it. On my pointing out what a rotten State Persia 
was, and how completely it was under Russian control, he said that 
it Russia occupied Herat she would make Persia her enemy. My 
strong dissent from this led him to propose that Herat should be 
made into a sort of Switzerland, on the buffer State system, 
although he had previously expressed his disbelief in the possibility 
of keeping up Afghanistan as a buffer between the two empires. 1 
held ihat such a project was impossible with Asiatics, but he con- 
tinued to maintain tnat England should keep her hands off the pJace 
under any contingencies 

" As 1 gathered from him, he maintains Russia's right to annex 
all the territory up to the Afghan frontier, if the nomads provoke 
her to advance; he holds that Russia should also have Afghan Tur- 
kestan — i.e., the country between the Oxus and the Hinrloo Koosh. 
He Considers that Herat ought not to be treated as an Afghan possCvS- 
sion, and, finally, he insists that the rest of Afghanistan should be 
looked upon as a neutral independent State, in the existence of 
which Russia has as much interest as England. It is needless to 
4 



98 THE EUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

point out that these opinions can not but be so many red rags to En- 
glish Russophobists, and that, much as the Piotessor desires a rec- 
onciliation between England and Russia, a cessation ot the Central 
Asian agitation is impossible while they are maintained. 1 myselt 
would allow Russia to annex up to Atghanistan; but 1 would give 
her to understand that that country is English territory, and must 
not be looked upon as less our property than Mysore or Baroda. 

" 1 used to think that the claims put forward by the Oolos and 
Novoe Vremya, asserting Russia's right to treat Atghanistan as a 
neutral State, and Herat as apart Irom Afghanistan, were merely 
expressions of Anglophobe feeling. It has surprised me to find 
them seriously maintained by a person of such weight as Professor 
Martens." 

Since Russia seized the gates of Herat, the St. Petersburg press 
has repeatedly intimated that she would not allow us to occupy and 
garrison the Key ot ludia. These opinions have been treated some- 
what heedlessly by the English press. They have regarded them 
simply as ravings of irresponsible journalists. But knowing what 
1 do of the aims of Russian statesmen, and with the warnings of 
Professor Martens ringing in my ears, 1 can not but think that the 
threats of the Russianpress possess a very serious significance. In 
my mind'l am persuaded, that if we allow this frontier complication 
tosimmer until Russia masses at Sarakhs and Mervand the gates of 
Herat a more powerful army than Lumsden and the Afghans con- 
trol for the defense of the Key of India, she will suddenly throw 
ofi the mask and deny out right to send a force thither. Hence, if 
there is to be any advance for the defense of Herat, it must be done 
without delay. 

The present complications are something more than an obstinate 
controversy about a few miles ot frontier. The conviction has been 
deepening in Russia lor years that the economical depression to 
which it is a prey can only be dissipated by a solution of the East- 
ern Question, and that that solution is only attainable by taking up 
such a position on the Indian confines as shall compel England to 
acquiesce in the Russian occupatiGi;.of Armenia and Constantinople. 

Apparently, Russia has now accepted in full the policy of Gen- 
eral Skobeleif, which, published piecemeal since his death, has 
permeated the arm}' and exercised an extraordinary effect in pre- 
paring Russia for fresh sacrifices. Let me quote what Skobeleff 
wrote to a Rassian diplomatist after his return from Geok Tepe, 
during a rest he was taking on his estate at Spasskoe Selo: 

"The expedition of 1880-81, intrusted to me, gave birth to the 
indispensability of creating new relations with Merv, Afghanistan, 
and Persia. It rests beyond doubt that the late Emperor would not 
allow any other influence on the Persian frontier but that ot Persia. 
Let us hope that those high ideals which lay at the foundation of 
the late Sovereign's programme will remain the leading ones of the 
present policy. Up to now, our national misfortunes, according to 
our view, have mainly arisen, not from the breadth of our ideas, but 
from the irresolution and changeableness ot our political and ideal 
aim of operations. This want ot determination, hand in hand with 
financial unscrupulousness, has lain a heavy burden on the whole 
structure or the State. Personally, for me the whole Central Asian 



THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 99 

question is fully palpable and clear. If bj" the aid ot it we do not 
decide in a comparatively short time to take in baud seriously the 
Eastern Question — that is, to dominate the Bosphorus — the fleece 
is not worth the tannins;. Sooner or later, Russian statesmen 
will have to acknowledge that Russia must rule the Bosphorus. 
That on this depends not only her greatness as a power of 
the first magnitude, but also her security in a defensive sense, 
and the correspondins development ot her manufacturina: centers 
and trade. Without a serious demonstration in the direction of 
India, in all probability on the side of Candahar, a war for the Bal- 
kan peninsula is not to be thought of. It is indispensable to main- 
tain in Central Asia, at the gates of the corresponding theater of 
war, a powerful body ot troops, fuUy equipped and seriously 
mobilized. We might give up the whole of Central Asia in return 
ior a serious and profitable alliance with England, until we.had 
secured those results on the Bosphorus above mentioned, since the 
whole of Central Asia possesses for Russia only a temporary polit- 
ical significance. As^a vestibule to the theater of war in the event 
of sharp complications, similar to those ol 1878, the conquered Akhal 
country would serve in conjunction with tlie exclusive preijonderating 
influence ice enjoy in Persia. . . . With the pacification of the 
Akkhal Tekke oasis, the widest field ot action has opened before 
Russian influence in Afghanistan, whenever circumstances require 
it. Examining the strategical roads for the manifestation of this in- 
fluence, in dependence on the results accruing to England from the 
Afghan war, we are bound to come to the conclusion that the prin- 
cipal line of operations will rest upon the newly-conquered oasis. 
The late Emperor, in appointing me commander against the Turco- 
mans, was pleased to declare, in expressing an opinion as to what 
would be the results of a successful termination of the expedition, 
that he would not allow on the Persian confines any other prepon- 
derating influence except that of Russia. Remembering the sacred 
words of the Emperor, 1 hastened forward to Askabadand proposed 
that the Atak should be vassal to us, and Residents appointed at 
Meshed, Herat, and Merv; and fiualiy, in drawing the frontier, 1 
considered as a mimmum of our demands that we should control 
the mountain passes. . , . What has been said above by me 
does not constitute a new (Jtiestion, but luckily the success of the 
Aknal Tekke expedition practically opens to us the possibility of 
exercising an influence on the pliancy of Great Britain in the event 
of fresh complications arising from the Eastern Question. This 
affair, more than any other undertaking, demands knowledge and 
prolonged systematic preparations. In support of what 1 have 
stated, 1 am happy that 1 can quote an extract from the reports of 
Ellis, the English Embassador at Teheran (the contemporjiry of 
Siraonitch), to Lord Palmerston in 1835, now just published: '1 
have arrived at the deep conviction that the British Government can 
not in any case allow the extension of the dominion of Persia in the 
direction of Afghanistan without absolirtely infringing the security 
of our Indian possessions. Persia either does not wish, or can not 
€nter into a lasting alliance with Great Britain. Our policy for the 
future ought consequently to be to regard Persia not as a rampart 
protecting India, but as a first parallel, from which at a given mo- 



100 THE KUSSIAKS AT THE GATES OF HERAT, 

ment an invasion of India mf^ht proceed. Every step of Persia. 
toward the East brings liussia closer to the p^ites ot India.' Here 
is a revelation to us ot political ideas, vrhich ought to Jie in the fut- 
ure at the fundament, and with which I was guided in all my opera- 
tions, both military as well as those concerning the political frontier 
line of the newly subjugated country." 

This was published in the Novoe Yremya last j^ear, on the second 
anniversary of Skobelefi's death. The gaps in the letter represent 
portions prudently suppressed by that paper. It it be caietully 
read, it will be found to possess fuller significance, and contain a 
more direct bearing on the present Russian advance and the present 
claims, tlian anything ever published in tlie Russian language, in- 
cluding the stale but often quoted will of Peter the Great. 

" Russia does not want India; she wants the Bosphorus." Such 
was the declaration of Geneial Soboleff in the Russ a few months 
ago, and it will be seen that his words reT3resent very nearly the 
views of Skobeleft. The terms of peace seem simple, and there are 
certain simple-minded sentimentalists who are carried away b}^ the- 
plausibiiity of the O. K. and urjie that the British lion should lie- 
down with the Russian bear and surrender Constantinople. But I 
thinli I shall be able to show thai tlie offer is totally hollow, and one 
which can not accepted, even by the most willing Russophile. 

In the first place, not a single Russian writer has yet defined what 
the acquisition of " Constantinople " reallv means. Only one thing 
is certain — Russia does not mean Constantinople iiself and nuthing 
moie. On the contrary, she wants the whole of the Bosphorus and 
Dardanelles to give her a free and uncontrolled passage to the Medi- 
terranean, and the amount of territory she would require wiih the 
channels she leaves open. Now, on the north side of the Bosphorus 
and Dardanelles is European Turkey, nearly aa large as Great 
Britain, with 5,275,000 souls (we exclude EastRoumelia and simply 
reckon the territory \mder the direct sway of the Porte): and on the 
south side is Turkej^ in Asia, larger than German3% France and 
Austria combined, with a population of 17,000,000. How much of 
this would Russia want? Because, having secured the Bosphorus, 
we know that she would require plentj^ of territory on both sides to 
protect it from attack. 

As regards territory in Europe, Russia has expressed pretty 
plainly her desire to take over all that is left of the Porte's 
dominions, while, in respect to Asia, it is considered essential tJiat 
she should have xirmenia, so as to connect Kars with the Bosphorus. 
Thus, although the 8,000,000 people in the immediate vicinity or 
the Bosphorus, and the 14,000,000 other subjects of the Sultan lo- 
cated lurlher off, do not ask for Russian rule, England is requested 
to surrender the larger portion of them, because Russia wants an 
outlet to the Mediterranean. On the same grounds Denmark ougiit 
also to be surrendered, because the Danes control the exit from the 
Baltic. Nay, there is greater reason for this, because, while the an- 
nexation of Denmark would affect the interests of only 2,000,000 peo- 
ple, the annexation ot Constantinople would interfere directly with 
the destinies ot at least 8,000,000 people, and indirectly with 14,000,- 
000 more. In a word, there can be no RuBsian acquisition of Con- 
stantinople that does not carrj with it the annexation ot a large 



THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 101 

proportion of the Sultan's territory, and it is well, therefore, that 
this should be clearly borne in mina by those who advocate a bargain 
between Russia and England. 

But, supposing England did. surrender Constantinople, would 
India be ever free from attack, as tsoboleft implies? Could we 
safely leave the gates of Heiat iu Russia's hands? These are ques- 
tions to which it is impossible to return an affirmative repl3^ 

In (he first place, Russia's guarantee, verbal or in writing, would 
be no guarantee whatever. To lely upon any diplomatic compact 
would be to put ourselves in a position as bad as that of the suburban 
policeman, who should hand over in a dark lane his truncheon jand 
revolver to the captured burglar, in return for the scoundrel's as- 
surance lo go quietly to the station. It is not England's fault, but 
Russia's, that there is no guarantee Russia can giv^e us which we can 
possibly respect. But even if we could place more reliance on Rus- 
sian treaties, the expansion of Russia isa factor that would infallibly 
render them in time waste paper. Russia has a trontier Ime across 
Asia 5,000 nules in length, no single spot of which can be regarded 
as permanent. Starting from the Pacific we find that she hankers 
tor the northern part of Corea, regards as undetermined by bound- 
ary with Manchuria and Mongolia, regrets that she eave back 
Kuldja, hopes that she will some day have Kashgar, questions the 
Ameer's right to rule Afghan Turkestan, demands the gates of 
Berat, keeps open a gieat and growing complication with Persia 
about the Khorassan froniier, treats more and more every year the 
Shah as a dependent sovereign, discusses havine some day a port in 
the Persian Gulf, and believes she will be the future mistress of the 
whole ol Asia Minor. It may not be Russia's fault that her frontier 
is nowhere in a condition of rest. 1 will not aiscuss thai point, but 
I do insist that the frontier is one which must expand in me future^ 
and m so doing, frequently press on our interests. Consequently^ 
the surrenuer of Constantinople w^ould be of no avail in bringing 
about a permanent peace between the two countries, because there 
exist a score of other loopholes for quarreling between them. 

It is the recognition, the sorrowful Tccognition of this, tliat ren- 
ders me such a resolute opponent of the Russian advance into 
Afghanistan. Were I convinced that the surrender of Constanti- 
nople would put an end to the conflict between the two empires, I 
should be the strongest advocate of such a concession, for 1 like 
Russia. 1 have many sincere friends in the country. 1 take the 
deepest interest in its progress and expansion, and 1 should be the 
last to advocate war. But 1 recognize that permanent peace can not 
be purchased by any surrender, and it is the consciousness that the 
concessions will only beget fresh demands that causes me to insist 
on the necessity for resisting to the utmost Russia's claim to the 
gates of Herat. 

However disagreeable the task may be, England has but one 
course open to her. She must insist on the surrender of the Afghan 
points seized, and she must apply herself resolutely to the organiza- 
tion of the new frontier. Fortunately, if the Afghan barrier lies 
open to Russia, it lies open equally to ourselves. The conditions at 
Heiat are totally different from those at Cabul, The people are al- 
most devoid of fanaticism, they have a traditional feeling in uur 



102 THE EUSSIAXS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 

favor, and have already developed a fraternal sentiment since the 
presence of the Lumsden mission in their midst. Thus, it by 
friendly arrangement with the Ameer we could maintain a force in 
or near Herat, the measure would be very popular in the locality. 

As regards the actual frontier the matter is still easier. Along 
the whole valley of Herat to Kusan, the people dwelling in the vil- 
lages are quiet and well-disposed; north of them, to the Russian 
outposts, there are scarcely any inhabitants at all. Thus our out- 
posts would be safe on the Hari Rud side of Herat. With regard 
to the Murghab, immediately north of Herat, are the Jemshidis. 
These 1 have already described as peaceful and friendly; so again 
are the Sank Turcomans. 

oSow for Afghan Tjjrkestan. From Bala Murghab to the Oxus 
the Uzbegs are described by Grodekoff as particularly peaceful — too 
much so, he thinks, as they thereby expose themselves to Afghan 
tyranny. Tiie few Turcomans also found are lik'^wise free from 
turbulence. In this manner a very slight Anglo-Afghan cordon 
would suffice to guard the frontier from Persia to the Oxus, and it 
would effectually check Russian designs on Balkh and other fore- 
posts of the Hindoo Koosh, as well avS screen Herat. 

To the east of Herat are the Hnzaras, and south east the Araaks. 
These are supposed to number collectively 650,000 souls, and could 
supply 20,000 or 30,000 horse equal to the Turcomans. They are 
Mongols by stock, and so independent that the Afghans have never 
been able to brins: the former totally under sulDJeclion. With both, 
good relations have been established by Sir Peter Lumsden, and it 
is not anticipated by our Indian military experts that they would 
occasion any trouble, while, being anon Afghan people, they would 
be a valuable support toouroordc.n, in the event of any tumult among 
the Afghans themselves. The Firuzkuhis, 30,000 m number, are 
another tribe that might render excellent assistance. 

Thus, a cordon established along the new frontier would have 
powerful support in its rear, and from Herat to the Oxus would be 
safe from tribal attack and separated by the Hindoo Koosh from the 
tumults and fanaticism of Cabul. The sole difficulty is the linking 
of this cordon with our position at Quetta. 

The first thing to be remembered is, that we are the practical 
proprietors of the whole of Beluchistan, the present Government 
having established a protectorate over it It is very important to bear 
this in mind, because it gives us the means of establishing comrauni- 
ication tvith Plerat, without touching Candahar. As a matter of 
fact, the cordon I have referred to could be extended along the 
Perso- Afghan frontier to East Beluchistan, and there join hands 
with our own military forces. It has been pointed out by the high- 
est authority that a railway to Herat is feasible from the port of 
Gwadur, on the coast of Beluchistan, and this could be carried up 
to the Key of India without meddling with Candahai, or traversing 
any country held in force by hostile tribes. 

Before Sir Peter Lumsden left England 1 discussed with him this 
plan^ which 1 had been maturing some time, and had only refrained 
from making public to prevent Russia taking timely steps to frus- 
trate it. I based its success upon the tranquil character of the 
JSorth-west and West Afghan frontiers, and my views on this point 



THE EUSSIAN^S AT THE GATES OF HEEAT. 



10^ 



have since been confirmed by tlie correspondence dispatciied trom 
tliat region to the English and Indian press. Such a cordon would 
effectually checli any further Russian advance, and it would leave 
untouched Cabul and Oandahar, and llie districts generally of 
Afghanistan where fanaticism abounds, and the ill-feeling engen- 
dered by the last war has not yet passed away. 

Of late it has become known that some such plan had been drawn 
up by the ablest military authorities in India during the viceroyaltj 




LORD DUFFEKIN. 



Of the Marquis of Ripon. 1 can not help thinking that England's 
power in India would have been stronger to-day, had he attended 
to this moie, and left alone such fire-brand questions as the llbert 
Bill. 

Still, it is not too late for its adoption, if it be taken in hand be- 
fore Russia consolidates her position at the gates of Herat. If it be 
left untouched till then, Russia, 1 am persuaded, will never allow 
the English to garrison the North- v^est Afghan frontier without. 



104 THE RUSSIAIS-S AT THE GATES OE HERAT. 

making a determined effort to prevent it. On this account, it is es- 
sential that public opinion in this country should he perfectiy lipe 
for the permanent mannins: of the Afglitin frontier with Indian 
troops, and that Russia should teel that Earl Dufferin is backed up, 
if he adopts such, a policy, by the patriotic feeling of the entire En- 
glish empire. 

1 may add that our military resources in India are quite equal to 
the task, if increased by a few re-enforcements from home, and that 
the sole obstacle is, whether the Goverilment may not hold back, 
fearing that public opinion in England is not sufficiently advanced 
for such a forward movement. To go into full details of the policy 
would be to lengthen out a bookalready sufficiently long, and, what 
is worse, perhaps leail to Russian intrigue, in London and on the 
spot, to prevent its realization. But 1 have said enough in this 
volume in describing the new frontier, to indicate its feasibility; and 
India being ready to tai^e the task in hand, in conjunction with the 
Ameer, 1 venture to express a hope that every reader will do his 
utmost to support the authorities at home and in India in accom- 
plishing it. 

With regard to Earl Dufferin, little fear need be entertained that 
he will prove unequal to the situation. The case, however, is 
different with the Government at home. Mr, Gladstone's Cabinet 
is notoriously given to making concessions, and Russia, well aware 
of this, is resorting to every artifice to squeeze it. Against this evil 
tendency must be maintained a determined struggle, " No surren- 
der!" must be the motto of every Englishman as regards Penjdeh, 
and " Hands off!" in respect to Ak Robat, Rul-i-Kljisti, and other 
gates of the Eey of India. Whet her Russia shall win the great camp- 
ing-ground of Herat or be permanently excluded fiom it, depends 
largely upon j^ou. It you, as one of the public, do not manifest a 
fixed determination to keep Russia out of Herat and its gates, the 
Government will catch the spirit of your indifference, and Russia 
will succeed in realizing her demands. 

Let me make the appeal, therefore, that if you thoroughly ap- 
predate the importance of preserving Herat, you will nut simply 
content yourself witli silent acquiescence. The press and the plat- 
form are open to you to give publicit}^ to your support, and it you 
have means you can help in the dissemination of pamphlets to keep 
alive public feeling to the danger of the Russian advance. I have 
never rejected any one's co-operation in the sacred task of safeguard- 
ing India from the menace from the Korth, and gratefully place on 
record the encouragement which has been given to my efforts by the 
sympathy conveyed to me by my readers. Witti your help 1 may 
be able to do more than 1 am doing; without it 1 remain just as de- 
termined as ever not to allow Russia to have Herat while my tongue 
and my pen can prevent it, 

England has no aggressive aims in Central Asia; she has no de- 
sire to meddle with anybody beyond the Afghan border. Afghan- 
istan itself she strongly wishes should remain independent, and to 
render it so she has been paying the Ameer a subsidy of £120,000 a 
year to consolidate his authority. With that independence 1 am as 
little disposed to meddle as any member of the Manchester school 
43an be, but 1 hold that it can never be preserved by the simple proc- 



THE RUSSIANS AT THE GATES OF HERAT. 105 

ess ot tossing £10,000 a month across our Indian frontier, and ex- 
ercising no control over its expenditure. The Ameer, if a clever 
man in some respects, ia not everywhere in his dominions a popular 
sovereign, and only Englishmen who are ignorant of Afghan afiairs, 
or refuse to watch them, can deny that there is only one step be- 
tween his rule and anarch}^ If he were to die to-morrow we have no 
guarantee that a period of turbulence would not prevail at Cabul, 
and Russia has pretty plainly informed us that if we do not main- 
tain order throughout Afghanistan, she will not bind herself not to 
advance across the border to restore it. In other words, an out- 
break at Herat would be a sufficient excuse for the occupation of 
the Key of India. 

Again, if Englishmen are blind to the fact, Russia is not, that the 
tribal differences existing in Afghanistan render the countr}^ pecul- 
iarly well adapted for gradual disintegration. The notion of a united 
Afghanistan is fit only for the nurser^^ The Afghans are conquer- 
ors and foreigners in the whole of the country north of the Hin- 
doo Koosh, from Balkh to Herat. Their control ot Herat, as Rus- 
sia is constantly reminding us, is quite of recent origin, and even 
yet they have not succeeded in imposing their rule over all the 
clans dwelling between Herat and Cabul. If Russia retains her 
present position, she will be admirably placed for intriguing with 
the non- Afghan peoples, and detaching them one by one from the 
Ameer's rule. Tlie Jemshidis would be operated upon first, then 
the Uzbegs, afterward the Hazaraks and Aimaks, and so on, with 
very little trouble. Unless we screen these tribes by an Indian 
cordon, Russia will be able to eat her way into the heart of Afghan- 
istan. 

The rampart of the Sulieman range is as much a delusion as the 
Paropamisus hills. It used to be thought that a great mountain 
barrier ran parallel with the Indus, and that it was only pierced 
by three or four cracks— the Khyber, Bolan, and Gomui passes. 
That myth was exploded during the last war, a regular survey hav- 
ing disclosed the existence ot 289 passes, every one capable of being^ 
traversed by camels. In the Dera Ismail Khan district alone there 
are 92 passes; and in excess of the 289 alreadj'" mapped on the 
Indo-Aighan frontier, there are 75 more, leading from Beluchistan 
into India. To control all these passes in time o£ war, against an 
army located at Candahar, would be impossible. Among military 
men to-day there is no difference of opinion that we must go for- 
ward and take up a strong position to control the few roads debouch- 
ins: in the direction of this range. In other words, we must assume 
charge of the Key of India. 

England has to face this fact, and it is no use shirking it. If she 
does not pervade Afghanistan Russia will, and the weakest part ot 
the barrier being precisely that which is closest to Komaroff and 
Alikhanoff, there is obviously every facility for the slow sapping 
intrigue, at which Russia is such an adept." "We have already our- 
selves broken the isolation of Afghanistan by dispatching officers 
and troops to Herat, Let us develop that intercourse, and upon it 
base the erection of such a barrier along the Russo-Afghan frontier 
as will effectually secure Afghanistan from the corroding influence 
of Russia, and afford a means of consolidating our own. There 



106 THE EUSSIA;N^S at the gates of HERAT. 

need be no serious annexations, no no ed ding with the susceptibil- 
ities or power ot Ameer or Afghan. Once such a defense is organ- 
ized, in the Ameer's name, for the Key of India, we can rapidly put in 
order India itself. But, it must be clearly understood, Ihis can be 
done only by ousting Russia from the gates ot Herat she has seized, 
and by peremptorily rejecting her demands for the remainder. Other- 
wise a wedge will have been successfully driven in from Merv and 
Sarakhs to the great camping-ground of Herat, and it will require 
an enormous expenditure to defend the broken frontier from such 
treacherous coups de main as the recent seizure of Merv and the 
clash to the bulwarks of the Key of India. 



THE END, 



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69 Madolin's Lover, By the author 

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author of " Dora Thorne "... 20 

74 Aurora Floyd, By Miss M. E. 

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author of " Dora Thorne "... 20 
77 A Tale of Two Cities. By Chas, 

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79 Wedded and Parted. By the 

author of " Dora Thorne "... 10 

80 June, By Mrs. Forrester. . ... 20 

81 A Daughter of Heth. By Wm. 

Black 20 

82 Sealed Lips. By Fortun6 Du 

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83 A Strange Story. By Sir E. Bui- 

wer Lytton 20 

84 Hard Times. By Charles Dick- 

ens 10 

85 A Sea Queen. By W. Clark 

Russell 20 

86 Belinda, By Rhoda Broughton 20 

87 Dick Sand; or, A Captain at 

Fifteen. By Jules Verne 20 

88 The Privateersman. By Cap- 

tain Marryat 20 

89 The Red Eric, By R. M. Ballan- 

tyne , 10 

90 Ernest Maltravers. By Sir E. 

Bulwer Lytton 20 

91 Barnaby Rudge. By Charles 

Dickens., ,,. 20 

92 Lord Lynne's Choice. By the 

author of " Dora Thorne "... 10 

93 Anthony Trollope's Autobiogra- 

phy , ao 

94 Little Dorrit. By Charles Dick- 

ens. First half ..,..,... 20 

94 Little Dorrit. By Charles Dick- 

ees. Second half.. . . ,.20 

95 The Fire Brigade. By R. M. 

Eallantyne 10 

96 Erling the Bold. By R. M. Eal- 

lantyne 10 

97 All in a Garden Fair. By Walter 

Besant ,.,.., 20 

98 A Woman-Hater. By Charles 

Reade 15 

99 Barbara's History. By Amelia 

B.Edwards... ...20 

100 20,000 Leagues Under the Seas. 

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101 Second Thoughts. By Rhoda 

Broughton , 20 

102 The Moonstone. By Wilkie 

Collins ,. 15 

103 Rose Fleming. By Dora Ruasell 10 

104 The Coral Pin, By F. Du Bois- 

gobey , 30 

105 A Noble Wife. By John Saun- 

ders ..,.., 20 

106 Bleak House, By Charles Dick- 

ens. .. . -. 40 

107 Dombey and Son. By Charles 

Dickens 40 

108 The Cricket on the Hearth, and 

Doctor Marigold. By Charles 
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109 Little Loo. By W. Clark Rus- 

gg]l i.,.. ,.20 

110 Unaer'the Red' Flag. ' By Miss 

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117 A Tale of the Shore and Ocean. 

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119 Monica, and A Rose Distni'd. 

By " The Duchess " 10 

120 Tom Brown's School Days at 

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121 Maid of Athens. By Justin Mc- 

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122 lone Stewart. By Mrs. E. Lynn 

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128 Afternoon, and Other Sketches. 

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134 The Witching Hour. By " The 

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135 A Great Heiress. By R. E. Fran- 

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136 "That Last Rehearsal." By 

" The Duchess ". 10 

337 Uncle Jack. By Walter Besant 10 

138 Green Pastures and Piccadilly. 

By William Black 20 

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140 A Glorious Fortune. By Walter 

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143 One False, Both Fair. J. B. 

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144 Promises of Marriage. By 

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145 " Storm-Beaten :" God and The 

Man. By Robert Buchanan.. 20 

146 Love Finds the Way. By Walter 

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147 Rachel Ray. By Anthony Trol- 

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148 Thorns and Orange-Blossoms. 

By the author of " Dora 
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NO. PRIC&. 

149 The Captain's Daughter. From 

the Russian of Pushkin 10 

150 For Himself Alone. By T. W. 

Speight 10 

151 The Ducie Diamonds. By C. 

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152 The Uncommercial Traveler. 

By Charles Dickens 20 

153 The Golden Calf. By Miss M. E. 

Braddon :S0 

154 Annan Water. By Robert Bu- 

chanan 20 

155 Lady Muriel's Secret. By Jean 

Middlemas 20 

156 " For a Dream's Sake." By Mrs. 

Herbert Martin 20 

157 Milly's Hero. By F. W. Robin- 

son 20 

158 The Starling. By Norman Mac- 

leod,D.D 10 

159 A Moment of Madness, and 

Other Stories. By Florence 
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160 Her Gentle Deeds. By Sarah 

Tytler 10 

161 The Lady of Lyons. Founded 

on the Play of that title by. 
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162 Eugene Aram. By Sir E. Bul- 

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163 Winifred Power. By Joyce Dar- 

rell 20 

164 Leila ; or. The Siege of Grenada. 

By Sir E. Bulwer Lytton 10 

165 The History of Henry Esmond. 

By William MakepeacejTback- 
e ray 20 

166 Moonshine and Marguerites. By 

"The Duchess" 10 

167 Heart and Science. By Wilkie 

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168 No Thoroughfare. By Charles 

Dickens and Wilkie Collins... 10 

169 The Haunted Man. By Charles 

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170 A Great Treason. By Mary 

Hoppus 30 

171 Fortune's Wheel, and Other 

Stories. By " The Duchess " 10 

172 " Golden Girls." By Alan Muir 20 

173 The Foreigners. By Eleanor C. 

Price 20 

174 Under a Ban. By Mrs. Lodge.. itO 

175 Love's Random Shot, and Other 

Stories. Bv Wilkie Collins... iO 

176 An April Day. By Philippa P. 

Jephson 10 

177 Salem Chapel. By Mrs.Oliphant 20 

178 More Leaves from the Journal 

of a Life in the Highlands. By 
Queen Victoria 10 

179 Little Make-Believe. By B. L. 

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180 Round the Galley Fire. By W. 

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186 The Canon's Ward. By James 

Pa^n 

187 The Midnight Sun. ByFredrika 

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188 Idonea. \ By Anne Beale 

189 Valerie'sFate. Mrs. Alexander 
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191 Harry Lorrequer. By Charles 

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192 At the World's Mercy. Bv F. 

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197 For Her Dear Sake. By Mary 

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'209 John Holdsworth, Chief Mate. 

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210 Readiana: Comments on Cur- 
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216 Foul Play. By Charles Reade. 15 

217 The Man She Cared For. By 

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218 Agnes Sorel. By G. P. R. James 15 
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221 

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Which Loved Him Best? By 

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Clark Russell 15 

The Arundel Motto. Mary Cecil 

Hay 15 

The Giant's Robe. By F. Anstey 15 

Friendship. By " Ouida " 20 

Nancy. By Rhoda Broughton. 15 
Princess Napraxine. By " Oui- 
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Maid, Wife, or Widow? By 

. Mi's. Alexander 10 

Dorothy Forster. By Walter 

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Griffith Gaunt. Charles Reade 15 
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Signa. By " Ouida " 20 

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278 For Life and Love. By Alison. 10 

279 Little Goldie. Mrs. Sumner Haj^- 

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280 Omnia Vanitas. A Tale of So- 

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281 The Squire's Legacy. By Mary 

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882 Donal Grant. By George Mac- 

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883 The Sin of a Lifetime. By the 

Author of " Dora Thorne "... 10 
aU4 Doris. By " The Duchess ". . . 10 



20 



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10 



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286 



287 
288 
289 



290 
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The Gambler's Wife 20? 

Deldee ; or. The Iron Hand. Vy 
F. Warden 20- 

At War With Herself. By the 
author of " Dora Thorne". .. 10 

From Gloom to Sunlight. By 
the author of " Dora Tfcorne " 10 

John Bull's Neighbor in Her 
True Light. By a "Brutal 
Saxon " 10 

Nora's Love Test. By Mary Cecil 
Hay • 20 

Love's Warfare. By the author 
of " Dora Thorne " 10^ 

A Golden Heart. By the auttior 
of '-Dora Thorne" 10 

The Shadow of a Sin. By the 
authorof " Dora Thorne "... 10 

Hilda. By the author of " Dora 
Thorne'"' 10' 

A Woman's War. By the author 
of " Dora Thorne " 10 

A Rose in Thorns. By the au- 
thor of "Dora Thorne "...... 10 

Hilary's Folly. By the author 
of " Dora Thorne " 10 

Slitchelhurst Place. By Marga- 
ret Veley 10= 

The Fatal Lilies, and A Bride 
from the Sea. By the author 
of " Dora Thorne " 10' 

A. Gilded Sin, and A Bridge of 
Love. By the author of *' Dora 
Thome".... 10 

Dark Days. By Hugh Conway. 10 

The Biatchford Bequest. By 
Hugh Conway 10 

Ingledew House, and More Bit- 
ter than Death. By the author 
of " Dora Thorne ". 10 

In Cupid's Net. By the author 
of "Dora Thorne "..... 10 

A Dead Heart, and Ladj^ Gwen- 
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thor of "Dora Thorne" 10^ 

A Golden Dawn, and Love for a 
Day. By the author of " Dora 
Thorne" 10 

Two Kisses, and Like No Other 
Love. By the author of " Dora 
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Beyond Pardon 20" 

The Pathfinder. By J. Feni- 
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The Prairie. By J. Fenimore 
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Two Years Before the Mast. By 
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A Week in Killarney. By " The 
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The Lover's Creed. By Mrs. 
Cashel Hoey 15 

Peril. By Jessie Fothergill — 20 = 

The Mistletoe Bough. Edited 
by Miss M. E. Braddon 20 ■ 

Sworn to Silence ; or. Aline Rod- 
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820 A Bit of Human Nature. By 

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322 A Woman's Love-Story. 10 

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824 In Luck at Last. By Walter 

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825 The Portent. By George Mac- 

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826 Phantastes. A Faerie Romance 

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345 Madam. By Mrs. Oliphant.... 20 
846 Tumbledown Farm. By Alan 

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347 As Avon Flows. By Henry Scott 

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848 From Post to Finish. A Racing 

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381 The Red Cardinal. By Frances 

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383 Introduced to Society. By Ham- 

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385 The Headsman ; or, The Abbaye 

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Duchess " 10 

391 The Heart of Mid-Lothian, By 

Sir Walter Scott 20 

393 Peveril of the Peak. By Sir Wal- 
ter Scott 20 

393 The Pirate. By Sir Walter Scott 20 

394 The Bravo. By J. Fenimore 

Cooper 20 

395 The Archipelago on Fire. By 

Jules Verne 10 

396 Robert Ord's Atonement. By 

Rosa Nouchette Carey '. 20 

397 Lionel Lincoln ; or, The Leaguer 
' of Boston. By J. Fenimore 

Cooper 20 

398 Matt: A Tale of a Cai-avan. 

By Robert Buchanan 10 

399 Miss Brown. By Vernon Lee . . 20 

400 The Wept of Wish-Ton-Wish. 

By J. Fenimore Cooper 20 

401 Waverley. By Sir Walter Scott 20 

402 Lilliesleaf; or. Passages in the 

Life of Mrs. Margaret Mait- 
land of Sunnyside. By Mrs. 
Oliphant 20 

403 An English Squire. C. R. Cole- 

ridge 20 

404 In Durance Vile, and Other 

Stories. By " The Duchess " . 10 

405 My Friends and I. Edited by 

Julian Sturgis 10 

406 The Merchant's Clerk. By Sam- 

uel Warren 10 

407 Tylney Hall. By Thomas Hood 20 

408 Lester's Secret, By Mary Cecil 

Hay 20 

409 Rov's Wife. By G. J. Whyte- 

Melville 20 

410 Old Lady Mary, By Mrs. Oli- 

phant 10 



NO. 
411 



412 
413 

414 



415 
416 
417 



418 
419 



420 



421 



422 
423 

424 



425 
426 
427 



428 
429 



430 
431 
432 
433 



434 

435 

436 
437 



437 



PRICE. 

A Bitter Atonement. By Char- 
lotte M. Braeme, author of 
" Dora: Thorne " 20 

Some One Else. By B. M. Croker 20 

Afloat and Ashore. By J. Feni- 
more Cooper 20 

Miles Wallingford. (Sequel to 
" Afloat and Ashore.") By J. 
Fenimore Cooper 20 

The Ways of the Hour. By J. 
Fenimore Cooper. 20 

Jack Tier ; or. The Florida Reef. 
By J. Fenimore Cooper 20 

The Fair Maid of Perth ; or, St. 
Valentine's Day. BySirWal- 
terScott 20 

St. Ronan's Well. By Sir Wal- 
ter Scott 20 

The Chainbearer ; or, The Little- 
page Manuscripts. By J. 
Fenimore Cooper SO 

Satanstoe; oi% The Littlepage 
Manuscripts. By J. Fenimore 
Cooper 20 

The Redskins; or, Indian and 
Injin. Being the conclusion 
of The Littlepage Manu- 
scripts. J. Fenimore Cooper 20 

Precaution. J. Fenimore Cooper 20 

The Sea-Lions; or, The Lost 
Sealers. J. Fenimore Cooper 20 

Mercedes of Castile; or. The 
Voyage to Cathay. By J. 
Fenimore Cooper 20 

The Oak Openings; or. The Bee- 
Hunter. J. Fenimore Cooper. 20 

Venus's Hftves. By Ida Ash- 
worth T#lor 20 

The Remarkable History of Sir 
Thomas Upmore, Bait.. M.P., 
formerly known as " Tommy 
Upmore." R. D. Blackmore. 20 

Z^ro: A Story of Monte-Carlo. 
By Mrs, Campbell Praed 10 

Boulderstone; or. New Men and 
Old Populations. By Wiliam 
Sime 10 

A Bitter Reckoning. By the 
author of "By Crooked Paths" 10 

The Monikins. By J. Fenimore 
Cooper : 20 

The Witch's Head. By H. Rider 
Haggard 20 

My Sister Kate. By Charlotte 
M. Braeme, author of " Dora 
Thorne," and A Rainy June, 
By "Ouida" 10 

Wvllard's Weird, By Miss M. 
E. Braddon 20 

Klytia: A Story of Heidelberg 
Castle. By George Taylor.... 20 

Stella. By Fanny Lewald 20 

Life and Adventures of Martin 
Chuzzlewit. By Charles Dick- 
ens. First half 20 

Life and Adventures of Martin 
Chuzzlewit. By Charles Dick- 
ens. Second half .....20 



CO 



THE SEASIDE LIBRARY.-Pocket Edition. 



NO. PRICE. 

438 Found Out. Helen B. Mathers. 10 

440 Mrs. Lirriper's Lodgings. By 

Charles Dickens 10 

441 A Sea (Jhange. By Flora L. 

Shaw 20 

442 Rauthorpe. By George Henry 

Lewes 20 

445 The Shadow of a Crime. By 

HallCaine 20 

446 Dame Durden. By " Rita " . . . . 20 

447 American Notes. By Charles 

Dickens 20 

448 Pictures From Italy, and The 

Mudfog Papers, &c. By Chas. 
Dickens 30 



NO. PRICE, 

449 Peeress and Player. By Flor- 

ence Marryat 30 

450 GodfreyHelstone. ByGeorgiana 

M. Craik 20 

451 Market Harborough, and Inside 

the Bar. By G. J. Whyte- 
Melville .- 30 

452 In the West Countrie. By May 

Crommelin 20 

455 Lazarus in London. By F. W. 

Robinson 20 

457 The Russians at the Gates of 

Herat. By Charles Marvin. .. IG 



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The following works contained in The Seaside Library, Ordinary Editior 
are for sale by all newsdealers, or will be sent to any address, postage free, ot| 
■receipt of 12 cents for single numbers, and 25 cents for double numbers, by tk y 
f)ublisher. Parties ordering by mail will pleo.se order by numbers. 



MRS. ALEXANDER'S WORKS. 

30 Her Dearest Foe 20 

36 TheWooingO't 20 

46 The Heritage of Langdale .*...<... 20 

370 Ralph Wilton's Weird 10 

400 Which Shall it Be? 20 

532 Maid, Wife, or Widow 10 

1231 The Freres » 20 

1259 Valerie's Fate 10 

1391 Look Before You Leap , .- , . 20 

1502 The Australian Aunt _ 10 

1595 The Admiral's Ward 20 

1721 The Executor „ 20 

1934 Mrs. Yereker's Courier Maid ,... 10 

WILLIAM BLACK'S WORKS. 

13 A Princess of Thule... . .^ , .o. -,,.., 20 

58 A Daughter of Heth „.... 10 

47 In Silk Attire , 10 

48 The Strange Adventures of a Phaeton 10 

51 Kilmeny , . . . 10 



THE SEASIDE LIBB ART. —Ordinary EdfvUm, 

53 The Monarch of Mincing Lane 10 

79 Madcap Violet (small type) , 10 

604 Madcap Violet (large type) 20 

242 The Three Feathers 1(? 

390 The Marriage of Moira Fergus, and The Maid of Killeena. K? 

417 Macleod of Dare 20 

451 Lady Silverdale's Sweetheart ' 1(? 

568 Green Pastures and Piccadilly 1(? 

816 White Wings: A Yachting Romance Id 

826 Oliver Goldsmith 10 

'950 Sunrise: A Story of These Times. 30 

1025 The Pupil of Aurelius 10 

1032 That Beautiful Wretch 10 

1161 The Four MacNicols 10 

1264 Mr. Pisistratus Brown, M.P., in tlie Highlands IG 

1429 An Adventure in Thule. A Story for Young People 10 

1556 Shandon Bells 20 

1683 Yolande 20 

1893 Judith Shakespeare: Her Love Affairs and other Advent- 
ures 20 

MISS M. E. BRA^DDON'S WORKS. 

26 Aurora Floyd 20 

69 To the Bitter End 20 

89 The Lovels of Arden 20 

95 Dead Men's Shoes 20 

109 Eleanor's Victory 20 

114 Darrell Markham 10 

140 The Lady Lisle 10 

171 Hostages to Fortune „ 20 

190 Henry Dunbar 20 

215 Birds of Prey 20 

235 An Open Verdict 20 

251 Lady Audley's Secret 20 

254 The Octoroon 10 

260 Charlotte's Inheritance 20 

287 Leighton Grange .- 10 

295 Lost for Love 20 

322 Dead-Sea Fruit .2'^ 

459 The Doctor's Wife 20 

469 Rupert Godwin t 20 



THE SEASIDE LIBRABY.—Ordina/ry Edition. 

481 Vixen 20 

482 The Cloven Foot 20 

500 Joshua Haggard's Daughter 20 

519 Weavers and Weft 10 

525 Sir Jasper's Tenant 20 

539 A Strange World 20 

550 Fenton's Quest 20 

562 John Marchmont's Legacy 20 

572 The Lady's Mile 20 

579 Strangers and Pilgrims ^ 20 

581 Only a Woman (Edited by Miss M. E. Braddon) 20 

619 Taken at the Flood 20 

641 OnlyaClod 20 

649 Publicans and Sinners 20 

656 George Caulfield's Journey 10 

665 The Shadow in the Corner 10 

666 Bound to John Company; or, Robert Ainsleigh 20 

701 Barbara ; or, Splendid Misery 20 

705 Put to the Test (Edited by Miss M. E. Braddon) 20 

734 Diavola; or, Nobody's Daughter. Part 1 20 

734 Diavola; or, Nobody's Daughter. Part II 20 

811 Dudley Carleon 10 

828 The Fatal Marriage 10 

837 Just as I Am; or, A Living Lie 20 

942 Asphodel 20 

1154 The Mistletoe Bough 20 

1265 Mount Royal..... 20 

1469 Flower and Weed 10 

1553 The Golden Calf 20 

1638 A Hasty Marriage (Edited by Miss M. E. Braddon) 20 

1715 Phantom Fortune 20 

1736 Under the Red Flag 10 

1877 An Ishmaelite 20 

1915 The Mistletoe Bough. Christmas, 1884 (Edited by Miss 

M. E. Braddon) 20 

CHARLOTTE, EMILY, AND ANNE BRONTE'S WORKS. 

3 Jane Eyre (in small type) 10 

^6 Jane Eyre (in bold, handsome type) 20 

162 Shirley , 20 

311 The Professor. 10 



THE SEASIDE LIBBABY.— Ordinary Edition. 

329 Wuthering Heights ID 

438 Villette SO 

967 The Tenant of Wildfell Hall , 20 

1098 Agnes Grey 20 

LUCY RANDALL COMFORT'S WORKS. 

495 Claire's Love-Life 10 

552 Love at Saratoga » 20 

672 Eve, The Factory Girl ,. 20 

716 Black Bell , , 20 

854 Corisande. 20 

907 Three Sewing Girls. 20 

1019 His First Love 20 

1133 Nina; or, The Mystery of Love. 20 

1192 Yendetta; or, The Southern Heiress. 20 

1254 Wild and Wilful 20 

1533 Elfrida; or, A Young Girl's Love-Story 20 

1709 Love and Jealousy (illustrated) 20 

1810 Married for Money (illustrated). 20 

1829 Only Mattie Garland 20 

1830 Lottie and Victorine ; or. Working their Own Way 20 

1834 Jewel, the Heiress. A Girl's Love Story 20 

1861 Love at Long Branch; or, Inez Merivale's Fortunes 20 

WILKIE COLLINS' WORKS. 

10 The Woman in White 2G 

14 The Dead Secret , 20 

22 Man and Wife 20 

32 The Queen of Hearts 20 

38 Antoniua ....20 

42 Hide-and-Seek '. . . . 20 

76 TheNew Magdalen , 10 

94 The Law and The Lady o....... 20 

180 Armadale 20 

191 My Lady's Money. 10 

225 The Two Destinies .... 10 

250 No Name 20 

286 After Dark 10 

409 The Haunted Hotel , 10 

433 A Shocking Story 10 

487 A Rogue's Life ..,,...... 10 



THE SEASIDE LIBRARY.— Ordinary Ediiwn. 

551 The Yellow Mask 10 

583 Fallen Leaves 20 

€54 Poor Miss Finch 30 

€75 The Moonstone 20 

696 Jezebel's Daughter 20 

713 The Captain's Last Love 10 

721 Basil 20 

745 The Magic Spectacles 10 

905 Duel in Heme Wood = 10 

928 Who Killed Zebedee? 10 

971 The Frozen Deep 10 

990 The Black Robe 20 

1164 Your Money or Your Life 10 

1544 Heart and Science. A Story of the Present Time 20 

1770 Love's Random Shot ". 10 

1856 "I Say No" 20 

J. FENIMORE COOPER'S WORKS. 

222 Last of the Mohicans 20 

224 The Deerslayer 20 

226 The Pathfinder 20 

229 The Pioneers 20 

231 The Prairie 20 

233 The Pilot 20 

585 The Water- Witch 20 

590 The Two Admirals /. '.v . . . 20 

-615 The Red Rover 20 

761 Wing-and-Wing 20 

940 The Spy 20 

1066 The Wyandotte 20 

1257 Afloat and Ashore „ 20 

1262 Miles Wallingford (Sequel to "Afloat and Ashore") 20 

1569 The Headsman; or. The Abbaye des Yignerons 20 

1605 The Monikins 20 

1661 The Heidenmauer ; or, The Benedictines. A Legend of 

the Rhine 20 

1691 The Crater; or, Yulcan's Peak. A Tale of the Pacific 20 

CHARLES DICKENS' WORKS. 

20 The Old Curiosity Shop 20 

100 A Tale of Two Cities ,20 

103 Hard Times 10 



THE SEASIDE LlBBABT.—Ordina/ry EdUion. 

^^^^"^ 11 II — ^- ■! II. ■ III I. ■■nan . ■ ■ ' ■■ mm^mmmm 

118 Great Expectations 30 

187 David Copperfield ; 20 

200 Nicholas Nickleby 30 

213 Barnaby Rudge 20 

218 Dombey and Son. 20 

239 No Thoroughfare (Charles Dickens and Wilkie Collins) .... 10 

247 Martin Chuzzlewit. "20 

272 The Cricket on the Hearth 10 

284 Oliver Twist 20 

289 A Christmas Carol 10 

297 The Haunted Man 10 

304 Little Dorrit , 20 

308 The Chimes 10 

317 The Battle of Life 10 

325 Our Mutual Friend 20 

337 Bleak House 20 

353 Pickwick Papers 20 

359 Somebody's Luggage 10 

367 Mrs. Lirriper's Lodgings 10 

372 Lazy Tour of Two Idle Apprentices 10 

375 Mugby Junction 10 

403 Tom Tiddler's Ground 10 

498 The Uncommercial Traveler 30 

521 Master Humphrey's Clock 10 

625 Sketches by Boz 20 

639 Sketches of Young Couples 10 

837 The Mudfog Papers, &c 10 

860 The Mystery of Edwin Drood 20 

900 Pictures From Italy 10 

1411 A Child's History of England 20 

1464 The PicnicPapers 20 

1558 Three Detective Anecdotes, and Other Sketches 10 

WORKS BY THE AUTHOR OF "DORA THORNE." 

449 More Bitter than Death 10 

618 Madolin's Lover 30 

656 A Golden Dawn 10 

678 A Dead Heart 10 

718 Lord Lynne's Choice; or. True Love Never Runs Smooth. 10 

746 Which Loved Him Best 20 

846 Dora Thorne 20 

921 At War with Herself 1« 



THE SEASIDE LiBMAitr.'-mavrwry Emtm. 

■ ■ ^ — " Vm 

981 The Sin of a Lifetime ,, '^ 

i013 Lady Gwendoline's Dream „ „ ,.,.,...,., 10 

£018 Wife in Name Only ..„ = „.„„,... , .=.,,, o.. oc 2^ 

1044 LikeKo Other Love = ...„,, o. .. o» .c, . .......=. 1(» 

1060 A Woman's War , , o . . 0,0 . . . , . 10 

1072 Hilary's Folly ,..,.,,.,„ o =., c ....,,..,... 10 

1074 A Queen Amongst Womea o = . c ,., .... 00 ..„ = ,.. c c , , 10 

1077 A Glided Sin ,...o.,.„ ..,„.,. o ....... , IQ 

i081 A Bridge of Love.« = .. . , ...o .,,..0,. 10 

1085 The Fatal Lilies » o. . = .. ..o.., ....o. . ...o . ».o . ., .. 10 

1099 Wedded and Parted , o. .. o. ...... ...o o. ., 10 

1107 A Bride From the hea.... . .0, . .....o.. ..= 0. ...,o..... c . 10 

1110 ARose in Thorns « o. ...o ........ ...o,. .c 10 

1115 The Shadow of a Sin.. ,.c.... ...o.. coco,... o..,,.aco 10 

1122 Redeemed by Love c... = .o,.o ooo.c..., 10. 

1126 The Story of a Wedding-Riag. . . .. » , . . ». » . <,. o » c, . 10 

1127 Love's Warfare « o ..oo..„. ..., 20 

1132 Repented at Leisure ,. .0.0. .,..,».,,. o, „ 20 

1179 From Gloom to Sunlight.. , ,..o ». .<> .c.., = .. .,0. ,. . 30 

1209 Hilda ....,..<, .0.0 = ...c .......... 20 

1218 A Goldeu Heart » ... o =.«,..,,.,..,..,. . .20 

1266 Ingledew House o .... c = ... .,..., o ,» = 10 

1288 ABroken Wedding-King.. ...... .......... 0..0.,... .0..0 20 

1305 Love For a Day; or. Under the Lilacs. . ......,,....,,.... 10 

1357 Tne Wife's Secret o. 10 

1393 Two Kisses ,0.. ....,.., o. 10 

1460 Between Two Sins. , 10 

1640 The Cost of Her Love oc, .... .., 20 

1664 Romance of a Black Veil.. ............. o... ,0.......... 20 

1704 Her Mother's Sin.... , ............ c. ...... c= 20 

1761 Thorns and Orange Blossoms, .. ............... ,0 ...o = .. 20 

1844 Fair but False, and The Heiress of Arne . ...... ^ ... c ... ,. 10 

1883 Sunshine and Roses ...,.,,...00.,...- 20 

1906 In Cupid's Ket ,.«.,,... o. ,, 10 

ALEXANDER DUMAS' WORKS. 

144 The Twin Lieutenants. , . c. ,.=- , 10 

151 The Russian Gipsy = . . . c .... , , . 10 

155 The Count of Monte-Ciiato {Ifornplete in One Volums), ..... 20 

160 The Black Tulip = . ,_ 10 

167 The Queen's Necklace. ....... 20 



THE SEASIDE LIBBABY. — Ordinary Edition. 

172 The Chevalier de M-aison Rouge. , 30 

184 The Countess de Charny 20 

188 Nanon 10- 

193 Joseph Balsamo; or. Memoirs of a Physician 20 

194 The Conspirators , 10 

198 Isabel of Bavaria 10 

201 Catherine Blum 10 

223 Beau Tancrede; or, The Marriage Verdict (small type) 10 

997 Beau Tancrede; or. The Marriage Yerdict (large type) 20 

228 The Regent's Daughter ' ' 10 

244 The Three Guardsmen ^ 20 

268 The Forty-five Guardsmen 20 

276 The Page of the Duke of Savoy 10 

278 Six Years Later; or, Taking the Bastile 20 

283 Twenty Years After 20 

298 Captain Paul 10 

306 Three Strong Men 10 

318 Ingenue , 10 

331 Adventures of a Marquis. First half 20 

331 Adventures of a Marquis, Second half 20 

342 The Mohicans of Paris. Yol. I. (small type) , 10 

1565 The Mohicans of Paris. Yol. I. (large type) 20 

1565 The Mohicans of Paris. Yol. II. (large type) , 20 

1565 The Mohicans of Paris. Yol. III. (large type) 20 

1565 The Mohicans of Paris. Yol. lY. (large type) 20 

344 Ascanio 10 

608 The Watchmaker 20 

616 The Two Dianas 20 

622 Andree de Taverney 20 

664 Yicomte de Bragelonne (1st Series). 20 

664 Yicomte de Bragelonne (2d Series) 20 

664 Yicomte de Bragelonne (3d Series) 20 , 

664 Yicomte de Bragelonne (4th Series) 20 

688 Chicot, the Jester , 20 

849 Doctor Basilius 20 

1452 Salvator: Being the continuation and conclusion of " The 

Mohicans of Paris." Yol. I 20- 

1452 Salvator: Being the continuation and conclusion of "The 

Mohicans of Paris." Yol. II 20^ 

1452 Salvator: Being the continuation and conclusion of " The 

Mohicans of Paris." Yol. Ill 20 



THE SEASIDE LIBUABY.— Ordinary Edition. 

1452 Salvator: Being the continuation and conclusion of " The 

Mohicans of Paris." Vol. TV 30 

1452 Salvator: Being the continuation and conclusion of "The 

Mohicans of Paris." Yol. Y 20 

1561 The Corsican Brothers 10 

1592 Marguerite de Yalois. An Historical Romance 20 

F. DU BOISGOBEY'S WORKS. 

709 Old Age of Monsieur Lecoq. Part I 20 

709 Old Age of Monsieur Lecoq. Part II 20 

1062 The Severed Hand (La Main Coupee) 20 

1123 The Crime of the Opera House. First half 20 

1123 The Crime of the Opera House. Second half 20 

1142 The Golden Tress ...- 20 

1225 The Mystery of an Omnibus - 20 

1241 The Matapan Affair. First half 20 

1241 The Matapan Affair. Second half 20 

1307 The Robbery of the Orphans; or, Jean Tourniol's Inherit- 
ance .20 

1356 The Golden Pig (Le Cochon d'Or). Part 1 20 

1356 The Golden Pig. Part II 20 

1432 His Great Revenge. First half 20 

1432 His Great Revenge. Second half 20 

1465 The Privateersman's Legacy. First half 20 

1465 The Privateersman's Legacy. Second half 20 

1481 The Ferry-boat (Le Bac) 20 

1534 Satan's Coach (L'Equipage du Diable). First half 20 

1534 Satan's Coach (L'Equipage du Diable). Second half 20 

1550 The Ace of Hearts (L'As de Coeur). First half 20 

1550 The Ace of Hearts (L'As de Coeur). Second half 20 

1602 Marie-Rose; or, The Mystery. First half 20 

1602 Marie- Rose; or. The Mystery. Second half 20 

1717 Sealed Lips... ; 20 

1742 The Coral Pin 30 

1793 Chevalier Casse-Cou. First half 20 

1793 Chevalier Casse-Cou. Second half 20 

1799 The Steel Necklace 20 

1800 Bertha's Secret. First half 20 

1800 Bertha's Secret. Second half 20 

1841 Merindol 20 

1842 The Iron Mask. First half 20 



THE SEASIDE LIBB ART. —Ordinary Edition. 

1842 The Iron Mask. Second half 20 

1874 Piedouche, a French Detective 20 

1885 The Sculptor's Daughter. First half 20 

1885 The Sculptor's Daughter. Second half 20 

1886 Zenobie Capitaine. First half 20 

1886 Zenobie Capitaine, Second half 20 

1925 Babiole, the Pretty Milliner. First half 20 

EMILE GABORIAU'S WORKS. 

408 File No. 113 ^ 20 

465 Monsieur Lecoq. First half , 20 

465 Monsieur Lecoq. Second half 20 

476 The Slaves of Paris. First half 20 

476 The Slaves of Paris. Second half 20 

490 Marriage at a Venture 10 

494 The Mystery of Orcival 20 

501 Other People's Money 20 

509 Within an Inch of His Life .' 20 

515 The Widow Lerouge 20 

523 The Clique of Gold 20 

671 The Count's Secret. Part 1 20 

671 The Count's Secret. Part II 20 

704 Captain Contanceau ; or, The Volunteers of 1792 10 

741 The Downward Path; or, A House Built on Sand (La De- 

gringolade). Part 1 20 

741 The Downward Path; or, A House Built on Sand (La De- 

gringolade). Part II 20 

758 The Little Old Man of the Batignolles 10 

778 The Men of the Bureau 10 

789 Promises oi Marriage 10 

813 The 13th Hussars 10 

834 A Thousand Francs Reward 10 

899 Max's Marriage; or, The Vicomte's Choice 10 

1184 The Marquise de Brinvilliers 20 

MARY CECIL HAY'S WORKS. 

8 The Arundel Motto .^ 10 

407 The Arundel Motto (in large type) 20 

9 Old Mycldelton's Money 10 

427 Old Myddelton's Money (in large type) 20 

17 Hidden Perils 10 



THE SEASIDE LlBTtAltT.—V'im^^jory mmm^ 

434 Hidden Perils (in large type). , » . , ,o 2© 

23 The bquire's Legacy » . . . . 10 

516 The Squire's Legacy (in large type) 20 

27 Victor and Vanquished .^ , . . . = 20 

, 29 Kora's Love Test ...<, 10 

421 iHora's Love Test (in large type)., c . o . = = = 26 

275 A Shadow on the Threshold ... = o..c..c c...... Ife 

363 Reaping the Whirlwind ...o... .c«o 10 

384 Back to the Old Home = ...., 10 

415 A Dark Inheritance c ,..,.... <, 10 

440 The Sorrow of a Secret, and Lady Carmichaers Wiii. o . . ... 10 

686 BrendaYorke ooo.o, liJ 

724 For Her Dear Sake..... ,..,.. .c 20 

§52 Missing 10 

855 Dolf s Big Brother .......... \^ 

980 In the Holidays, and The Name Cut on a Gate , . , . , 10 

935 Under Life's Key, and Other Stories ^ 20 

972 Into the Shade, and Other Stories o = 20 

1011 My First Offer 10 

1014 Told in New England, and Other Tales. 10 

1016 At the Seaside; or, A Sister's Sacrifice. .................. 10 

1220 Dorothy's Venture , <. . c , . » = ,.. 20 

1221 Among the Ruins, and Other Stories. o. 10 

1431 " A Little Aversion " oo 10 

1549 Bid Me Discourse 10 

CHARLES LEVER'S WORKS. 

98 Harry Lorrequer ,.....,. 2^ 

132 Jack Hinton, the Guardsman. . . , . . . . o 20 

137 A Rent in a Cloud o ...... ,.o, 10 

146 Charles O'Malley, the Irish Dragoon (Triple Humfoer)..^., 30 
152 Arthur O'Leary , 20 

168 Con Cregan 20 

169 St. Patrick's Eve .,.., 10 

174 Kate O'Donoghue 20 

257 That Boy of Norcott's ,......=. 10 

296 Tom Burke of ** Ours." First half 20 

296 Tom Burke of " Ours. " Second half. . , . . , 20 

319 Davenport Dunn. First half. o .... = ... 20 

819 Davenport Dunn. Second half o . 20 

464 Gerald Fitzgerald SO 



THE SE ABIDE LIBRAE T.— Ordinary Edition, 

470 The Fortunes of Glencore , 20 

529 Lord Kilgobbin. , 20 

-546 Maurice Tiernay , , 20 

^66 A Day's Eide ..;.... , 20 

609 Barrington , 20 

633 Sir Jasper Carew, Kniglit ,,,..-■ , , . . 20 

657 Tlie Martins of Cro' Martin, Part I , . 20 

657 Tlie Martins of Cro' Martin. Part II , _ . . 20 

822 Tony Butler ,.....,. ,.._ 20 

872 Luttrell of Arran. Part I /. . , 20 

872 Luttrell of Arran. Part II 20 

551 Paul Gosslett's Confessions. , , „ 10 

S65 One of Them. First half. „ 20 

965 One of Them. Second half. ,..,.,., 20 

^89 Sir Brook Fossbrooke. Part 1 = .. = .. 20, 

"989 Sir Brook Fossbrooke. Part II ■ ,.,..,.,..„.,. 20 

1235 The Bramleighs of Bishop's Folly ,..,.,,. 20 

1309 The Dodd Family Abroad. First half ,,, ...... . 20 

1309 The Dodd Family Abroad. Second half ..,...._ 20 

1342 Horace Templeton.. 20 

1394 Roland Cashel. First half , 20 

1394 Roland Cashel. Second half ... 20 

1496 The Daltons; or. Three Roads in Life. First half 20 

1496 The Daltons; or. Three Roads in Life. Second half 20 

GEORGE MACDONALD'S WORKS. 

455 Paul Faber, Surgeon ,..,.... 20 

491 Sir Gibbie 20 

595 The Annals of a Quiet Neighborhood , 20 

606 The Seaboard Parish ,...». 20 

627 Thomas Wingfold, Curate ..;...=. 20 

643 The Vicar's. Daughter ,..,, 20 

668 David Elginbrod , . 20 

677 St. George and St. Michael , , . 20 

790 Alec Forbes of Howglen , . 20 

«87 Malcolm 20 

922 Mary Marston , . 20 

938 Guild Court. A London Story 20 

948 The Marquis of Lossie . , 20 

962 Robert Falconer 20 

4375 Castle Warlock : A Homely Romance 20 



THE 



New York Fashion Bazar. 

THE BEST AKEEIGAN HOUE MAGAZINE. 

Price 25 Cents per Copy. Subsci'iption Price $'/2.30 per Year. 



The New York Fashion Bazar is a magazine for ladies. It contains 
everything which a lady's magazine ought to contain. The fashions in dress 
which it publishes are new and reliable. Particular attention is devoted to 
fashions for children of all ages. Its plates and descriptions will assist every 
lady in the preparation of her wardrobe, both in making new dresses and re- 
modeling old ones. The fashions are derived from the best houses and are 
always practical as well as new and tasteful. 

Every lady reader of The New York Fashion Bazar can make her own 
dresses with the aid of Munro's Bazar Patterns. These are carefully cut to 
measure and pinned into the perfect semblance of the garment. They are use- 
ful in altering old as well as in making new clothing. 

The Bazar Embroidery Supplements form an important part of the magazine. 
Fancy work is carefully described and illustrated, and new patterns given in 
every number. 

All household matters are fully and interestingly treated. Home informa-. 
tion, decoration, personal gossip, correspondence, and recipes for cooking have 
each a department. 

Among its regular contributors are Mary Cecil Hay, " The Duchess," author 
of "Molly Bav.^n," Lucy Randall Comport, Charlotte M. Braeme, author of 
"Dora Thorne," Mrs. Alex. McVeigh Miller, Mary E. Bryan, author of 
"Maneh," and Florence A. Warden, author of "The House on the Marsh." 

The stoi-ies published in The New York Fashion Bazar are the best that 
can be had. 

We employ no canvassers to solicit subscriptions for The New York Fashion 
Bazar. All persons representing themselves as such are swindlers. 

The New York Fashion Bazar is for sale by all newsdealers, price 25 cents 
per copy. Subscription price $-2.50 per year. Address 

&EORGB MUNRO, PulDlisher, 

p. O. Box 3751. 17 to 37 Vanclewater Street, N. Y. 



THE CELEBRATED 

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For sale by Dnie:e:ists, or by mail $1. 



MuNRo's Publications. 



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LATEST ISSUES. 
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438 Found Out. By Helen B. Mathers.. . 10 

440 Mrs. Lirriper's Lodgings. B.y Charles 

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441 A Sea Change. By Flora L. Shaw. . . 20 

442 Ranthorpe. By George Henry Lewes 2( 

445 The Shadow of a Crime. By Hall 

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446 Dame Durden. By " Rita "... 20 

447 American Notes. By Charles Dickens 20 

449 Peeress and Player. By J'lorence 

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By Charles Marvin 10 



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